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ABSTRACT 
Debates about whether or not to engage in interventions to stabilize and rebuild states that have 
suffered extreme events, such as wars and large-scale natural disasters include questions about 
whether or not the intervening force can complete the mission.  Intervening is a complex task 
that faces considerable political and military obstacles, even when the intervention is welcome.  
The situation is only more complex and difficult when the force is not welcome.  This requires 
the reconstruction, and often construction, of governance capacity in the situation when all, or 
nearly all, capacity has been destroyed, but the situation is rapidly changing.  To be effective, the 
missions and the governance structures that those missions are trying to build must have not only 
the capacity to govern, but also the resilience to respond and adapt to that changing environment. 
This research examines the relationship between resilience, capacity, and a mission’s 
effectiveness.  Capacity is the total amount of resources available to the mission, including the 
funds, materiel, and personnel that each organization devotes to the effort of completing mission 
tasks.  Resilience is the mission’s ability to identify changes in the environment and adapt to 
them.  Effectiveness is the mission’s ability to meet its formally stated goals, as well implicitly 
understood goals.  Analyzing these relationships requires first answering these questions: 
 Who are the actors? 
 What are the system rules? 
 What are the patterns of interaction? 
 How do actors select actions? 
 How do actors select which actors with whom they will interact? 
 v 
 What are the patterns of variation in the data covered in the preceding questions? 
 
The data to answer all of these questions is gathered both from existing data sources, including 
situation and newspaper reports, and from interviews with the individuals involved in the 
decision making during two reconstruction efforts: the 1992-2002 UN intervention in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and the on-going UN intervention in Haiti, which began in 2004.  The research 
constructs models of these events using qualitative systems analysis, network analysis, statistical 
analysis, and simulation analysis to show that increasing resilience increases effectiveness, after 
controlling for capacity. 
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1.0  CONTINUED FAILURES OF NATION-BUILDING MISSIONS 
Debates about whether or not to engage in interventions, whether humanitarian, as in United 
Nations (UN) interventions that followed the ouster of then-Haitian President Jean Bertrand 
Aristide or the signing of the Dayton Accords that ended the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, or 
primarily military, as in the US invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, include prominent questions 
about whether or not the intervening force can complete the mission (Kaufmann, 1999).  The 
questions are valid; these are not simple missions.  Intervention is a complex, military task that 
faces considerable political and military obstacles, even when the intervention is welcome.  The 
situation is only more complex and difficult when the intervention is not welcome (Kaufmann, 
1999; Posen, 1999).  Then the laborious and more complex task of nation-building follows the 
intervention.  Nation building requires the reconstruction, and often construction, of governance 
capacity in the situation when all, or nearly all, of that capacity has been destroyed.  To date, 
reconstruction missions have not performed well, either.  These missions assemble and then 
wield enormous amounts of money and manpower.  They rarely achieve any lasting success.  
Aside from the well-publicized, on-going conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, more than 
ten years after the end of fighting in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and East Timor, each 
remains in the focus of the international security agenda (ICG, 2012).  Current policy is already 
elucidated by current research, indicating that the research lacks the necessary insights for 
effective policy in this arena. 
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1.1 NATION-BUILDING AS A RESPONSE TO INSTABILITY AND CONFLICT 
1.1.1 Nation-Building Basic Theory and Role 
Nation-building is not a new term, though it has taken on multiple definitions over time.  First 
emerging in the 1950’s, nation-building was closely aligned with development theories on 
modernization (Hippler, 2005c).  These theories sought ways to drive economic growth and 
development in parts of the world that remained poor and unindustrialized.  They sought to distill 
and condense the experiences of those countries considered “developed,”, meaning Western 
Europe, Canada, and the United States as a roadmap for growth and development elsewhere 
(Peet and Hartwick, 1999; Rostow, 1960).  This view saw nation-building as the political 
equivalent to modernization theory’s work on economic growth and development.  By the mid-
1970’s, modernization had fallen out of favor with development theorists (Peet and Hartwick, 
1999), and so too had this original formulation of nation-building theories and policies (Hippler, 
2005b). 
While modernization theory has never benefited from a rebirth, nation-building remerged 
in 1990’s, but with a different usage.  It now carried two meanings.  One provided scholars with 
a language to describe the genesis of modern nations and nation-states.  The ages-long process of 
building nations, such as the German nation, the French nation, or the American nation gained 
the label of nation-building (Hippler, 2005c).  At the same time, nation-building became the term 
that analysts and policy makers applied to the effort of building a national identity in a 
population (Hippler, 2005c).  The popular view of this kind of effort is of teleological theories 
and policies designed to draw together the disparate member groups of a society and build the 
capacity and legitimacy of a government in its own territory (Derichs, 2005; Pfaff-Czarnecka, 
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2005).  It was not always used this way.  In some areas, most notably in, but certainly not limited 
to, the Balkans, nationality definitions defined in-groups as much by who their out-groups were 
as by common culture, history, and language.  This produced ethnic and national conflicts as 
these groups vied for control of states and governments whose borders crisscrossed national 
divisions (Hayden, 2011; Pfaff-Czarnecka, 2005; Burg and Shoup, 1999). 
As part of the understanding of nation-building that developed during the 1990’s, three 
elements developed that denoted nation-building.  Under this definition, nation-building required 
1) an integrative ideology that allowed for constituent ethnic groups to view themselves as a 
single, coherent nation; 2) an integration of society that brings together the constituent ethnic 
groups into a single, coherent society and economy; and 3) a functional state apparatus, the 
construction of which is often referred to as “state-building” (Hippler, 2005c).  This sets out a 
clear, if expansive understanding of what nation-building requires for success.   
In this definition, analysts recognized a possibility for using nation-building as a strategy 
for preventing regional conflicts from occurring or recurring (Mason et al, 2011; van Edig, 
2005).  A growing propensity for internal conflicts after the end of the Cold War required a 
different approach to conflict response than had always been used in responding to intrastate 
conflicts (Helman and Ratner, 1992).  Helman and Ratner refer to this as “state-saving,” calling 
for the United Nations to step into failed and failing states and conduct “nation-building” to 
stabilize that state’s government.  Heinrich and Kulessa rightly point out that “Heldman [sic] and 
Ratner speak of ‘nation-saving’, whereas what they really mean is ‘state-saving’ (2005, 57).  
This clarified any agenda of nation-building to support stability as being truly about the third 
element of nation-building, state-building.  With the capacity to police its own a territory, a 
government could prevent instability from developing and spilling either into internal conflict or 
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across its borders into another state.  If this had already occurred, then nation-building could still 
be applied to prevent instability or conflict from recurring. 
1.1.2 Nation-Building Policy Research Patterns and Shortcomings 
With the potential of nation-building, or, more accurately, state-building as a means for 
establishing stability within and between states identified, scholars and policy makers began to 
seek policies that produce nation-building on a timeline that could prevent conflict.  Like any 
work of construction, two questions must be answered:  “What do we need to build?” and, “How 
do we build it?”  For nation-building, in a post-Cold War world, this meant establishing stable 
democracies, which, in turn, meant understanding what institutions made up a democracy and 
how to directly construct or induce the construction of those institutions (Pateman, 1996).  Only 
with answers for these questions could policy makers take advantage of the perceived benefits of 
nation-building for political and social stability. 
1.1.2.1 Theoretical Research Patterns 
The first of these questions co-opts the already voluminous research on democracy and 
democratization.  Questions and conclusions that are as old as the writings of Locke (1690), 
Rousseau (1762), and de Tocqueville (1840) become relevant as they presented fundamental 
building blocks of democracy.  Democracy theorists build from these texts to understand the 
place and role of civil society in functioning democracies (Putnam, 2000; Chambers and 
Kopstein, 2001; Barber, 1998; Cohen and Arato, 1992). Others examine economic freedom 
(Bowles and Gintis, 1986), participatory democracy (Pateman, 1970), and deliberative 
democracy (Benhabib, 1996; Gutmann and Thompson, 1996), as the key institutions of a 
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functioning democracy.  This body of literature examines advanced democracies and what 
structures and institutions operated internally, and so provided guidance on what must be built. 
At the same time that many political scientists delved into the constituent elements of 
functioning democracy, others tried to understand and chart how democracies developed.  Like 
modernization theory in economic development before it, and some based heavily in 
modernization theory (Lipset, 1953), democratization researchers often seek stages of 
development that compared historical paths with the development of the institutions that the 
democracy theorists had identified as key institutions (Markoff, 1996; Rueschemeyer, Stephens, 
and Stephens, 1992; Rustow, 1970).  This body of literature became voluminous as well as each 
successive researcher critiqued the stages that previous researchers presented.  This culminated 
in the work of Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens (1992) that presents a separate and 
individual path of democratization for each country.  The stages that each researcher presents 
wash up against the complexity of the definition of democracy and the historical and political 
processes that brought about democracy.  This complexity prevents conclusions from emerging 
from case studies research methods as the cases are too idiosyncratic to support broad 
conclusions about how democracy can or cannot be built. 
On top of the co-opted theoretical research on democracy and democratization, policy 
researchers sought the best way to state-build in the shortened timeline necessary to ameliorate 
conflicts than the sometimes centuries-long timelines of democratization theory.  One of these 
lines of research asks the basic question of how nation-building can be done by an external 
power to the country that serves as venue to the nation-building (Hopp and Kloke-Lesch, 2005; 
Dobbins et al, 2003).  Another line of research examined the transitional justice to see how legal 
systems could be organized, and developed, and what legal tools could be applied to support the 
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development of rule of law and stabilize war-torn societies (Matheson, 2001; Stahn, 2001; 
Strohmeyer, 2001; Christie, 2000).  Another questioned the usefulness of military and political 
interventions, including the efficacy of the military forces, in effecting the changes and building 
the institutions that a democracy needs to survive (Grigoryan, 2010; Hippler, 2005a, 2005b; 
Schäfer, 2005).  Yet still other lines examine the role of international organizations (Lemay-
Hebert, 2011; Shannon et al, 2010; Reljic, 2005; Dobbins et al, 2004) non-governmental 
organizations in nation-building (Schade, 2005), oil wealth (Obi, 2005), foreign aid effectiveness 
(Winters, 2010), and how to address self-determination and multiethnic societies during nation-
building (Reljic, 2005).  To be explored in more detail in Chapter 2, these lines of research 
suffered from the same defect as the theories on democratization.  First, the research has 
struggled to maintain a common definition of nation-building.  Sometimes it seeks to understand 
nation-building, but more often it uses the language of nation-building to investigate state-
building.  Second, each focuses on the role and structure of one institution or another, testing 
how to build their focal institution, and in what order the institutions could or should be built.  
The only consistent conclusions they could reach was that each case was too unique to support 
conclusions across cases.  This leaves policy makers without any clear answers on how to 
conduct an effective nation- or state-building mission. 
1.1.2.2 Research Methods Patterns 
In trying to reach conclusions, some of the studies listed above use statistical approaches 
(Grigoryan, 2010), the rest use case study analysis, whether they select a broad base of cases, a 
small selection of cases, or a single case.  For case study analysis to provide external validity, it 
requires cases to be substantially similar on all but a small number of variables (George and 
Bennett, 2004; King, Keohane, and Verba, 1994).  In single cases, this requires policy makers to 
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compare current cases back to past cases to see if the salient details of the single case apply to 
the current case, while the researcher must select cases based on patterns of variance in the 
variables in multi-case studies.  As a result, even the most ambitious of projects can reach only 
general conclusions.  Dobbins et al (2004) reach the largest set of conclusions when comparing a 
vast array of both United Nations- and United States-led nation-building missions.  Focusing on 
conflict interventions, where United Nations Security Council resolutions give the intervention 
latitude and international legitimacy in operating to support future stability, their list is as 
follows: 
 
Deficiencies included: 
 the slow arrival of military units 
 the even slower deployment of police and civil 
administrators 
 the uneven quality of military components 
 the even greater unevenness of police and civil 
administrators 
 the United Nations’ dependence on voluntary funding to 
pay for such mission-essential functions as reintegration of 
combatants and capacity building in local administrations 
 the frequent mismatch between ambitious mandates and 
modest means 
 the premature withdrawal of missions, often following 
immediately after the successful conclusion of a first 
democratic election.  (Dobbins, 2004, xvii-xviii) 
 
These same conclusions would become a refrain for a great deal of post-conflict nation-building 
assessments.  Each time, with the lessons of the previous missions already known, a new mission 
would try again and make the same fundamental mistakes, just in a different way (Dobbins et al, 
2004; Dobbins et al, 2003; Dempsey and Fontaine, 2001).  Even the most meticulously planned 
of interventions and nation-building missions, East Timor, which the World Bank foresaw and 
began to plan for well in advance of the start of the mission (Rohland and Cliffe, 2002), faced the 
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same critiques.  Dobbins et al (2004) went on to rate the UN’s mission in East Timor as 
successful, but by ten years after the initial intervention, East Timor was fraying again (ICG, 
2012).  These conclusions had been enough to determine the key tasks of post-conflict nation-
building, but not how to complete these tasks on the ground. 
1.1.2.3 Policy Prescription Patterns 
Finding the policies for effective stabilization and reconstruction continues to be the 
central question of the research agenda of post-conflict research.  Some of these studies apply 
statistics (Shannon et al, 2010) or even game theory (Grigoryan, 2010), while most conduct case 
studies.  Regardless, the formulation of this research has been to take a policy approach that has 
been tried in a post-conflict setting and test its method or extent of application against either the 
overall success of the mission or against the success of the mission in the field that that policy 
affects, such as rule of law, social cohesion, or governance. 
Prominent in this literature is the focus on transitional justice.  Uniformly recognized as 
an essential task, transitional justice seeks two aims.  First, it looks to try to bring healing to the 
immediate conflict aftermath.  The tool for this task is the truth and reconciliation commission, 
some of which utilize prosecutorial arms while others do not (Stahn, 2001; Strohmeyer, 2001; 
Christie, 2000).  The authors in these cases examine how different missions handled 
reconstructing local courts or, for Christie (2000), how the South Africans established their own 
truth commission.  They propose reasons why commissions worked in their separate contexts, 
but are only able to provide suggestions for what aspects of the society a future mission must 
consider when attempting to establish a commission.  In an unpublished work, presented at a 
conference of the International Studies Association, Scheinert (2009a) provides statistical 
evidence of how truth commissions have helped in preventing wars from recurring when the 
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original conflict saw extensive civilian casualties.  While this study has better external validity 
than others on the use of truth commissions with its use of statistics rather than a 1-N case study, 
it looks only at the cases of actual commissions and does not address the decision processes that 
led to the use of the commissions.  It also produced complicated results that do not speak to any 
goal of stabilization or reconstruction beyond ensuring that the initial conflict does not recur.  
These studies provide evidence that truth and reconciliation commissions can be an effective tool 
in transitional justice, but still only address one aspect of one issue in the long and complex list 
issues involved in post-conflict reconstruction. 
Transitional justice research is not the only nation-building research to face these limits.  
Other researchers are attempting to understand post-conflict political and security development 
or economic development.  Grigoryan (2010) applies a game theoretic model that shows why 
violence towards minority groups might increase under the threat of external intervention.  
Shannon et al (2010) show that external intervention is statistically likely to shorten conflicts.  
Mason et al (2011) apply a hazard model to show that the outcome of the previous conflict does 
not influence its recurrence, but rather the degree to which the settlement perpetuated a condition 
of multiple sovereignty.  Lemay-Hebert (2011) review the failures of the UN approach to state-
building in Kosovo and East Timor, examining how well UN policies applied the principles of 
cultural sensitivity and local participation, and finding that the international administrations did 
not support them well.  Winters (2010) argues strenuously for accountability in the flow of 
foreign aid.  Each of these studies focuses on one policy issue, even as some compare multiple 
missions with either case studies or statistical analysis.  This creates research with limited policy 
application, as it is only able to assess whether a specific policy worked in a specific case or why 
a certain principle was or was not faithfully followed.  More importantly, none of these studies 
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looks at one of the hallmarks of a complex system, how policy choices and progress impacts 
other policy areas, that is to say, the impacts across issues in non-linear systems. 
Seybolt has shown some evidence of leading research on interventions towards a 
complexity approach, but has yet to reach the lessons already learned in other fields about 
analyzing complexity.  Seybolt (2007) embeds his search for a measure of success with questions 
such as how much force should the interveners use, based on a typology of four types of 
intervention.  This is an attempt at addressing the complexity of intervention, but still limits the 
amount of complexity it can address by forcing case studies into a limited number of categories.  
In another study, Seybolt (2009) even uses the language of complex systems, applying what he 
calls “system network theory” to design a system dynamics model of aid flows, identifying the 
same weaknesses in the current literature that are discussed here.  He recognizes the existence of 
a network of non-governmental organizations all attempting to provide aid, citing a network’s 
propensity for adaptation, but fails to examine the formation of the network or how and why the 
adaptation has its impact, merely taking its presence as an a priori characteristic of a network 
with certain impacts.  In effect, Seybolt examines the aid system without examining the aid 
actors.  This leaves out a key piece of a full complex systems analysis, as will be presented in 
Section 2.2.2.  The result is that, while he uses the language of complex systems, Seybolt does 
not perform an analysis that applies the precepts and methods of complex systems.  Drawing 
instead from business management, Seybolt misses the lessons that disaster preparedness and 
response have already learned in applying complex systems to a situation that is far more 
comparable to post-conflict reconstruction. 
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1.1.3 Towards a New Understanding and New Approach 
The continued failure of existing research to generate the conclusions necessary to find the 
policies that will turn around the track record of nation-building missions suggests that a new 
approach is required to find effective policies and practices.  In practice, nation-building 
missions more closely resemble political intervention that seeks to provide aid to war-torn 
populations and support post-conflict reconstruction of physical infrastructure, governments, and 
societal institutions.  The missions are not the only international interventions to attempt this 
task, though they are the only ones to do so in a post-conflict context.  International extreme 
events, though, are not limited to just conflicts.  Included in that same category are large-scale 
natural disasters.  This includes examples such as the January 12
th
, 2010 Haitian Earthquake, 
recent tsunamis that struck Indonesia in 2009 and 2004, and the 2011 Japan Black Swan Event 
that brought an earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear accident.  The need to prepare for, and respond 
to, these events has generated its own voluminous literature that contains lessons for the 
organizations responding to conflicts and conflict aftermaths. 
At the same time that the international community was preparing to intervene in East 
Timor, a new method for responding to natural disasters was emerging in the respective literature 
(Homer-Dixon, 2006; Comfort, 1999; Perrow, 1999; Hutchins, 1995; Wildavsky, 1988).  These 
researchers focused not on what kinds of response teams would be necessary or what kinds of 
equipment would be necessary, requirements that are analogous to those which Dobbins et al 
(2004) focus on for nation-building.  Instead, they focus on the response process, on how 
preparedness and response identify and disseminate information that responders need in the field 
(Comfort, 1999; Hutchins, 1995).  This conclusion is based on two key insights into the nature of 
disasters and disaster response.  The first insight is that it is not safety procedures that produce 
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safety, but risk taking and the lessons for resilience in the face of danger that produced greater 
safety.  By risking dangers, experiencing them, and learning how to adapt in response to them, 
society could improve overall safety (Wildavsky, 1988).  The second insight was that disaster 
response efforts are made of networks of organizations and individuals all acting separately, but 
coordinating with each other to ameliorate the impacts of the disaster and prepare for future 
disasters (Comfort, 1999).  This represented a fundamental change in the conception of disaster 
response.  No longer were these responses top-down, centrally-organized efforts of responders.  
Instead, a response could, and, under the network conception would, inherently, take advantage 
of such network benefits as self-organization and adaptation (Barabasi, 2002; Johnson, 2001; 
Axelrod and Cohen, 2000; Holland, 1995, 1992).  The key to response was finding how to build 
a resilient network that could manage that adaptation (Comfort et al, 2010a).  The second insight 
also means that many organizations would be spread over the geographic expanse of the 
response, each knowing and learning different types of information about the progress of both 
the disaster and the response (Hutchins, 1995).  Managing adaptation in that network would 
mean integrating all of that information so that any one organization could respond effectively 
(Comfort et al, 2010a). 
The insights of disaster response are only relevant if post-conflict reconstruction missions 
are sufficiently similar to disaster response to justify comparison.  Following her tenure as 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, a tenure which saw the First Gulf War, 
massacres in Rwanda, the break-up of Yugoslavia and its attendant wars, the ouster of Aristide 
and the Haitian boat people, the break-up of the Soviet Union, and Taliban’s takeover of 
Afghanistan, Sadako Ogata published a memoir (2005) that describes her experience in 
confronting these crises.  In it, she describes rapidly changing and emergent situations with new 
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challenges emerging constantly.  Each situation she describes contains unique problems that are 
products of the history, politics, and current events of the locations.  This matches the kind of 
situations that disaster preparedness and response scholarship faces.  Further, Ogata (2005) 
describes situations where social structures and institutions as well as physical construction have 
been heavily damaged, if not outright destroyed.  Disasters, even without the explicit impacts of 
the conscious involvement of governments, armies, or any kind of irregular military force, do 
this same damage.  In so doing, governments and militaries generate opportunities for change, 
reorganization, and redevelopment to stabilize the future situation and generate greater future 
growth and development (Homer-Dixon, 2006).  Post-conflict reconstruction, then, represents 
the same opportunity that nation-building scholars have noted (Mason et al, 2011; van Edig, 
2005).  These similarities provide sufficient evidence to justify reimagining the approach to post-
conflict state-building and reconstruction that utilizes the methods which disaster response and 
preparedness research is using to seek new policy options and solutions. 
This study tests the application of inferences from the disaster and preparedness and 
response literature about the role of communication and coordination in post-conflict situations.  
It first defines the concepts of resilience, capacity, and effectiveness, used in the disaster 
preparedness and response literature, in ways tailored to post-conflict stabilization and 
reconstruction missions.  Using these definitions, the study measures communication and 
coordination networks in two empirical cases to build a conceptual model of stabilization and 
reconstruction that illustrates the roles that communication and coordination play in the systems 
that form within stabilization and reconstruction missions.  The conceptual model and 
measurements of resilience, capacity, and effectiveness then support computational models that 
measure the relationships between resilience, capacity, and effectiveness in a generalized, but 
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empirically-based, model of post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction that provides final 
lessons and the role and impact of resilience, capacity, and effectiveness in post-conflict 
stabilization and reconstruction missions.  This model shows how communication and 
coordination can improve the effectiveness of these missions, regardless of the individual context 
of each mission, thereby providing policy guidance that escapes the traps of path dependency 
and idiosyncrasy that have so far stymied the post-conflict state-building literature. 
1.2 DEFINING RESILIENCE, CAPACITY, AND EFFEECTIVENESS 
Current research into disaster response and preparedness includes a strong focus on the 
importance of capacity, both of the response operations  mobilized by  the government of the 
region struck by the disaster, and resilience for effectively managing any response (Comfort, 
Boin, and Demchak, 2010; Comfort, 2005).  Since post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction 
missions can be compared to post-disaster relief efforts, the implication is that sufficient 
resilience and capacity is required in the network of organizations that develops among the 
organizations overseeing and participating in the post-conflict mission for the mission to be 
effective.  To test this hypothesis requires a definition of each of the key conceptual variables for 
this study:  resilience, capacity, and effectiveness.  None of these terms represents a simple 
concept, requiring careful definition, and, in Chapter 3, operationalization. 
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1.2.1 Resilience 
When post-extreme event relief and reconstructions missions begin, whether after natural 
disasters or armed conflicts, a varying number of public, private, and non-profit organizations 
rush into the area to begin delivery of various services which the local population needs.  A 
network forms among these organizations when they attempt to coordinate their efforts.  The 
network passes knowledge, information, materiel, and personnel between the organizations to 
support the response effort.  A response emerges from the aggregate of the individual 
interactions between the organizations as they attempt to further their relief efforts (Comfort, Oh 
et al, 2010; Ostrom, 2005; Axelrod and Cohen, 2000; Holland, 1995; Prigogine and Stengers, 
1984).  For this network to be effective, it must continue to provide these needs to those 
operating in the network and those relying on its services (Provan and Milward, 2001, 422).  In a 
static situation, this kind of analysis can be used iteratively to bring a network into a closer match 
to the situation, with the network administrative organization that Provan and Milward claim a 
network requires (2001, 418) directing the change through adjusting funding and organization.  
In a rapidly changing situation, this framework fails since it would attempt to hit a moving target, 
as the needs of network members and clients and the best way to meet those needs continuously 
change.  Networks are also known for this ability to self-organize (Watts, 2003; Arquilla and 
Ronfeldt, 2001; Johnson, 2001; Axelrod and Cohen, 2000; Kauffman, 1993; Prigogine and 
Stengers, 1984).
1
  Requiring a network administrative organization jettisons this strength.  
Instead of asking whether a network meets the needs of those operating it and those relying on its 
services, questions about network effectiveness should focus on how networks can utilize self-
                                                 
1
 See Chapter 2 Section 2.2, “Complexity” for a fuller discussion of this characteristic of networks. 
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organization among their component actors to identify changing needs and then adapt to meet 
those needs. 
How the actors in a network identify, acquire, and utilize information about changing 
needs determines the network’s resilience.  A resilient system or organization is one that can 
maintain operation after being stressed in some way (de Bruijne et al, 2010).  For military 
planning, resilience means redundancy in materiel and personnel.  When a unit or its materiel is 
destroyed in battle, the army can continue operations by deploying troops and materiel to replace 
those destroyed.  Even in the context of the computer networks that maintain Wall Street’s 
operations, resilience comes from having extra materiel which the network can rely upon when 
the primary materiel is destroyed (Homer-Dixon, 2006).  For a network of organizations, this 
means that the organizations involved find a way to continue operating through stresses.  In the 
context of armed struggle between networks, Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001) argue that this 
requires correctly operating on five key levels, “the technological, social, narrative, 
organizational, and doctrinal levels” (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 2001, x).  Their explanations of this 
definition suggest they approach getting these levels correct as part of preplanning.  If it is not 
planned correctly, then the network will not achieve its goals.  In contrast, a resilient network 
will treat errors in planning as a stressor to be overcome and will identify errors and adapt when 
it is operating incorrectly on any of those levels.  Arquilla and Ronfeldt’s theory does not 
account for adaptation to environmental changes in practice in the planned operation for each 
level during the mission, making it a static system. 
Understanding resilience in a changing situation requires moving beyond Arquilla and 
Ronfeldt’s static approach.  New research is finding ways to approach resilience in this way.  For 
Comfort et al (2010), resilience is found in how organizations detect, recognize, and 
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communicate information about the risk of natural disasters.  For Demchak (2010), resilience is 
found in maximizing information to minimize operational surprise, which comes from a lack of 
knowledge.  Instead of focusing on preplanning or on prepositioning materiel, these approaches 
focus on how organizations acquire and utilize information.  To be resilient, an organization 
must have access to the information generated in a system and use that information to adapt to 
changes in the system.  This requires the organization to interact with as many other 
organizations as possible, thereby learning what the other organizations know.  It also requires 
that organizations process that information and then adapt appropriately. 
1.2.2 Capacity 
Even resilient organizations and networks can be overwhelmed if they can identify key changes 
but lack the capacity to respond.  While presenting the impacts of the heterogeneity of a disaster 
response system, Comfort (2005) drew parallels between the size of an organization and its 
capacity.  For Comfort, capacity comes from the amount of resources, local knowledge, and 
personnel that an organization can devote to its disaster response tasks.  For post-extreme event 
reconstruction, this same principle would apply; capacity is the amount of resources, local 
knowledge, and personnel that an organization can apply to its reconstruction tasks. 
1.2.3 Effectiveness 
At its most simple, an effective response to any extreme event is one that meets the goals set out 
in its original mandate.  The clearest measure of mission effectiveness is the degree to which the 
mission achieves the aims set out in its mandate (Cohen, 2006).  In Haiti, this document is UNSC 
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Res. 1542 (2004).  A response to the internal armed conflict that drove then-Haitian President 
Jean Bertrand Aristide into exile, the resolution established the United Nations Stabilization 
Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), with a mandate to stabilize Haiti, support the duly constituted 
political process, and support efforts at improving the human rights conditions in Haiti, 
particularly for women and children (UNSC Res. 1542, 2004, 2 – 3).  For Bosnia, there are two 
resolutions that defined the initial goals.  The first, UNSC Res. 743 (1992) established the United 
Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) with a mission of protecting civilian “pink zones” 
(UNSC Res. 743, 1992; “Former Yugolavia – UNPROFOR, 1996).  Subsequently, UNSC Res. 
1035 (1995) established changed UNPROFOR into the United Nations Mission in Bosnia-
Herzegovina (UNMIBH)
2
, with a mission to monitor, advise, inspect, and train law enforcement 
officials in Bosnia, advise local governance on policing and aid NATO’s Implementation Force 
(IFOR).
3
  UNMIBH also had responsibilities beyond policing, to coordinate other UN activities 
regarding demining, elections, humanitarian relief, human rights, and economic and 
infrastructure rehabilitation (UNSC Res. 1035, 1995, 1; “Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 2003).  For 
defining and measuring effectiveness, this study works from the basic premise that missions are 
effective to the degree to which that they achieved their stated goals.  For Haiti, this means 
measuring how well the mission has met its goals of stabilizing the Haitian political situation and 
improving human rights conditions.  For Bosnia, this means measuring effectiveness by how 
well the mission has met its goals of training law enforcement, rebuilding infrastructure, 
providing for elections, human rights, and humanitarian relief. 
                                                 
2
 Initially, the force was formally referred to as the International Police Task Force (IPFT).  A Special 
Representative of the Secretary – General would direct UNMIBH and have authority over the IPTF Police 
Commissioner (“Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 2003). 
3
 IFOR would later be replaced with the multinational Stabilization Force (SFOR), also directed by NATO.  
UNMIBH tasks in assisting IFOR would transfer to SFOR with the changeover (“Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 2003). 
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There is more to the success of these missions than whether they achieve whatever goals 
the mission states at the outset.  Researchers have long noted the tendency for mission creep in 
all sorts of international missions, whether military interventions or IMF and World Bank bailout 
efforts, among others (Einhorn, 2001).  Reconstruction and nation-building are also prone to 
mission creep (Hippler, 2005; Dobbins et al, 2004; Dobbins et al, 2003).  Nation-building is 
unique in its mission creep in that it drifts toward building more governance and, often, a more 
robust democracy.  That is, nation-building efforts, once started, tend to drift towards more 
extensive and expansive versions of the same primary goal, to establish stable governance with 
sufficient strength and capacity to govern the whole of the area in question, whether a whole 
state, an autonomous region, or a set of autonomous regions within the recognized borders of a 
single state.  Since assessments of how well the mission has achieved this goal will require 
subjective assessments, measurements will rely on expert opinions of how well the mission has 
performed and how effectively the system has developed the kind of governing institutions it has 
attempted to build.  These judgments will not likely provide any kind of numeric measure of 
success, but rather will provide a qualitative assessment of effectiveness that varies between 
undermining mission effectiveness and completing mission goals, at the two extremes. 
1.3 RESEARCH FRAMEWORKS: THE STRUCTURE OF ORGANIZATIONAL 
NETWORKS IN UNITED NATIONS INTERVENTIONS 
As discussed above, the current policy prescriptions and research on nation-building continues to 
fail to produce effective post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction missions.  This holds 
whether the policy recommendations are drawn from the research on nation-building and 
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democratic transitions independent of internal conflict or from empirical study of actual cases of 
reconstruction missions using current standard methodologies (See Section 1.1.2).  Despite the 
vast resources assembled, the needs outstrip the resources applied to the effort.  Current research 
has failed to produce an explanation for this outcome (Dobbins et al, 2004; Kaufmann, 1999).  
That research may not apply the most appropriate framework.  If the conclusions drawn from the 
disaster preparedness and response literature are applicable to post-conflict efforts, then research 
using methods from the disaster preparedness and response literature will show that a lack of 
coordination and adaptation in the behavior of the organizations involved in the state-building 
and reconstruction missions explains the continued lack of effectiveness. 
1.3.1 Frameworks for Analyzing Complex Adaptive Systems 
The situation that these missions face is chaotic and rapidly changing.  The governance 
structures that those missions are trying to build and the missions that operate in them must be 
ready to adapt to chaotic and rapidly changing situations (Ogata, 2005).  To address their own 
rapidly changing situations, disaster preparedness and response research applies a research 
framework and methodology specifically designed to deal with rapidly changing situations, 
complex adaptive systems.  The aim of complex adaptive systems theory is to address the unique 
issues raised by situations characterized by rapid change, multiple lines of causality, and non-
linear relationships (Axelrod and Cohen, 2000; Holland, 1995).  This is the approach that 
disaster preparedness and response research currently applies (Comfort, Oh et al, 2010; Comfort, 
1999).  This is the approach that this study will apply to post-conflict state-building and 
reconstruction missions. 
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The situations that complex adaptive systems theory and methods are designed to address 
present a challenge to standard approaches to scientific research.  Whether positivist, post-
positivist, or from another epistemological tradition, social science attempts to identify cause and 
effect in a specific context.  Yet complexity shows that the very causes and effects that alter the 
context also alter the relationships between causes and effects.  This interaction reduces the 
validity of methods that assume independence among the actors to the analysis of complex 
problems.  Estimating a model of the effects of one specific policy choice, such as the expansion 
of funding for schools, either in Bosnia or in post-earthquake Haiti, faces a stiff challenge in 
producing meaningful results unless the analysis can also account for how the system will 
respond to that policy choice. 
Scholars have begun to consider ways to adjust scientific approaches to analyze the 
unique issues of complexity theory.  In the social sciences, specific attention has focused on the 
work of Axelrod and Cohen (2000) and Elinor Ostrom (2005) and her colleagues in the 
Workshop on Political Theory.  Each set of researchers proposes a framework for addressing 
complexity that describes and analyzes the system that operates in the action situation under 
study, focusing on how the actors interact with each other.  These frameworks focus on modeling 
the operation of a system as a means of understanding how the system works.  Ostrom’s model 
focuses on action arenas where the researcher analyzes the system by identifying the actors in the 
arena and the rules which govern how the actors make decisions and carry out their actions.  
Axelrod and Cohen extend their model to include efforts at predicting how that system will 
respond to policy changes and initiatives.  Both sets of researchers establish a framework for 
studying individual cases of complex adaptive systems to understand the dynamics of 
complexity.  Both frameworks will be described and explored in detail in Chapter 2.  The 
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frameworks provide guidance on what questions a research must answer to describe a system and 
then model how that system changes in response to exogenous and endogenous events. 
1.3.2 Initial Conditions 
Before any research can assess the impact of any system on a situation, it must first determine 
the initial conditions of that situation.  This establishes a baseline and allows for measurement of 
the change (Comfort, 1999).  Traditional comparative approaches require that these conditions be 
the same in theory and substantially similar in practice.  As discussed above, this is where most 
comparative efforts in post-extreme event reconstruction declare failure and default to attempting 
to draw policy conclusions from single-case studies.  In Shared Risk, Comfort compares the 
responses to eleven different earthquakes in widely divergent parts of the world, across ten years, 
from 1985 to 1995 (Comfort, 1999).  What makes comparison possible is that the method does 
not compare the particular situations, but the systems that respond to them, and draws lessons 
from how the systems vary with the amount of improvement, or worsening from the baseline.  
The methods which researchers have developed for studying complex adaptive systems are 
designed to allow for systemic comparisons of situations that would not initially appear to be 
comparable.  By acknowledging the path dependency and non-linearity of such systems, 
complexity theory explicitly states the vast differences between each case.  By adopting an 
analytical framework of complex adaptive systems that builds on the IAD and Harnessing 
Complexity frameworks, this analysis explicitly addresses situations that are widely divergent in 
context but similar in terms of the policy problems they present.  Complexity frameworks focus 
on the system and adaptation rather than specific descriptors of a system.  Analysis of complex 
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systems builds comparability by determining how, why, and to what degree, a system and its 
actors change and adapt from a baseline of each system’s initial conditions. 
The first step of this project will be to characterize the initial conditions in each case 
under study, the UN missions in Bosnia and Haiti.  In the context of a conflict, these initial 
conditions include the cultural, technological, and organizational context, as well as the political, 
and historical situations in which the initiating conflict occurred.  In Shared Risk, the initial 
conditions included geologic risk of earthquakes and the policies regarding emergency response 
and the structures of the emergency response systems.  In post-extreme event reconstruction, the 
initial conditions will focus on governance forms and structures, societal fractures and fault lines, 
and the risk of conflict.  In defining that baseline, I will compare the degree of adaptation and 
rate of change in the missions by assessing the varying levels of resilience and capacity 
documented for each mission over time. 
1.3.3 Primary and Intermediary Research Questions 
This study examines the proposition that reconstruction missions following extreme events, 
either after conflicts or natural disasters, when governance has been severely diminished or 
eliminated, need both capacity and resilience to be effective.   Separately, both capacity and 
resilience are necessary, but insufficient.  To test this proposition, this study first answers a series 
of more specific, intermediary research questions, guided by the IAD and Harnessing 
Complexity frameworks.  These research questions guide data collection and analysis for this 
study.  Collecting data in reference to the set of intermediary research questions will ensure the 
data necessary for exploring the primary question and measuring resilience, capacity, and 
success.  Only with the intermediary research questions answered can this study build the 
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network models, conceptual variables, and simulation model (See Chapter 3) that it will use to 
draw conclusions regarding the primary research question regarding the relationships between 
resilience, capacity, and effectiveness. 
Applying IAD, the study will ask the following intermediary research questions of two post-
extreme event reconstruction missions, Bosnia and Haiti: 
 
 Who are the actors? 
o What are each actor’s characteristics? 
o What roles are they expected to play in the peace-keeping mission? 
o What roles do they play in practice? 
 What are the system rules? 
o What rules apply to all actors?  
o What rules, if any, apply to different actors within the system? 
 How do the actors view the rules? 
 How do the actors respond to the rules? 
 How and when do the rules change? 
o What rules apply to the environment?  How do they operate? 
 
Applying Harnessing Complexity, the study will also ask this further set intermediary research 
questions of the same post-extreme event reconstruction missions: 
 
 What are the patterns of interaction? 
o Which actors interact with which other actors 
o What incentives or disincentives to interaction do the actors face? 
o How does interaction change actor capacity? 
o How do patterns of interaction change system resilience? 
o How does interaction change assessments of success? 
 How do actors select actions? 
o Are actions based on official roles? 
o Are actions based on assumed roles? 
o How do assumed roles change with the actions of other actors? 
 How do actors select which actors with whom they will interact? 
o Are interactions selected through system roles? 
o Are interactions selected through a relationship between the characteristics of the 
actors choosing either to interact or not interact? 
 What are the patterns of variation? 
o How do actors respond to other actors? 
o How do actors gather information about variation? 
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o How do actors utilize information about variation? 
o How do system changes impact actor capacity? 
o How do system changes impact system resilience?  What changes promote 
resilience and what changes undermine resilience? 
o What is the relationship between system variation and assessments of success? 
1.4 CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE STUDY 
This study draws together two disparate strains of research that focus on substantially 
comparable, but not identical, policy situations, bringing benefits to both bodies of literature and 
policy practice, primarily for the performance of post-conflict reconstruction missions.  For the 
reconstruction literature, this study introduces a new mode of understanding and method of 
analysis.  As introduced above, in Section 1.1, and will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 
2, the nation-building and reconstruction literatures do not currently conceptualize stabilization 
and reconstruction missions as complex adaptive systems.  Applying complex adaptive systems 
theories and methods will refocus questions on what makes stabilization and reconstruction 
missions effective from which tasks must be done and which policies applied, and in what order 
in all missions.  Indeed, this study does not seek to define what goals a mission should have or 
policies it should pursue. Rather, it changes the questions to how the organizations involved 
build a system in all missions that allows them to learn about changing needs and priorities in 
individual missions and adapt to meet those changes, to identify and adapt to situations where 
they have the wrong goals and policies.  This will change the focus of both the policy 
prescriptions and research on stabilization and reconstruction missions from a focus on a recipe 
of policies and institutions to a focus on system, communication, and coordination. 
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While this study is designed to apply insights from the research on disaster preparedness 
and response to post-conflict situations, it still brings benefits to the research on disasters.  In a 
response to a natural disaster, all of the organizations enter the response system agreeing, in 
principle, on the primary goal:  humanitarian aid and disaster relief.  This context undoubtedly 
influences the conclusions that expanded communication and coordination improve results 
(Comfort, 1999), that maximal resilience is found in maximized communication and 
coordination (Comfort, Oh et al, 2010).  This is not an assumption that necessarily applies to 
post-conflict situations.  Indeed, it is not an assumption that applies to the reconstruction of 
Bosnia.  Unrepentant Bosnian Serb forces continued after the war to oppose centralization of 
Bosnian authority and undermine central government (Bose, 2002; Chandler, 2000).  Both 
Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat leaders continue to this day (OHR Media Round-ups, 2002, 
2001, 2000).  Changing this assumption about the nature of the organizations that make up the 
response system may or may not change the final conclusions, but it will expand their 
applicability. 
1.5 ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
This study applies mixed methods that will be explained over the next two chapters and applied 
in the remaining six chapters.  Chapter 2 presents the theoretical concepts that support this study.  
This review includes expanding the presentation of literatures on nation-building and complex 
adaptive systems, and resilience presented in this chapter, as well as distributed cognition.  
Chapter 3 presents the data and methodology used for this study.  It presents the details of how 
the IAD and Harnessing Complexity frameworks are applied in this study and how the concept 
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variables, resilience, capacity, and effectiveness are operationalized with several component 
variables for each.  Chapter 4 begins the analysis by developing the initial conditions that will 
serve as a baseline for analysis for both case studies, Bosnia and Haiti.  Chapters 5 and 6 present 
the case study analysis done under the IAD and Harnessing Complexity frameworks and network 
modeling.  Bosnia is presented in Chapter 5 and Haiti is presented in Chapter 6.  Chapter 7 
integrates the results from the analysis of the case studies by presenting a conceptual model of 
post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction and a factor analysis to measure the correlations 
between the component variables defined in Chapter 3.  Chapter 8 draws together the analysis 
from Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7 to define and run a computer simulation that models the functional 
operation of a post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction mission.  Chapter 9 then presents the 
study’s final conclusions, the ramifications for current academic and policy debates, and 
directions for future research. 
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2.0  COMBINING NATION-BUILDING WITH DISASTER PREPAREDNESS AND 
RESPONSE FOR A DEEPER UNDERSTANDING 
This study draws on research from several fields, combining them to pursue interdisciplinary 
research.  In seeking to understand the effectiveness of international interventions and nation-
building missions, it is primarily situated in the literature of nation-building, and specifically 
within the state-building portion of that literature.  This literature, focuses on studying the 
processes of nation- and state-building, on what institutions develop and which institutions are 
the most essential, and on what policies can and should be used to promote building various 
institutions.  Where this study departs from that literature is assuming that even in the best 
planned missions in the most researched countries and parts of the world, nation-builders will 
still commit errors in understanding of history and culture, which lead to errors in policy and 
practice. 
Accounting for this pattern of error, while still producing effective stabilization and 
reconstruction missions, requires constant reassessment of the value of aid activities and 
adjustments to changing needs and priorities.  To do this, organizations must attain and 
communicate information on the effectiveness of their programs and adapt those programs as 
needs change.  Systems analysis refers to this as a feedback loop (Johnson, 2001; Holland, 1995, 
1992; Prigogine and Stengers, 1984).  The research on Complexity and Complex Adaptive 
Systems is on assumptions of the feedback loops underlying multiple directions of causality 
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inherent in the presence of such loops.  Since case study methods (George and Bennett, 2004) 
and statistical methods (Kennedy, 2003; Pindyck and Rubenfeld, 1998) are built primarily upon, 
and work best in, situations of unidirectional, if not necessarily linear, causality, they fail to 
properly analyze complex adaptive systems.  To address this problem, Ostrom (2005) and 
Axelrod and Cohen (2000) have developed frameworks for a systems analysis of complex 
adaptive systems.  These frameworks will guide this analysis.  In addition, Hutchins (1995) has 
identified key aspects of information flow through complex adaptive systems that are built on 
human actors, while Comfort (1999) has applied the method to disaster preparedness and 
response.  These works provide additional guidance to this study, and when combined with the 
frameworks for analyzing complex adaptive systems define the method for modeling that this 
study utilizes. 
2.1 INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTIONS AND NATION-BUILDING 
2.1.1 The Position of Nation-Building in International Relations Theory 
Chapter 1 established what nation-building is and its potential role as a way of responding to 
current conflicts and preventing future conflicts, and how the current literature fails in 
conceptualizing stabilization and reconstruction.  These efforts sit in a complicated position of 
international law and international security policy, one where competing absolute international 
legal principles collide against each other right alongside politics between states, where a state’s 
position is often dictated by the extent of its interest in the conflict being discussed.  The 
collision point is where international interventionism collides with state sovereignty (Finnemore, 
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2003).  This collision has generated an enormous scholarly literature that expands into the core 
international relations theories of liberalism and realism, to role and power of codified 
international law and norms of international behavior of states, both on the independence of 
states, acceptable behavior of governments and individuals, and civil war and the right of self-
determination.  A full review of these literatures is unnecessary for this study, but a basic 
introduction sets an important context. 
2.1.1.1 The Legality of Intervention and Nation-Building 
It might be impossible to find a concept more foundational to modern international 
relations than state sovereignty.  The entire system of states is built on the declaration in the 1648 
Peace of Westphalia that created the concept when it gave German princes the ability to 
determine the official religion of the people under their rule without interference from any 
outside power.  This was the defining feature of the Peace and the defining feature of the 
“Westphalian” system that is the one still in operation today (Nye, 2000; Rourke and Boyer, 
2000; Malanczuk, 1997).  In principle, sovereignty allows intervention only when the local 
government invites the intervening force, or, under Chapter 6 of the United Nations Charter, 
when both parties to a conflict invite a peacekeeping force.  Without this invitation, no attempt at 
external state-building can be made legally since external state-building is an intervention, and 
external intervention is, inherently, a violation of sovereignty. 
In the 1940’s, history intervened when memories of the Holocaust began the process for 
developing a new international norm that allows conflict intervention to stop particularly 
egregious war crimes, particularly genocide, mass killing of civilians, and ethnic cleansing 
(Finnemore, 2003; Nye, 2000; Rourke and Boyer, 2000; Kaufmann, 1999; Malanczuk, 1997).  
This provided a check on state sovereignty and the basis for what has become known as Chapter 
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7 and a half peacekeeping (Nye, 2000; Rourke and Boyer, 2000; Malanczuk, 1997), where the 
United Nations can impose peacekeeping missions in on-going conflicts without any local 
consent, though it does require a UNSC resolution.  The effort to find the balance between these 
two norms, sovereignty and intervention, in practice has generated a debate among scholars as to 
which takes precedence, in general and in specific cases, as well as the true extent of both norms 
and just how absolute they really are, and with real-world impacts on international law and the 
legality of interventions (Krasner, 1999; Hoffman, 1995) and the stabilization missions that so 
often come with them.  If sovereignty prevails, then state-building becomes largely illegal, but if 
intervention prevails, then state-building is a legal tactic, but still only as useful as it is effective. 
2.1.1.2 Failed States and Frozen Conflicts 
Finding legal room for intervention initiated a movement among policy makers to find 
security situations that required interventions to address.  Policy makers now took aim at ethnic 
conflicts and failed states (Solana, 2004; Gaddis, 2002; Kaufmann, 1999), using the potential for 
instability and the space for organized crime and armed conflict that weak governments generate 
(Zartman, 1995) as a basis for intervention.  These were situations in which policy makers and 
researchers recognized a use for nation-building.  A military intervention could only go so far; it 
could only defeat military adversaries or it could establish physical security.  For a lasting 
solution to failed and failing states, governance would have to be strengthened to ensure that the 
government could enforce itself across the whole of the state.  This is exactly the goal of state-
building, and, as discussed in Chapter 1, nation-building in practice is actually state-building. 
While publicly claiming to support peace, democracy, stability, or any other 
internationally-respected norm, many interventions actually sought to promote the interests of 
the intervening state or states.  If not entering in a balanced way, such as promoting one side over 
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another, or if the intervention was poorly designed or executed, the result would often be a 
“frozen conflict” (Socor, 2004; Solana, 2004; King, 2001).  Rather than finding a self-sustaining 
peace that can expand over time and generate stability, frozen conflicts exist in a permanent state 
of high tension, with the potential for an active resumption of the conflict part of every crime and 
political debate.  This creates a need for a permanent intervention, and does so in two ways.  In 
the cases where the intervener has picked a side, the intervener becomes a permanent part of the 
local political landscape, whose presence remains essential to preventing its opposition from 
restarting a conflict that that opposition might win (King, 2001).  Even if the intervention is truly 
trying to improve local governance to turn a weak state into a strong state, and assuming that the 
state the intervention is supporting is not a party to a conflict, a frozen conflict can still create a 
permanent intervention, since that state of permanent near-conflict is what the mission is trying, 
and failing, to eliminate.  That is, a frozen conflict represents unmet goals in the intervention, 
meaning the intervention must either continue or accept defeat and leave. 
2.1.2 Understanding Effectiveness in Stabilization and Reconstruction 
For a stabilization and reconstruction mission to avoid producing a frozen conflict, it must be 
effective, but what defines effectiveness is not necessarily clear, nor is how it is achieved.  
Comparing the effectiveness of missions requires finding a measure of effectiveness that can be 
compared across missions.  As discussed in Chapter 1, research on post-conflict reconstruction 
has so far looked for which policies produce effective missions.  In searching for this elusive 
goal, researchers have tried a variety of different measures of effectiveness as a means of testing 
which policies are most effective.  In doing this, they have struggled just to define effectiveness.   
The search into what is effective has yet to consider the lessons of complexity and disaster 
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management.  Rather, the field is seeking policy lessons by comparing various aspects of a 
mission with that mission’s effectiveness or success (Cohen, 2006).  As a research method, the 
principle is sound, but has yet to yield results.  Most research gets bogged down in finding a 
definition of effectiveness or success that can be compared across missions.  Each mission is 
unique, with specific goals and parameters that rarely line up neatly with those of another 
mission.  Some missions set out to establish peace and generate economic growth, as in East 
Timor.  Others set out with more modest goals, such as establishing sufficient peace for political 
processes to resume, as in Haiti. 
2.1.2.1 Mission Goals 
Two methods have emerged in the literature as a measure of success.  Seybolt (2007) has 
proposed the use of lives saved by a military intervention, along with ways of calculating that 
figure.  As will be discussed in greater detail, this method is limited.  Its effect is to limit the 
measurement of effectiveness to the initial intervention, when military forces actively intervene 
to save lives.  By this measure, Seybolt (2007) finds many successful cases of intervention that 
remain on the international security agenda as situations that face a threat or renewed conflict 
(ICG).  Instead, researchers are settling into what Cohen has suggested as the method for 
measuring progress:  the degree to which mission objectives are being achieved, as measured by 
a rigorous set of metrics (Cohen, 2006).  While admittedly subjective, this approach enables at 
least rough comparisons between cases on an order of, “Was the mission successful or not?”  
This may be a blunt instrument, but it is more useful than endlessly redefining success, and 
might even allow for percentage measures of success for those missions that have multiple, 
clearly-stated goals. 
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Many analyses of post-conflict reconstruction have focused on why specific missions 
have failed.  Researchers focus on why one actor or another was unprepared or incapable of the 
mission.  They often take the form of decrying the efforts of one state or another, such as the 
United States, to get involved as nearly inherently untenable (Dempsey and Fontaine, 2001). Or 
they show why a major actor, such as the United Nations, lacked the necessary political power to 
make a successful contribution (Dobbins et al, 2001). It marks the kind of substantive analysis 
that disaster management now avoids and replaces with structural analysis.  Analysis of 
reconstruction missions now tacitly acknowledges path dependency by regularly noting that the 
planning phases paid insufficient attention to the history of the locale and the conflict, and so 
made key political, legal, social, and economic mistakes. 
2.1.2.2 Mission Creep 
The greatest challenge to any conception of mission success or effectiveness comes from 
the tendency towards mission creep.  Mission creep is the empirical observed tendency of 
international interventions to gradually take on more and more ambitious tasks and goals.  To 
some degree, this is a function of the mission seeking to continue operating even as initial goals 
reach completion.  At other times, it is the product of political leaders who wish to achieve 
greater goals than those initially set (Einhorn, 2002). Well established in the research of long-
standing international financial organizations such as the World Bank (Einhorn, 2002), mission 
creep happens in international peacekeeping and reconstruction missions.  While never noted 
directly, Hippler’s edited volume (2005) and all of Dobbin’s et al edited volumes (2008, 2004, 
2003) show this pattern when discussing and defining mission goals and effectiveness.  The post-
war mission in Bosnia and the peacekeeping mission in Haiti both began primarily as missions 
designed to support policing (“Bosnia and Herzegovina”; “MINUSTAH”) before being asked to 
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support greater efforts at guaranteeing security, rule of law, and political development.  In 
Bosnia, this goes even further when including the pre-war mission, UNPROFOR, which began 
as a mission to maintain safe havens, first in Croatia, then in Bosnia, before first being expanded 
to support active humanitarian efforts under the United Nations High Commission for Refugees 
(UNHCR), and being expanded again to deploy military force in self-defense and coordinate in 
eventual NATO airstrikes (“Former Yugoslavia”).  This pattern of expansion makes using a 
measure of effectiveness built purely from achieving mission goals impossible.  Any measure 
must include the more expansive goals that mission creep generates. 
2.2 COMPLEXITY AND COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS 
2.2.1 Entropy and Emergence 
In physics, the forces of entropy are identified as a powerful dynamic that moves toward disorder 
(Prigogine and Stengers, 1984).  Despite this tendency, biological structures exist on activity and 
order, fighting against entropy within their own structures (Prigogine and Stengers, 1984, 131).  
Increasingly complex organisms develop to deal more effectively with their environment and 
competition from other organisms.  Humans design and build more complex tools and machines 
(Prigogine and Stengers, 1984, 10 – 18).  Governments have become more complex in governing 
style, from very simple methods of policy formation under monarchies to complex processes of 
writing and approving bills in today’s United States Congress.  After developing bureaucracies to 
implement policies, governments and populations find that those bureaucracies grow in size and 
complexity, even as opposing interests would threaten to rip them apart (Weber, 1968, 1964).  
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Order emerges when it appears it otherwise should not.  Further, this process is not limited to 
structures like an organization or an organism that exists within larger systems.  Large systems 
develop through the same adaptive processes as the organizations operating in them.  Indeed, the 
structures of both the systems and the organizations adapt to that of the other in an interacting, 
evolving process.  Even societies that are torn apart by civil war and other internal conflict find 
some form of order through reciprocal exchange of action and effect.  As the actors change, so 
will their structure of interaction.  What evolves is a complex adaptive system. 
Like Schrödinger’s Cat, the entry of an actor into the system changes the system.  Any 
actor that wishes to operate in such a system will have to understand the rules by which such a 
system operates, both in general arrangements and in specific details.  It requires that those 
actors understand what changes are occurring in the system and how they are occurring.  Not 
only will that actor need to understand how their very presence affects the system, but they will 
have to be able to both anticipate and then assess, and often reassess, how their actions affect the 
other actors and the system (Comfort, Oh et al, 2010, 35 – 41).  It is the purpose of all 
interventions to change the situations they enter and to predict how the situation will change and 
to understand how the situation is changing. 
This challenge faces those states and international organizations that seek to aid war- and 
conflict-torn states and societies.  Policy makers and security analysts have begun to identify 
these weak states as international security issues and threats.  Scholars define them as states in 
which central control and order largely collapse (Helman and Ratner, 1992); they are defined by 
chaos.  In what looks like the complete disintegration of order and society, the maximum state of 
social entropy, a system of actors, including individuals and organizations, nonetheless, will have 
emerged.  This system will have some shape and some order which evolved from the interplay 
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among the set of actors, each pursuing its own interest.  Any organization that fails to seek 
information about this emerging system and then integrate it into its mission will fail to improve 
the faltering society it was intended to support.  Examining the networks that interventions have 
supported will show what type of network structures facilitate or diminish this information flow.  
It will also show whether structure is sufficient to support success, or whether resilience is 
essential to the performance of the network.  Network operations remain critical; without 
information flows, even the best structured networks will still fail. 
Developing network structure is not simple.  Whether the United Nations, NATO, or an 
individual state launches the mission, it designs a mission structure that matches its standard 
methods of operations.  That is, UN missions like MINUSTAH in Haiti focus on peacekeeping 
and supporting the government which invited them (UNSC Res. 1542, 2004), while NATO 
missions like the Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia take a 
military approach, using chains of command.  Mission structures change organically, as they 
enter the situation.  How they operate in practice will not necessarily match how they are 
intended to operate.  So, the question changes from whether or not self-organization occurs, to 
how, why, and at what point in the mission it occurs in practice (Holland, 1995; Prigogine and 
Stengers, 1984).  To explore these questions, I turned to the theory of evolution that explains the 
development of different forms of organization and organism. 
In Darwin’s Theory of Evolution, researchers found a starting place (Holland, 1995).  
The theory provided a mechanism in adaptation that could be observed and applied to any 
system, organization, or organism.  As an actor tried something new, either the adaptation would 
succeed and carry on, or it would fail and be eliminated.  This recurring practice helped to 
explain why the organs of a plant or animal or the policies and procedures of an organization 
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were not always the most effective or the most efficient.  As the organism attempted various 
adaptations, it did not undo the previous forms.  Rather, each successive adaptation was built on 
the previous one (Holland, 1995). 
This pattern of adaptation, in turn, suggests a theoretical explanation for another 
observation.  Similar situations did not always produce similar adaptations.  Similar policies built 
to address similar policy problems did not always produce similar results, nor did similar 
countries apply similar strategies of action or similar institutions while still achieving similar 
goals.  Instead, they noticed the phenomenon of path-dependency (Holland, 1995).  Traditional 
policy analysis focuses heavily on econometric and statistical analysis.  This method generally 
ignores context and history, unless that context and history are part of the statistical model.  Path 
dependency illustrates the failings of that approach; the situation is not exogenous, and prior 
actions and events have a meaningful impact on what effects the policy has.  Path dependency 
eliminates the ability for policy researchers to generalize across a wide variety of what would 
have previously been considered similar policy problems.  It is no longer possible to create a 
generalized policy approach to low grade conflicts or to the reconstruction efforts that usually 
follow.  Under path dependency, the history of the conflict influences what policies will have an 
effect and what those effects will be.  It is important to know how the conflict developed and 
how groups reorganized themselves within the society, and what actions they took.  All of these 
events influence which states or international organizations can intervene in the conflict and can 
support the rebuilding, and which ones cannot, either due to local politics or to that institution’s 
strengths and weaknesses. 
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2.2.2 Analyzing Complex Adaptive Systems 
Complexity theory describes situations that traditional research methods, such as statistics and 
case studies do not handle very well.  Case studies require substantially similar situations to 
develop natural experiments of a limited number of variables (George and Bennett, 2004).  
Complex systems are unique, preventing a researcher from finding sufficiently similar cases to 
produce valid research conclusions.  Statistics require a large number of independent trials 
(Kennedy, 2003).  Complex adaptive systems defy both of those requirements; the separate 
systems are not large in number nor are they independent, either between cases or within cases.  
Learning occurs in organizations during each case as they adapt to meet their goals, and learning 
from previous cases happens between cases for the very same reason (Ostrom, 2005; Axelrod 
and Cohen, 2000).  This requires new methods to analyze complex adaptive systems.  In the 
social sciences, two works have proposed frameworks for analysis and will be presented here.  
These frameworks guide the analysis of this study. 
2.2.2.1 Harnessing Complexity Framework 
Axelrod and Cohen (2000) defined the earlier framework and the one that names the 
situations it is designed to address.  Axelrod and Cohen define three spheres of examination that 
a scholar could use to study an operational system.  These are variation, interaction, and 
selection.  The authors note that these functions are the key descriptive factors of a complex 
adaptive system (CAS): that is, CAS’s have constant variation, interaction between the actors 
and other conditions such as geography and resources, and actors in the CAS self-select their 
actions and interactions based on observation of current practice.  They, therefore, design their 
framework to identify the patterns of variation, interaction, and selection that exist in the 
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network.  The goal of the researcher is at first descriptive, in that he or she finds the patterns of 
variation, interaction, and selection that exist in the targeted research area. 
To guide a researcher in describing those patterns, Axelrod and Cohen set out a detailed 
list of terms that they define as central elements of the framework.  These central elements define 
the detailed questions that a researcher must answer to apply Axelrod and Cohen’s Complex 
Adaptive Systems framework.  There are twelve total central elements, presented in the author’s 
order with the author’s definition of them (p. 153):   
 
 Strategy, a conditional action pattern that indicates what to do in which 
circumstances. 
 Artifact, a material resource that has definite location and can respond 
to the actions of agents. 
 Agent, a collection of properties (especially location), strategies, and 
capabilities for interacting with artifacts and other agents. 
 Population, a collection of agents, or, in some situations, collections of 
strategies. 
 System, a larger collection, including one or more populations of 
agents and possibly also artifacts. 
 Type, all the agents (or strategies) in a population that have some 
characteristic in common. 
 Variety, the diversity of types within a population or system 
 Interaction pattern, the recurring regularities of contact among types 
within a system. 
 Space (physical), the location in geographical space and time of agents 
and artifacts. 
 Space (conceptual), the “location” in a set of categories structured so 
that “nearby” agents will tend to interact. 
 Selection, processes that lead to an increase or decrease in the 
frequency of various types of agents or strategies. 
 Success criterion or performance measure, a “score” used by an agent 
or designer in attributing credit in the selection of relatively successful 
(or unsuccessful) strategies or agents. 
 
To define the patterns of variation, interaction, and selection, the researcher describes the full 
observed data for each of these twelve categories.  With that done, the researcher defines the full 
scope and complexity of the system under study. 
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This is an open framework that can be applied to a variety of vastly divergent situations, 
making it more of a method of understanding systems, and justifying it as a framework for 
defining research. Comparability between cases comes in explaining and comparing the content 
that each separate case has in each of the twelve categories.  Additionally, the authors claim that 
by completely defining the system in this way, the researcher can draw plausible inferences for 
how the system will respond to any changes or shocks to which the researcher chooses to subject 
the system, making this framework useful as the initial step in defining a validated simulation of 
the system. 
2.2.2.2 Institutional Analysis and Development Framework 
Ostrom (2005) takes a different direction in defining her framework.  While she utilizes 
the system and actors as central parts of her framework, she focuses on the rules of the system.  
These rules define how actors interact in the specific system and so define much of the system’s 
performance.  Instead of describing a system only through its observed characteristics, Ostrom 
defines action arenas that encompass the constituent parts of the system, as well as the system’s 
performance.  For Ostrom, the action arena is a function of the actors, systems, rules, and other 
attributes present.  This conceptualization allows her to limit the variables required in studying a 
complex adaptive system without limiting the ability to consider that complexity.  In Ostrom’s 
model, exogenous variables such as biophysical or material conditions, community attributes, 
and rules feed into an action arena.  In this action arena, participants interact in action situations, 
and reciprocally influence each other.  The interactions of these participants then feed 
information back into the action arena and produce outcomes.   These outcomes, in turn, feed 
back into the exogenous variables and the larger action domain.  Ostrom calls this formulation 
the Institutional Analysis and Development framework, which can be applied to actual policy 
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situations similar to the application of Axelrod and Cohen’s framework.  That is, a researcher 
would develop a conceptual model of a complex system by identifying the actors involved, their 
individual or organizational characteristics, their interactions with one another, and the rules they 
use to govern their system of interactions. 
2.2.2.3 Role of Network Analysis in Systems Analysis Frameworks 
Neither framework requires the use of network analysis as part of applying the 
framework.  Nevertheless, a researcher applying network analysis will be able to answer many of 
the questions that the frameworks direct.  A network analysis is primarily a descriptive agent-
based model of an empirically observed system.  Whether they are organizations pursuing 
humanitarian goals or individuals forming friendships or seeking advice, the actors and their 
patterns of interaction define that system.  A network model captures this two-tiered system 
where an agent-based model provides the basis for a systems model.  The frameworks for 
analyzing complex adaptive systems use the same conception of a system built from many 
constituent parts that all apply their own rules and strategies.  The concept of networks then 
provides the rigorous format that aids the researcher in defining the characteristics of that 
system. 
With the actors and interactions defined, network analysis then gives the researcher a set 
of tools and measures to rigorously describe the network (Newman, Barabasi, and Watts, 2006; 
Hanneman and Riddle, 2005; Wasserman and Faust, 1994).  These measures allow the researcher 
to identify key nodes in a network in different ways that have different interpretations for 
different parts of a system, such as identifying hub nodes in the network with degree centrality as 
well as bridging nodes with betweenness centrality.  Networks researchers have also identified 
network types, such as small world networks, scale free networks, and core-periphery networks, 
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providing both conceptual and mathematical definitions of each (Newman, Barabasi, and Watts, 
2006; Hanneman and Riddle, 2005; Wasserman and Faust, 1994).  There is now a long list of 
network measures and a proliferation of network analysis computer programs that will calculate 
those measures (Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman, 2002; Carley, 2001).  Whether identifying the 
rules of an action arena or the patterns of variation, interaction, and selection in a complex 
system, network analysis will answer many of the questions of the frameworks, and it will do 
this in a way that is verifiable and replicable across the same data from the same data sources. 
2.3 INFORMATION FLOW IN COMPLEX SYSTEMS 
2.3.1 Distributed Cognition 
Underlying the concept of complex adaptive systems articulated by Ostrom and Axelrod and 
Cohen is an often unstated assumption about how the actors recognize variation and respond to 
it.  Implicit in this approach is the assumption that, as the situation changes, only a portion of the 
actors involved will notice the change when it happens.  Depending on the network and its 
conditions of operation, a change may go unnoticed initially, with the participating actors 
recognizing the change in performance only when they rely on a previous assumption or reenter 
a geographic location that they have not entered for a certain period of time.  In order to operate 
effectively, individuals and organizations must be cognizant of this information.  If they are not, 
then they cannot adjust to it, and their decisions will be based on faulty information (Simon, 
1983).  Nevertheless, an implicit characteristic of complex adaptive systems is that no one part of 
the system contains all of the relevant information about the system and its operations.  In his 
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work, Hutchins (1995) illustrates this phenomenon.  His work (1995) documents the practice of 
navigation as a situation that necessitates constant and clear, if encoded, communication for all 
the actors to perform their jobs properly.  This premise is even more important in action arenas, 
such as post-extreme event reconstruction, that are more geographically distributed than the 
navigation deck of a Navy ship. 
Aside from the greater understanding of information flow within teams that the Hutchins’ 
(1995) research generated directly, distributed cognition has several important impacts for 
researching geographically-distributed systems.  Since no one person knows all of the 
information in such a system, no one set of data sources, compiled by one person, can have all 
the relevant information for research and analysis.  Additionally, field reports from 
organizations’ active response to disasters and conflicts tend to focus on specific issues.  Often 
the best individual source, situation reports focus on what the publishing organization has done 
and achieved, and often with which other organizations they worked.  News reports are more 
detached from individual actors, but often miss activities in hard-to-reach locations, which 
abound in conflict zones and the immediate aftermath of large scale disasters.  Humanitarian 
appeals provide large scale details about the organizations that combined to write the appeal, 
including extensive data on the amounts of personnel and resources dedicated to the response 
and the complete list of projects that each organization is attempting.  Amidst that detail, though, 
aid appeals tend to lack details on active collaborations and ignore challenges so as not to 
inadvertently convince donors that a response might be futile, indicating that sending additional 
funding would be wasting those resources.  There are still other types of reports, including 
Hotwashes and After Action Reports (AAR), government and academic studies, that all have 
their own foci and blind spots.  The result of these focus and geographic limitations to 
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information is that no one type of report from no one organization can provide the necessary 
details to support a systems or network analysis.  Rather, the researcher must pull together data 
from a variety of sources, published from a variety of organizations, to acquire sufficiently 
complete information for a valid systems analysis or network analysis. 
2.3.2 Information and Coordination in Natural Disaster Response 
Along with its impact for researchers, distributed cognition has many important impacts on 
practitioners in geographically-distributed systems.  As discussed in Chapter 1, Comfort (1999) 
has focused on fully developing the understanding of those impacts and seeking policies and 
procedures to address them.  Comfort begins with the same principle embedded at the base of 
distributed cognition.  That is not the principles from Hutchins, but rather that mentioned above 
from Simon (1983), that a decision maker must have accurate and as complete as possible 
information to make a properly informed decision.  Comfort (with Wukich et al, 2011; with Oh 
et al, 2010; with Haase, 2006; 1999) then adds another layer to Hutchins’ (1995) observation 
about geographically-distributed information.  This observation recognizes that information is 
also distributed over time in the form of past practices and experience and in the expertise of past 
and current disaster managers.  Since managers have incomplete information about both past 
practices and current developments, to meet Simon’s requirement, the managers need a way of 
gaining real-time information on current developments and access to a store of past practices and 
experience.  The solution that Comfort and Wukich et al (2011) propose is the application of 
sociotechnical systems that integrate disaster and operations reporting from organizations active 
in the response with a decision support system that contains lessons from past practice. 
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International disaster response efforts have begun attempting to use such systems.  
Scheinert and Konstantinova (2011) examine the use of two specific systems in the aftermath of 
the January 12
th
, 2010 Haitian Earthquake, ReliefWeb
4
 and OneResponse.
5
  Operated by the 
United Nation’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), and within the 
context of the United Nations Cluster System, both sites present reports from the organizations 
involved in UN-coordinated disaster response efforts.  Unfortunately, these sites fared poorly 
during the response to the Haitian earthquake, as communication both failed to deliver 
information in a timely manner or contain the information necessary to coordinate a response 
(Scheinert and Konstantinova, 2011) and ultimately broke down entirely (Comfort, Siciliano, and 
Okada, 2011). This breakdown in organized communications in the response system left a 
stratified response built around three pools of actors, the international responders, the Haitian 
government, and the Haitian general populace (Comfort, McAdoo et al, 2011).  This failure in 
the field does not represent a disproof of the effectiveness of sociotechnical systems, but 
indicates of failure to apply them properly.  The importance of the use of such systems to actual 
response in the field still stands as the implication for practitioners of distributed cognition. 
2.3.3 Complexity in International Relations Theory and Practice 
It would be false to claim that the development of complexity theory and networks has gone 
unnoticed by scholars and practitioners of international security.  They have primarily taken a 
different focus, however, and different application than that which researchers for natural 
disaster preparedness and response have found.  These security scholars have recognized the 
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 Can be found online at:  www.reliefweb.int. 
5
 Can be found online at:  http://oneresponse.info. 
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growth of non-state actors that are made from networks of individuals.  Sometimes these are 
peaceful political movements, other times they are dark networks, that is, networks like terrorist 
groups and criminal organizations that hide their membership and structure.  Either represented a 
network that could affect the situation that a fighting force would have to take into account, 
whether as an enemy combatant or in defining the political context of a military operation 
(Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 2001).  Even more distant from the network of organizations responding 
to a disaster, security scholars have also identified the growth of information technology 
networks, that is, computer networks as both a vulnerability to attack and a tool for offense and 
defense.  Using the same language of resilience and effectiveness, these scholars have developed 
requirements for defensible computer networks that will not be interrupted by attack (Homer-
Dixon, 2006; Alberts, Garstka, and Stein, 1999).  It is only in a limited way that security 
researchers have begun to apply organizational interactions and networks as a way of 
understanding the operations of a military force and complexity theory in understanding complex 
political and military situations (Alberts and Czerwinski, 1997; Rosenau, 1997).  In these ways, 
the concept and language of complexity and networks has entered the military lexicon, but still 
has not entered the discourse for the phase the follows after any intervening military force has 
generated a “mature theater,” one in which open fighting has ceased, but in which the military 
still plays a role (Bosnia Respondent 1). 
The most developed work on the list is that which addresses dark networks and computer 
networks.  The authors in Alberts and Czerwinski’s edited volume (1997) write about the 
concept of complexity and understanding complex adaptive systems, but only in terms of seeking 
long-term plans for operations in the system.  They write about the need for understanding the 
mechanisms of complex systems, listing the key features of those systems (Maxfield, 1997).  
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This is only the barest-bones analysis of the situation.  The work on disrupting dark networks 
and securing computer networks goes deeper, seeking and finding some policy options for 
developing networks that can survive attacks while also seeking ways to attack networks made of 
adversarial actors.  This research even uses the language of resilience that is present in the 
organizational network literature on disaster response and preparedness (Homer-Dixon, 2006; 
Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 2001; Alberts, Garstka, and Stein, 1999). 
This allows for some comparison between the two literatures on how they conceive of 
resilience.  The fundamental definition of resilience is the same, the ability of a network to 
persist in effective operation following a shock to the system.  How this is achieved is not the 
same.  As discussed in chapter 1, in disaster preparedness and response, resilience comes from 
the adaptive behavior of organizations in the network.  It is an emergent pattern of the system 
that develops out of organizations engaging in, and utilizing, self-organization and adaptation in 
the network to exchange information and coordinate operations that identify and adapt to 
emergent patterns that are specific to each system (Comfort, Boin, and Demchak, 2010).  For the 
researchers and policy analysts of dark networks and computer networks, and like the military 
establishments supporting their work, resilience comes from redundancy.  Like military materiel 
in the field, resilience in a computer network is assured when additional materiel can be 
redeployed to fill the roles of any materiel that has been destroyed.  This conception of resilience 
requires greater capacity for operation, as resilience is a function of the redundancy of materiel, 
and governance capacity is a factor in determining the level of materiel available.  Post-conflict 
reconstructions missions, however, face a situation where much, if not all, of both governance 
capacity and materiel have been destroyed; a large portion of the task of reconstruction is 
rebuilding that redundant set of materiel, especially in a situation where a peace has insufficient 
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broad-based support to prevent adversarial groups from attacking it.  This means that resilience 
must come from something other than pure materiel redundancy.  This is where the conception 
of resilience as an emergent pattern from the behavior of actors adds to literature on 
interventions and reconstruction.  By redefining resilience, this study provides a basis for 
redefining the mode of operations for post-conflict reconstruction missions.  While capacity to 
support action will still be necessary, a mission that applies this new definition stands a greater 
chance of effectiveness, as it will be able to adapt to changing situations, redress its own errors, 
and support the development of local governance that can find and maintain the requirements of 
a sustained peace in that region, regardless of what those requirements are, and especially when 
they vary greatly from the requirements of past efforts. 
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3.0  DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
This study will seek to measure the relationships between resilience, capacity, and effectiveness 
in post-conflict reconstruction missions.  To do this, the study builds a mixed-method analysis 
using empirical data gathered from two historical cases to test the application of inferences from 
the disaster preparedness and response literature about the role of communication and 
coordination to post-conflict situations.  The first is the UN intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
that started with the 1992 ceasefire agreement
6
 and expanded in 1995, following the Dayton 
Accords to acquire a larger mandate and the involvement of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO).  The second is the international response to the 2004 armed conflict in 
Haiti that led to the ouster of then-Haitian President, Jean Bertrand Aristide. These events will be 
analyzed as case studies of international intervention that are intended to build local governance 
capacity for sustainable development of the damaged regions.  Each mission began with a UN 
Security Council (UNSC) resolution that responded to conflict and defined the structure and 
goals of the mission.  For Haiti, this is UNSC Resolution 1542 (2004).  For Bosnia, there are 
two:  UNSC Resolution 743 (1992) and UNSC Resolution 1035 (1995).  These resolutions will 
provide a baseline for each mission for measuring the degree of change over time from that 
baseline.  This method draws from the nation-building literature in international relations by 
focusing on empirical cases of UN interventions that sought or continue to seek long-term 
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 This date represents the date of the signing of the Agreement in Sarajevo, on 2 January 1992. 
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political stabilization while analyzing the interventions using the different lens of the network 
approach currently used in the disaster preparedness and response literature.  The study first 
applies the IAD and Harnessing Complexity frameworks discussed in the previous chapter to 
understand the missions and their context.  The study then builds network models that allow for 
defining and measuring the key concept variables: resilience, capacity, and effectiveness.  Each 
variable contains a set of component variables that are measured using ordinal scales that reflect 
the content of the network data.  A factor analysis then measures the correlations between these 
components, both within and between concept variables.  Finally, the component measures, 
factor relationships, network models, and frameworks all provide basis for a computer simulation 
of a reconstruction mission that shows how resilience components affect the mission’s ability to 
complete aid tasks and build the local government’s resource stock.  This simulates the more 
complex relationship between resilience components and mission effectiveness that a factor 
analysis cannot capture, due to limitations in both network coding structure and statistical 
analysis methods.  This chapter lays out the details for each step and their justifications. 
3.1 EMPIRICAL DATA ANALYSIS AND CASE STUDY COMPARISON 
3.1.1 Case Study Selection 
Researching policy problems like the continued failure of post-conflict reconstruction missions 
requires using empirical data.  These missions occur as generally distinct events that last for a 
varying amount of time.  They occur in a limited geographic range, limited by the borders of 
whatever state on which they are focusing.  They have stated goals, while also having many 
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unstated goals caused by mission creep.  They operate in a specific cultural, political, and 
historical context, as well as current legal and physical security contexts.  To test the relationship 
between resilience and effectiveness, traditional case study methods would require finding two 
or more cases that are sufficiently similar to each other across all of these contexts, but having 
different levels of resilience and effectiveness, with similar capacities, since effectiveness is a 
function of both capacity and resilience (George and Bennett, 2004; King, Keohane, and Verba, 
1994).  Post-conflict reconstruction is a relatively new phenomenon.  The first true cases of it 
occurred in the Post-World War II reconstructions of Germany and Japan (Dobbins et al, 2004; 
Dobbins et al, 2003), only about 60 years ago.  Since that time, reconstructions have been 
attempted only a limited number of times.  Table 3-1 lists the events that have happened to date 
along with the lead political unit that directed the mission and its timeframe.  This is the 
population from which a researcher can select cases. 
 
Table 3-1. Major Post-Conflict Reconstruction Missions 
Mission Political Lead Time Frame 
Germany USA, UK, France 1945 – 1952 
Japan USA 1945 – 1952 
Congo UN 1960 – 1964 
Namibia UN 1989 – 1990 
El Salvador UN 1991 – 1996 
Cambodia UN 1991 – 1993 
Somalia UN/USA 1992 – 1994 
Mozambique UN 1992 – 1994 
Haiti (I) USA 1994 – 1996 
Bosnia-Herzegovina NATO/EU 1995 – 2002 
Eastern Slavonia UN 1995 – 1998 
Sierra Leone UN/UK 1998 – on-going 
East Timor Australia/UN 1999 – on-going 
Kosovo USA/NATO 1999 – on-going 
Afghanistan USA 2001 – on-going 
Iraq USA 2003 – on-going 
Haiti (II) UN 2004 – on-going 
Sources: Dobbins et al, 2008; Dobbins et al, 2004; Dobbins et al, 2003 
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What Table 3-1 shows is the diversity of context for all the cases of post-conflict 
reconstruction missions.  They have taken place on four different continents, including North 
America and Europe, and across several decades of history, representing immediate post-war, 
Cold War, post-Cold War, and post-9/11 time periods.  They have had a variety of lead actors.  
Finding two cases to support a traditional case study comparison would be impossible.  The 
complexity frameworks presented in Chapter 2, however, provide a basis for comparing vastly 
divergent cases.  This study utilizes that capability to compare two cases.  These cases, as listed 
in Table 3-1 are Bosnia and Herzegovina and Haiti (II).  The Bosnia case will begin with the 
initiation of UNPROFOR’s deployment to Bosnia in 1992, and will include the transformation of 
UNPROFOR into UNMIBH in 1995.  It will end with UNMIBH’s conclusion, on 31 December 
2002.  The Haiti case begins with the ouster of then-President Jean Bertrand Aristide and the 
initiation of the MINUSTAH mission, in 2004.  Though this mission remains on-going, this 
study closes its study period on 31 December 2010.  The reason for this is a practical one; this 
was the time at which work on this study began, while still allowing for a view of the rapidly 
changing events surround the 12 January earthquake and subsequent cholera outbreak. 
These cases are selected for their accuracy to current intervention practices and 
accessibility to study.  These two cases represent prominent UN interventions in response to 
extreme events.  Both events have taken place during the age of the internet, a great deal of data 
is readily available for public access, particularly in the Haiti case, which allows for more 
complete analyses than could be done in many other cases.  Second, just as the mission 
environments continually evolve, so does mission planning and operation.  Fully covering this 
change in Bosnia requires studying both the UNPROFOR and UNMIBH missions.  Both cases 
are recent missions.  Missions prior to these may be more settled, particularly for Haiti, but data 
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are less accessible and practices continue to evolve over time.  It would be fruitless for this study 
to critique practices from the earliest missions, unless those practices that had remained 
consistent throughout.  The very failure that this study examines has led to efforts by actors to 
improve performance and has eliminated that possibility.  Continual study has generated an on-
going literature in ‘lessons learned’ (Seybolt, 2009) that this study critiques in Chapters 1 and 2.  
Each new mission has sought to apply those lessons learned (Dobbins et al, 2008; Dobbins et al, 
2004; Dobbins et al, 2003).  That they have done so and continue to fail generates the 
fundamental policy problem of this study.  Newer cases have utilized the least tested and least 
critiqued methods, providing fertile ground for new study.  Newer cases also took place in a 
different technological context.  One of the newer practices of these missions is to post data in 
widely and publicly accessible forums, including internet websites.  Data for Haiti and Bosnia 
have been posted in such a manner.  The location of the cases also allows for ready field access 
for study, which has been conducted.  Details of the data are discussed below, in Section 3.2.1.  
In the language of the IAD Framework, these cases are the action arenas for this study; in the 
language of the Harnessing Complexity framework, these cases are the complex adaptive 
systems for this study. 
3.1.2 Unit of Analysis 
The unit of analysis for this study is the organization.  Specifically, the study focuses on 
organizations involved in two UN missions and the interactions among them in the process of 
implementing the missions.  The organizations under study will be the principal actors involved 
in each of the two cases, including governments and their agencies, non-governmental 
organizations, private businesses, and international organizations, including their agencies.  The 
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primary measures of capacity, resilience, and effectiveness will focus on the organizational level.  
This includes measures of the capacity of an organization in terms of its personnel and resources 
and measures of the degree to which organizations exhibit behaviors that demonstrate resilience.  
Finally, this analysis includes measures of the degree to which the participating organizations are 
meeting the stated goals of the missions.  Data will be gathered at the organization level, and the 
first level of analysis will present profiles of the performance of individual organizations and 
their interactions in mission operations. 
For each organization, this study will collect several characteristics.  In the parlance of 
network analysis, these will be organizational attributes.  Recording these attributes will maintain 
greater complexity in the data and allow for a richer analysis by supporting analysis of the 
patterns of these attributes in the network.  The attributes are Source of Funding, Jurisdiction, 
and Nationality.  Source of Funding records the economic sector from which that organization 
draws its funding, public, private, or non-profit.  Jurisdiction records the territorial space over 
which an organization’s actions have ramifications.  An organization with a State jurisdiction 
will be able to impact other actors over the entire territory of the target state of the mission, 
either Haiti or Bosnia, but not beyond the respective borders.  While this includes official state 
organs, it is not limited to them, and applies only to the extent that those state organs are 
observed as operating in the data.  Jurisdiction is defined relative to the target country for the 
mission.  That is to say, any organization based outside of either Bosnia or Haiti, as part of the 
respective case is labeled as either Regional or International.  For Bosnia, a Regional jurisdiction 
refers to the Balkans.  For Haiti, it refers to the Caribbean.  Nationality is the state or national 
affiliation for the organization.  This includes categories for organizations just as international 
non-government organizations (INGO’s), inter-governmental organizations (IGO’s), and 
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international private organizations (IPO’s) that do not have clear nationalities.  For Haiti, an 
additional attribute will be recorded that notes whether or not the organization was part of the 
United Nations system of international organizations.  The organizations will fill the role of 
actors under each of the frameworks for this study. 
The analysis will extend beyond the separate organizations to include system-level 
analysis.  This is necessary since the organizations under study do not operate independently of 
each other, but interact in a way that forms that system.  This creates a nested set where the 
organizations operate both autonomously and in relation to each other.  Under this framework, 
the structure of the system constrains how the organizations operate as well as defines their 
access to resources and ability to achieve success. Consequently, it is necessary to assess the 
relationships among the organizations in the system formed by their interaction.  The analysis 
will also apply system level measurements of capacity, resilience, and effectiveness that are 
aggregates of the primary organization – level measures.  The systems of UN intervention will be 
more narrowly defined than typical system-level analysis within the field of International 
Relations.  Typically, system level analysis looks at patterns of action and interaction in the full 
system of states (Waltz, 1959).  Rather, in this analysis, the two systems in question will be 
limited by geography and function to the specific reconstruction missions in Bosnia and Haiti.  
The exact bounds will be set for each case study, since the appropriate geographic, functional, 
and temporal bounds vary for each mission and over time within the mission, as listed and 
explained in Section 3.1.1. 
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3.2 DATA AND VARIABLES 
3.2.1 Data Sources 
Table 3-2. Data Sources 
Source Case Data Contained in the Source 
UNSC Res. 1035 (1995) Bosnia Initial Mission Goals, Initial Conditions, 
Knowledge, Formal Mission Structure 
SFOR CIMIC Documents Bosnia Actual Organization Interactions and 
Actions, Resources, Knowledge 
OHR Media Round-ups 
(Content of Newspapers) 
Bosnia Actual Organization Interactions and 
Actions, Resources, Knowledge 
UNSC Res. 1542 (2004) Haiti Initial Mission Goals, Initial Conditions, 
Knowledge, Formal Mission Structure 
MINUSTAH sitreps Haiti Actual Organization Interactions and 
Actions, Resources, Knowledge 
ReliefWeb sitreps
7
 (OCHA, 
USAID, WHO, and other 
organizations) 
Haiti (Post-
Earthquake) 
Actual Organization Interactions and 
Actions, Resources, Knowledge 
Consolidated Appeals (CAP) 
Documents 
Bosnia, Haiti (Post-
Earthquake) 
Tasks, Resources, Knowledge, 
Organization Involvement, Personnel 
Formal Reports Bosnia, Haiti (Pre-
Earthquake) 
Knowledge, Effectiveness, Actual 
Organization Interactions and Actions 
Semi-Structured Interviews Bosnia, Haiti
8
 Validate other sources, Patterns of 
Interaction, Personnel, Resources 
Individual Organization 
Websites 
Bosnia, Haiti Mission Statements, Knowledge, 
Resources 
 
Data on the networks are available from a variety of sources.  Each source contains different 
types of information that will aid in answering different questions and are mission specific.  
                                                 
7
 All of the documents which ReliefWeb has for the earthquake are available at 
<<http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/dbc.nsf/doc108?OpenForm&emid=EQ-2010-000009-HTI&rc=2>>. 
8
 Semi-structured interviews in Haiti were completed as part of a project the Center for Disaster Management 
completed, which included two trips to Haiti, the first during the second week of March, 2010, and the second 2 – 9 
May, 2010.  Data are used with permission. 
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Table 3-2 summarizes what data each source will provide.  After being gathered, the data will be 
coded into a single database, containing each organization’s actions, interactions, resources, 
knowledge, and personnel, and coded for timeframes.  This database will provide the basis for 
network modeling and analysis and for measuring the key variables, as described in Section 
3.2.2.  In addition to the data sources listed in Table 3-2, field research was conducted in both 
Bosnia and Haiti.  In both cases, this consisted of expert interviewers conducted on site.  A 
formal interview protocol was prepared for Bosnia; it is attached as Appendix A.  Field research 
in Haiti occurred from 2 – 9 May 2010, as part of a University of Pittsburgh, Center for Disaster 
Management rapid response study to the 12 January 2010 Haitian Earthquake.  Field research in 
Bosnia occurred from 13 – 19 September 2011. 
3.2.2 Network Coding 
Since network analysis is the appropriate modeling tool for researching complex adaptive 
systems, as discussed in Chapter 2, this study’s analysis utilizes that tool.  To do this, data coding 
focused on constructing a validated network database.  The principal component of any network 
database is the set of dyadic links between the actors in the network, which, as discussed above, 
are organizations in this study.  The researchers involved in coding the data for this study
9
 
reviewed the data sources for each case to identify which organizations were taking actions at 
which times.  The name of that organization is then recorded with the content of the action taken 
and any interacting organization that are also involved.  Each row of the database contains a 
                                                 
9
 Data coding for each for each case was handled separately.  The author of this study coded the Bosnia networks.  
For the Haiti networks, the author owes a great debt to the work of Ralitsa Konstantinova, who coded a very large 
portion of the data for this case, along with the author of this study. 
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single network dyad.  Events that include three or more organizations interacting are spread over 
multiple lines of the database.  Often, the action includes only one organization.  In those cases, 
the database codes an initiating organization, but no responding organization.  Rather than being 
a dyad, these actions are network monads, while still containing important data on the presence 
and activities of an organization in the system, even though that organization is unconnected to 
any other at that time.  To simplify the language, this study refers to the network monads and 
dyads, as well as network interactions.  In addition to the dyad, the network interactions record 
the attributes of each organization observed in the interaction and a status code for the progress 
of organizations in completing the tasks that make up the content of the interaction, along with 
the date of the interaction and the specific source of that interaction.  This is a standardized 
network coding method that has been in use in the University of Pittsburgh’s Center for Disaster 
Management.  This network database forms the basis upon which the study operationalizes its 
concept variables and records the interaction, selection, and variation of the Harnessing 
Complexity framework. 
3.2.3 Definition and Operationalization of Variables 
This study focuses on the relationship between three concept variables:  resilience, capacity, and 
effectiveness.  It contends that, after controlling for capacity, greater resilience will produce 
greater effectiveness in post-conflict reconstruction missions.  Chapter 1 presented the 
conceptual definitions for the conceptual variables.  These remain broad concepts that need 
specific, measureable definitions that can be applied to directly to the data.  To operationalize 
these variables, this study defines several component variables for each concept variable.  Each 
component variable is operationalized using an ordinal scale that is specific to that component.  
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The value is assigned by reviewing the content, status, and attributes of the organizations 
involved in each the network interactions and determining the appropriate category for all 
components.  This value is then recorded in the network database on the line of the respective 
network interaction.  The frequency counts for each component are first calculated to examine 
the data.  Concept variable measures are then aggregates of the component variable measures, 
where higher values on the ordinal scales represent higher values of the respective concept 
variable for that component. 
3.2.3.1 Resilience 
Resilience is the practice of accessing information on changing situations, adapting to them, 
and coordinating activities within and between organizations (Comfort, Oh et al, 2010; 
Demchak, 2010).  For this study, resilience has four components, as follows, with their scales: 
 Presence on the Ground (the mix of organizations by jurisdiction engaged in field activities) 
o 1:  No Presence; organizations not engaged in field activities 
o 2:  Only domestic organizations operating in the field (sub-national level) 
o 3:  Only domestic, state-level (national, federal, state) organizations 
o 4:  Only International organizations 
o 5:  Combination of Local- and State-level organizations 
o 6:  Combination of Local- and International-level organizations 
o 7:  Combination of State- and International-level organizations 
o 8:  Combination of Local-, State-, and International-level organizations 
 Internal Coordination 
o 1:  Action does not involve internal coordination 
o 2:  Report includes communication between different parts of the same organization 
 External Coordination 
o 1:  Action does not involve external coordination 
o 2:  Organization publishes report or makes requests for coordination 
 requests action in a task outside its own field of operation w/ no mention of 
reciprocation from the organization that  receives the request 
 situation report published to open system such as ReliefWeb 
 explaining/justifying actions to another organization 
o 3:  A meeting between two or more organizations for coordination. 
o 4:  Report includes cooperation between at least two organizations towards a goal 
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 Adaptation 
o 1:  Action does not include indications of adaptation 
o 2:  Content of interaction reports shows pattern of changes in actions or policies over 
time when compared against each other 
o 3:  Report of interaction includes explicit change in an organization’s actions or 
policies 
o 4:  Interaction aimed at more closely tailoring organizations towards goal 
o 5:  Error Correction:  When organization recognizes shortcomings in its knowledge 
and reaches out to a more knowledgeable organization in regard to the interaction 
3.2.3.2 Capacity 
Capacity is the amount of resources available to an organization to apply to its efforts to meet 
its goals.  These resources come in the form of funds, personnel, and knowledge.  This study will 
use the following scale for measuring the funds, resources, and personnel of the organizations 
involved, including definitions of each level: 
 1: very small organizations (all jurisdictions) 
o Those with expected staffs of around 10 members or less 
o Includes “black” groups 
o Groups of insufficient size to maintain a website or web presence 
 2: small organizations (all jurisdictions) 
o Organizations that would staff up to about 50 people or budgets in thousands to 10s 
of thousands of dollars, annually 
o Includes Entity-level political parties 
o Includes local-level government offices 
o Foreign Medical and Search and Rescue teams supported by government resources, 
but only including small staffs 
o INGO’s that only function or can only function in one location at a time 
 3: medium sized organizations (all jurisdictions) 
o Staffs between 50 and 100 or budgets at or exceeding $500,000/year 
o Includes state-level political parties 
o Entity-level agencies 
o INGO’s working in a limited number of countries 
 4: large domestic organizations and large international organizations (not government 
backed) 
o Large staffs or budgets exceeding $5,000,000/year 
o Organizations backed by a single foreign government 
o BiH Entities 
o INGO’s working in many countries 
 5: large international organizations (public only) that draw on resources of multiple 
governments, allowing for budgets of many millions of dollars per year 
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While funds and personnel are clearly operationalized measures, knowledge is a concept 
that requires operationalization.  The literature on knowledge and networks focuses on 
measuring knowledge and information flows through the network.  In this study, the movement 
of knowledge between organizations is treated as part of resilience; knowledge flows allow for 
resilience by providing organizations with the information they need to either confirm accurate 
knowledge stocks or repair inaccurate knowledge stocks (National Research Council, 2003).  In 
the security literature, many authors argue that military organizations are ill-suited to nation-
building and peace keeping due to misalignment of mission (Snow, 2000; Gow, 1999; Posen, 
1999).  Whether this claim, as it pertains to the military is accurate or not, it provides a basis for 
measuring knowledge in a clear and effective manner that this study utilizes.  It can be assumed 
that organizations possess the knowledge necessary to complete operations consistent with their 
primary mission as stated in their mission statements.  Therefore, an ordinal scale that measures 
the match between mission statements and actual activities can be suggested where high match 
indicates high knowledge while low match indicates low knowledge while knowledge flows can 
mitigate low knowledge.  The following scale will be used: 
 1: task and mission are fundamentally misaligned 
 2: task and mission are somewhat misaligned 
 3: task and mission are somewhat aligned 
 4: task and mission are fundamentally aligned 
 
Alignment is determined by coding a mission type from each organization’s mission statement.  
These are accessed on organization websites.  For those with no website, mission types are 
inferred from the network data.  Each mission type has two parts, the substantive field such as 
health, education, or military, and by the space in which the organization focuses its work, 
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including administration, organization, or field work.  Each network interaction then receives the 
same typing, where the content of the interaction determines what kind of activity is being done 
in what space.  Matching across both type and space qualifies as a ‘4’ while matching across 
neither qualifies as a ‘1’.  Partial matches will match only in either type of mission or space of 
operation, fall into categories ‘2’ and ‘3.’ 
3.2.3.3 Effectiveness 
Effectiveness is defined by completing stated mission goals and establishing pre-requisites 
for long-term stability (Cohen, 2006; Einhorn, 2001).  Unlike resilience and capacity, 
effectiveness includes the possibility for a measure that codes for movement away from 
effectiveness; it includes space for a negative measure of effectiveness, although it is not coded 
with a negative number.  Effectiveness has three components, defined and measured as follows: 
 An increase in the completion of aid tasks, which can include social actions towards 
addressing war crimes history 
o 1:  Actions undermine efforts towards completing aid tasks, including slowing or 
inhibiting completion as well as undoing previously completed aid tasks 
o 2:  No action towards aid tasks; Not Applicable 
o 3:  Some action towards organizing/completing task 
o 4:  Significant action towards completing a task 
o 5:  Task completed 
 Government legitimacy in the areas it controls.  This can include separate governing 
structures in the initial geographic area that each have legitimacy in the areas they control. 
o 1:  Actions undermine legitimacy 
 Actions directly question authority of central or local government(s) 
 Actions bring legality of the actions of a public entity into question 
 Actions interfered with operation of post-war international regime 
 Actions demonstrate a lack of support for post-conflict constitutional 
structures 
 Actions complicating or impeding diplomatic relations 
o 2:  Actions have no or neutral impact on legitimacy (includes N/A) 
o 3:  Actions support legitimacy of local government 
 Action taken by the local government with prompting or lead by an 
international organization 
 Actions acknowledged as supporting rule of law/ICTY 
 Actions support legitimate government 
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 Actions against legitimate government are done transparently and 
within the current system 
 Actions involved pursuit or arrest of war criminals 
 Report shows actions promoted and furthered effort at equal treatment of 
ethnic groups  in Bosnia or economic classes in Haiti (See Chapters 5 and 6) 
 Corruption investigation after the target of the investigation is out of office 
o 4: Actions directly supported/aided operation of local governance 
 Requires locally-initiated action(s), according the text of the transaction; the 
local organization need not be the coded as the Initiating Organization 
 International organization supports and aids the local actor in completing a 
locally-oriented and locally-initiated action 
 Corruption investigation where the target of the investigation is in office 
o 5: Actions establishing or smoothing diplomatic relations between governments 
 The formation of links between a legitimate government with resources and knowledge 
o 1:  Actions undermine government connection to resources/tax base or inhibit/slow 
actions to make connections 
o 2:  Actions have no impact on government resources or the content is “Not 
Applicable” for government links to resources 
o 3:  Actions provide government with 1-time donation/provision 
 ex.: extensive, 1-time spending by International Organizations on local 
business/contracting 
 The provision of additional staff to a response effort 
o 4:  Actions provided loan of funds to the government 
 Provision of loan that must be repaid 
 Provision of an internationally-based resource stream applied to a response 
effort for goods or personnel 
o 5:  Actions provide government with resource stream/tax base 
 Development of local industry/business 
 Debt service 
 Locally-based resource stream applied to a response effort 
3.3 ANALYSIS PROCEDURES 
3.3.1 Factor Analysis 
As presented above, the measurement for each concept variable is an aggregate of the observed 
measures of that concept variable’s component variables.  Each concept and component is based 
on a mixture of theoretical and empirical research, cited in the respective sections above.  The 
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result is that it cannot be assumed that the component categories do not overlap either within or 
between concept variables, despite this study’s efforts to ensure that this did not occur.  
Additionally, the magnitude of a change in value between the ordinal categories of different 
components is inconsistent between the components, even as it is as consistent as possible within 
a component.  For these two reasons, simple aggregations, such as sums and averages of the 
ordinal scales will not produce a reliable aggregate measure. 
Since simple aggregation will not produce reliable results, another aggregation method is 
required.  Faced with a similar situation, Cutter et al (2003) solved the problem of generating an 
aggregate measure for potentially correlated data by using a factor analysis to group variables 
into factors, whose loadings can then be utilized in simple summations to generate an aggregate 
score.  This study uses the same method as Cutter et al (2003) to test correlation between the 
component variables with one important difference.  Modern statistical programs
10
 allow for 
several different types of factor analysis.  The most common two methods are principal factors 
and principal component factors, which is also known as principal components analysis. 
Principal  factors analysis is best used for exploring untested correlation between variables, while 
principal  component factors is best used for limiting data and combining variables (Shlens, 
2005).  Cutter et al (2003) utilize principal components factors to combine data from the outset.  
This study’s approach is more exploratory than that done by Cutter et al, so it first uses principal 
factors to explore correlations and then combines data using principal components analysis to 
generate a measure performance across all the components for each network interaction.  As will 
be discussed in more detail in Section 3.3.2, several networks based on study case and time 
frame, named timeslices in network analysis terminology, are constructed for network analysis.  
                                                 
10
 All statistical analyses, including factor analysis and frequency crosstabulations, in this study utilize Intercooled 
Stata 11, using a permanent license purchased through a Stata GradPlan. 
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These same timeslices serve as a basis for a sensitivity analysis of the factor results for the 
correlations between component variables.  Should a consistent pattern of correlation be found in 
the data, then combined scores will be calculated using the principal component factors analysis 
method based on the pattern of positive and negative correlations found in the data.  If no 
consistent pattern of correlation is found following the sensitivity analysis, then the combination 
of the component variables will be skipped and the results analyzed for what patterns are present 
and what those patterns imply about the data generating process.  By identifying correlations 
between components, this analysis will provide insight into the rules and impacts of actions and 
events in the system and speak directly to the relationships between resilience, capacity, and 
effectiveness. 
3.3.2 Network Analysis 
Documenting patterns of interaction and selection in the data will require a more tailored 
approach than statistics offers.  As discussed in Chapter 2, network analysis is the most efficient 
form of analysis for identifying patterns of interaction and selection in a system.  It is a relatively 
simple method of modeling when it includes a single type of node and single type of network 
connection (Butts, 2009), but has the potential to be expanded to encompass very complex 
systems by using multiple types of nodes and multiple networks in a single model, as well as 
charting changes in the network over time.  Standard network analysis includes the simplest 
models.  Adding more node types and networks generates a meta-network analysis (Carley, 
2003), while separating the network into time periods, known as timeslices, generates a dynamic 
network analysis (Carley, 2003).  This makes network analysis a very flexible modeling 
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approach, allowing the researcher to carefully tailor the network models to the action arena under 
study. 
3.3.2.1 Static Network Analysis 
This study will begin its network analysis with the simpler model, analyzing 
organizational networks that treat the data as occurring during a single time slice.  This type is 
called static network analysis to indicate the lack of time variation and to differentiate it from 
dynamic network analysis.  To identify patterns of interaction and selection, the study analyzes 
these networks on both the node level and the network level.  At the node level, the study 
identifies node counts for the network, indicating the number of organizations involved, and the 
study will break node counts down to indicate the number of isolates in the network, or nodes 
that are unconnected to any other nodes.  The study will also identify the key actors in the 
network based on a range of centrality measures.  At the network level, this study will examine 
the network density, or the ratio of the number of connections that are in the network to the 
number of connections that could be in the network.  It will also examine grouping patterns, 
including any clique structures and clustering.  Along with addressing questions of selection, the 
study uses these results to identify macro-structures of the network to determine if the networks 
are small world networks or scale free networks.  This will identify connection patterns across 
the whole of the network, indicating system-level patterns of interaction and selection.  These 
analyses are performed for both cases and their results are presented in Chapters 5 and 6. 
3.3.2.2 Dynamic Network Analysis 
Developing more complicated models like the metanetworks and dynamic network 
analysis requires very rich data to support a very detailed database.  The data used in this study 
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are detailed enough to support to support dynamic network analysis.  The data also contain 
details on the day of publication of the report.  It is less consistent in terms of specifying on 
which days actions occur.  For that reason, the dynamic model will utilize monthly time slices.  
Table 3-3 lists the timeslices for each case.  The timeslices were chosen to match the availability 
of data to measure capacity and effectiveness, ensuring that data for all three concept variables 
are present in the same timeslice.  Slicing the data monthly created an anomaly in the Haiti data 
time frames.  Detailed data become available following the 12 January 2010 Earthquake.  The 
immediate post-earthquake period is defined as the first three weeks following the disaster, 
running 12 January – 1 February, since this is the standard period for the scope of a large-scale 
response to a natural disaster, during which the system develops and lasting patterns take hold 
(Comfort, Siciliano, and Okada, 2011; Scheinert and Konstantinova, 2011; Comfort, 1999).  The 
analyses performed for the static network analysis are repeated for each of the six time slices 
listed below.  This method charts changes in key entities and network structures across time and 
allows for measurement of changes from the initial conditions for each case, which will be 
presented in Chapter 4. 
 
Table 3-3. Network Timeslices 
Timeslice Bosnia and Herzegovina Haiti 
1 December, 2000 12 – 31 January, 2010 
2 July, 2001 1 February 2010 
3 January, 2002 June, 2010 
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3.3.3 Simulation Analysis 
Each of the above analyses only covers part of the picture.  Network analyses can provide rich 
results on the shape of networks and the flow of information through them, providing details on 
the flow of resources and the amount of resilience.  The factor analysis can tie capacity and 
resilience to effectiveness, but only in a limited sense.  The complexity frameworks that this 
study utilizes are necessary because complex adaptive systems violate several of the fundamental 
assumptions of statistical analysis.  In networks, observations are not independent of each other, 
but closely tied through patterns of connections, network roles, and path dependency (Butts, 
2009; Johnson, 2001; Axelrod and Cohen, 2000; Holland, 1995, 1992).  The effects of non-linear 
results in complex systems suggests that effectiveness observed in a specific interaction may not 
be the product of that interaction, but rather the product of other interactions.  Indeed, this pattern 
is regularly observed in the data; often the results of completed aid tasks and aid donations occur 
in an interaction separate from that which saw the resilient action that produced the desired 
outcome.  The result is that often the resilient actions that appear to precipitate an effective result 
occur much earlier in the data than the observed effectiveness, sometimes even in a different 
timeslice.  Additionally, multiple actions are often required to generate enough impact to register 
a measure of effectiveness.  This is another characteristic of complex systems (Johnson, 2001; 
Provan and Milward, 2001; Holland, 1995, 1992; Prigogine, 1984).  Factor analysis provides no 
means for addressing these short comings. 
To address these shortcomings, this study utilizes computer simulation to build a 
dynamic model of a post-conflict reconstruction system and test hypotheses about variations in 
the system.  With its near infinite flexibility, this method allows for operationalization of 
variables in ways more similar to the actual structure of the data generating process, providing 
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tools to social scientists that are not available elsewhere (National Research Council, 2006; 
Gilbert and Troitzsch, 2005).  The method requires extensive preparation to build a valid model.  
The study applies the results from all the preceding analyses, IAD, factor analysis, and network 
analysis to develop and validate a simulation model.  This model is built using the AnyLogic 
software package published by XJTek.  This software allows for embedding a network in an 
agent based simulation model that in turn supports a system dynamics model.  This is the basic 
method that this study uses; agents move through various states that impact the entry of 
resources into the system and the rate of aid task completion, the two clearly measureable 
components of effectiveness.  The movement of organizations through states provides the 
Presence on the Ground component of resilience.  The entry of resources provides the capacity 
measure while the rate of network connections and connection utilization determines the level of 
coordination and adaptation that are the other components of resilience.  The numbers that the 
simulation applies are derived from the empirical results of the factor and network analyses.  The 
construction of this simulation is a large and complex task, with many parts.  Appendix B 
contains the full design notes of the simulation.  The simulation will provide the final step of the 
analysis, drawing together the results from all the preceding analyses. 
3.3.4 Summary of Methods 
Taken together, this research  draws from a variety of data sources to cover two primary cases of 
UN intervention in domestic affairs, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Haiti, one of which splits into 
two distinct periods.  Each of these cases has distinct initial conditions that  serves as a baseline 
for the case.  Each case has separate data sources, determined by history and availability.  Table 
3-4 summarizes the structure of the study, as described above; it lays out how the cases compare 
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and the standpoints from which the study analyzes, and ultimately compares and contrasts, each 
case to build the final conclusions. 
 
Table 3-4. Logic of the Argument Summary 
Case Haiti Bosnia – Herzegovina 
Study Period 2004 – Earthquake Earthquake – 
December, 2010 
1992 – 31 December 2002 
Time of 
Initial 
Conditions 
2004 Internal Ouster of Aristide 1992 Ceasefire Agreement 
1995 Dayton Accords 
Initiating 
Documents 
UNSC Res. 1542 (2004) UNSCR Res. 743 (1992) 
UNSC Res. 1035 (1995) 
Data Sources Formal Reports, 
MINUSTAH sitreps 
OCHA sitreps, CAP 
documents 
IFOR/SFOR CIMIC 
documents, formal 
reports, CAP documents, 
Content of Newspapers 
Data 
Validation 
Semi – Structured Interviews Semi – Structured 
Interviews 
Network 
Analysis 
Static and Dynamic Network Analysis Static and Dynamic 
Network Analysis 
System 
Analysis 
IAD to describe rules; Factor Analysis of 
Component Variable Scores 
IAD; Factor Analysis of 
Component Scores 
Integration 
of Findings 
Comparison of Factor Results; Simulation Analysis 
 
This is still a complicated table, summarizing the mixed methods that are required to 
address a complex policy problem where no one data source does or can provide all the required 
data.  There are multiple roles for the data to play, and certain portions of the data can fill 
multiple roles, while other portions cannot.  Each role is an important piece of the analysis, and 
all roles must be filled to complete the analysis.  This is true as well for the analytic methods.  
The research questions posed approach a system from multiple angles, requiring multiple 
approaches to address them all.  Table 3-5 lays out the connections between research questions, 
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data, and analytic methods.  It shows which data and methods this study uses to answer each 
research question. 
 
Table 3-5. Summary of Research Questions, Data, and Analytic Methods 
Research Question Data Analytic Method 
Who are the actors? Situation Reports, Content of 
Newspapers, CIMIC Documents 
Network Analysis 
What are the system rules? Formal Reports, UNSC Resolutions, 
CAP Documents, Expert Interviews 
Field Visits, 
Factor Analysis 
What are the patterns of interaction? Situation Reports, Content of 
Newspapers, CIMIC Documents 
Network Analysis 
How do actors select actions? Situation Reports, Content of 
Newspapers, CIMIC Documents 
Network Analysis, 
Simulation 
How do actors select which actors 
with whom they will interact? 
Situation Reports, Content of 
Newspapers, CIMIC Documents 
Network Analysis 
What are the patterns of variation in 
the data covered in the preceding 
questions? 
Situation Reports, Content of 
Newspapers, CIMIC Documents 
Network Analysis, 
Simulation 
 
3.3.5 Research Validity 
The validity of the research rests largely on the quality of definitions and measures used for the 
primary research concepts, resilience, capacity, and effectiveness.  These are each complicated 
concepts, open to a variety of definitions and interpretations.  This research explores these 
definitions and offers a fresh conceptualization of the requirements for an effective UN 
intervention to stabilize a conflict zone.  Any conclusions that this research may support will 
include promoting the use of the definitions it proposes for understanding its key variables in 
future research. 
Social network analysis and simulation face the shortcomings inherent in all modeling 
methods.  Much of network analysis and simulation are built on the idea of modeling real world 
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events.  The networks represent models of actions that people or organizations or another class of 
actors took and with which other actors they took those actions.  Simulations represent action, 
outputs, and outcomes with even greater abstraction than network analysis uses.  Network 
analysis and simulation still require simplifying assumptions that hide the full richness and 
complexity of a situation, even as they reach to grasp more of the complexity of a phenomenon 
than more established methods do.  Butts (2009) lays these issues out clearly and succinctly.  By 
exploring the way researchers define nodes and edges in a network, the mathematical terms for a 
network’s representation of an interaction, and how they simplify and operationalize their 
definitions to build a model, Butts shows how improper definitions lead the researcher astray.  
Network analysis and complexity approaches still require the researcher to make assumptions, 
since it is still a modeling task.  These methods do not give license for a non-rigorous approach 
to research utilizing them, but rather a framework in which to grasp greater complexity and 
account for changing situations. 
3.3.6 Expected Findings 
In previous unpublished work, Scheinert (2009) finds some evidence that response and 
reconstruction efforts do not build or utilize the feedback mechanisms that are part of resilient 
structures.  He finds reports that noted that, in financing reconstruction grants and projects, the 
World Bank and other funding organizations considered methods of reviewing the success or 
continued appropriateness of grants already awarded in their aid program for East Timor.  The 
only review done was to determine whether or not projects adhered to their grant applications 
(Schiavo-Campo, 2003), not whether they had the intended impacts or whether a new approach 
to that impact should be attempted, or if the impact itself remained appropriate.  Prepared in 
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2003, it was not yet obvious what the full ramifications would be.  Ten years after the conflict, 
the situation in East Timor began to break down again, as it suffered through continued 
economic stagnation.  Without deeper study or the thorough testing of alternative hypotheses, 
this example gives some reason to expect the hypothesis of this research to be born out in the 
data. 
This study’s final step is exploring explanations for the continued failure of 
reconstruction and nation-building efforts despite the enormous resources that states and 
international organizations and international aid groups devote to the task.  First, the primary 
hypothesis, that both resilience and capacity are needed, will be disproven if all the aspects of 
both are observed in a case but the case does not contain any markers of effectiveness, including 
resumed conflict or economic stagnation and break down that is disproportionate to global 
economic situations.  This analysis requires evidence of communication about the changes in the 
situation, adaptation in the mission to adjust to the changes, followed by a lack of change in 
outcomes.  Since the ability to sort valid from invalid information is part of a resilient system, 
then changes from failure to failure and effectiveness to failure brought about through network 
communication will provide evidence against the primary hypothesis. 
Alternate explanations include that the UN missions are poorly planned beforehand, so 
that they cannot execute the mission or that missions do not properly account for the local 
situation.  Related to this explanation is the view that the missions continually define 
effectiveness in unachievable and inappropriate ways.  This view leads to missions that are 
doomed to failure from the beginning.  If these hypotheses perform better, then they should be 
adopted.  I will consider these possibilities in light of the findings. 
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A third alternative is that a mission may still fail if it does not carefully consider the 
situation’s “initial conditions” in its mission design.  If this is the case, either the factions that 
existed prior the mission will continue to operate or a coherent system between national and 
international actors that could generate a viable, working system will fail to develop.  So long as 
a mission is able to circulate information about risk and about its own adaptations, then even a 
mission with a faulty initial design may reorganize itself into a new design that is likely to be less 
faulty.  While this perspective lengthens a mission’s timeline and increases the overall costs of 
crisis that spawned the response, it could still produce an effective mission. Poor initial research 
by policy makers on the history of the area and its current situation does not necessarily 
eliminate a mission’s ability to be effective. 
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4.0  INITIAL CONDITIONS 
As discussed in Chapter 1, using complex adaptive systems frameworks to compare the 
effectiveness of mission structures requires comparing how each case improved from that case’s 
baseline.  The method does not compare the cases directly, but rather compares cases from 
within each case’s context.  This chapter will lay out how the baseline is defined, including 
setting out what sets of conditions constitute the Initial Conditions of a case.  After defining 
initial conditions, the chapter presents and analyzes the conditions in each case that characterize 
each case’s initial conditions.  Finally, the chapter compares the initial conditions across cases to 
verify the comparability of the cases, as well as provide a sense of the relative positions of the 
baselines for Bosnia-Herzegovina and Haiti.  As the opening stage of this study, this approach 
will ground each case in its context and provide a basis for comparing and contrasting the two 
cases. 
4.1 ROLE AND STATE OF INITIAL CONDITIONS 
4.1.1 Baseline for Analysis 
As mentioned above and discussed more fully in Chapter 1, initial conditions provide the 
baseline for measuring change in a system over time.  Among its other contributions, Comfort’s 
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work Shared Risk (1999) lays out the importance of initial conditions in assessing complex 
systems.  The role that initial conditions play is fundamentally the same role as control groups in 
a laboratory experiment, a placebo group in a drug trial, control variables in cross-sectional and 
panel data statistical regressions (Kennedy, 2003), or controls for nonstationarity in time series 
statistical analysis (Pindyck and Rubenfeld, 1998).  To chart the degree of change, the researcher 
must set a baseline from which to measure that change.  Without that baseline, measurement is 
impossible, and without that measurement of change, analysis is, in turn, impossible.  One of the 
innovations of disaster preparedness and response that Shared Risk makes is to set initial 
conditions as this kind of control mechanism for the analysis of complex systems, and then to 
define the key conditions that constitute a case’s initial conditions. 
4.1.2 Constituent Conditions 
Defining the set of initial conditions for a complex adaptive system first requires defining what 
set of conditions make up the initial conditions.  In Shared Risk, Comfort defines initial 
conditions as, “the existing state of the community at risk prior to a specific hazardous event.  It 
includes the basic resources available for learning and action, as well as the current operating 
context of the community” (1999, 34).  This is a broad definition that sets the basic formulation 
that initial conditions represent the pre-extreme event context in which the event and the 
subsequent response will later take place.  Comfort further refines that definition, “as the existing 
state of technical, organizational, and cultural practices in the community prior to the occurrence 
of a given disaster event” (1999, 41).  These three aspects represent the full context of a response 
to a natural disaster.  The state of technical practices provides a basis for the set of tools and 
infrastructure that the response will have at its disposal.  The organizational practices will detail 
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the laws and set of organizations, including government actors, within which a response must 
work.  The cultural practices, finally, define the means and methods a responder must utilize to 
work with the other individuals involved in the response.  Taken together, these are the full set of 
contextual practices for the operation of a response, and so define the set of states and practices 
that define initial conditions for a complex adaptive system. 
At an even more fundamental level than the questions for analysis that they present, the 
complex adaptive systems analysis frameworks, presented throughout Chapters 1, 2, and 3, 
layout the key understanding that any complex system exists by its own context and rules and 
that analyzing one requires analyzing it according to its own context and rules.  The indication 
for initial conditions is that these conditions will be a function of the rules and context of the 
specific system.  What this means is that the technical, organizational, and cultural practices 
present in the initial conditions will depend on the locality of the response.  The consequence for 
any analysis is that each case under study will require an independent assessment of the initial 
conditions of that case in reference to locality. 
The type of extreme event will impact the relevant set of initial conditions.  In the case of 
conflict, these conditions will further embed in the political and economic conditions that 
precipitated the conflict; in these cases risk represents the risk of conflict occurrence or 
recurrence, where the initial conditions include the post-conflict state of the arguments that 
caused the initial conflict.  In the cases that Comfort (1999) analyzes, this is not part of the 
context since, while the response is certainly political, and the argument about causes may be 
political too,
11
 the advent and fact of the disaster is not political.  In an armed conflict, the causes 
are inherently political, and often have an economic aspect.  The result is that, in a conflict 
                                                 
11
 The patterns that flooding in New Orleans took after Hurricane Katrina represent a situation where the flooding in 
the individual neighborhoods, particularly the Lower 9
th
 Ward, took on a political dimension. 
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situation, the initial conditions include the state of political, economic, and organizational 
conditions.  In this list, aspects of Comfort’s original list change some places.  With a larger 
importance on political conditions, some aspects of the organizational and cultural practices shift 
to the political conditions, while others shift to the economic conditions.  These are the 
organizational conditions along with the state of communications technology and physical 
infrastructure that govern the operations of organizations at all levels.  This provides a slightly 
different list of initial conditions for a post-conflict situation than for a post-natural disaster 
situation.  The change in causes of the extreme event lead to a change in focus of the initial 
conditions, making political conditions more important following a conflict than following a 
natural disaster. 
These conditions, political, economic, and organizational, form the initial conditions to 
the conflict event.  The initial conditions of the response also include the events of the conflict, 
especially including the events that ended the active fighting, since the pre-war conditions, the 
conflict, and its termination, are all closely connected, and jointly, through the path dependency 
of complex systems, define context of any post-conflict reconstruction.  This is the approach 
utilized by this study.  In the context of post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction, I define 
initial conditions as the political, economic, and organizational conditions that existed prior to, 
and developed during, the conflict.  To analyze these conditions, I present first the pre-conflict 
conditions, then the key aspects and events of the conflict, and how the conflict ended to 
properly seat the post-conflict environment in its historical context. 
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4.2 INITIAL CONDITIONS IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA 
In its broadest strokes, the initial conditions of the UN stabilization and reconstruction mission in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina lie in the end of European communism and the wars that occurred 
throughout the former Yugoslavia as that state broke up.  The fracture lines of Yugoslavia’s 
constituent ethnicities drove this break up and the break up, in turn, followed along these lines, 
with new political borders forming along Yugoslavia’s standing ethnic borders (Hayden, 2000).  
The political, economic, and organizational conditions that existed in Bosnia at the start of 
stabilization and reconstruction efforts will, therefore, be the conditions that existed by end of the 
Bosnian War, and the resultant levels of infrastructure destruction, ethnic relations, and the 
remnants of economic activities following the impacts of a war that also disrupted the transition 
from a command economy to a market economy. 
4.2.1 Political Conditions 
The dominant aspect of political organization in Bosnia is the distribution of the nations present 
within Bosnia, the Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs.  A single, simple logic has defined political and 
social structures within the borders of Bosnia, since before the former Socialist Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia.  This logic is that, “the Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs form separate groups and the 
politics fall into line accordingly” (Hayden, 2011).  These three groups constitute nearly all of 
the Bosnian population.  In popular American parlance, they would be called Bosnia’s main 
ethnic groups.  A key aspect for understanding the relations between these ethnicities, 
particularly as communist states broke apart in Europe and Asia, is the parlance in the Balkans 
uses a different term, “nation.”  This usage follows the definition that the term nation has as part 
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of the academic jargon of the international relations field; it follows the definition of nation 
discussed throughout chapters 1 and 2 that makes the concept of nation-building so problematic.  
In this parlance, nation-building is the building of a national consciousness, and a nation-state is 
one whose state borders correspond to national borders (Hayden, 2011).  When Yugoslavia 
would ultimately break up, the new borders would develop to follow those national divisions.  
Through the rest of Yugoslavia, this was relatively simple since the rest of state’s federal units 
each contained a population that was largely ethnically homogenous.  In Bosnia, in the 
geographic center of Yugoslavia, these lines would cross, and so set the stage for a contest over 
whether or not, and how, to change them (Burg and Shoup, 1999). 
4.2.1.1 Bosnian Nations 
To a more optimistic observer, it would seem the answer to this would be to initiate an 
externally-driven effort at actual nation-building, to build a Bosnian nation from the Bosniaks, 
Bosnian Croats, and Bosnian Serbs.  This goal would be optimistic nearly to point of naiveté.  A 
great deal of ink has been spilled by specialists on the relations of Balkan nations by scholars 
both from the Balkans and from outside.  This discussion consistently focuses on the continued 
strife and distrust between so many of them, particularly those present in Bosnia.  The history of 
the area is one of shifting imperial conquests and borders.  After sitting astride Roman and 
Byzantine borders, the medieval Banate and Kingdom of Bosnia would first be overrun by, and 
then see the high water mark of, the Ottoman Turks, whose influence would lead some ethnic 
Serbs to convert from Serbian Orthodox to Muslim, and so make the Bosniak nation.  Bosnia’s 
northern border with Croatia would hold for a long time as the highly militarized border between 
the Ottoman and Austrian empires, with each side placing militarized Serbian populations on 
opposing sides of the border (Burg and Shoup, 1999).  These regions, one in Croatia and one in 
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northern Bosnia, still have large Serb populations, and are referred to as a krajina, the Serbo-
Croatian word for a military border.  When the Ottomans withdrew, the Austro-Hungarians took 
over.  After World War I, when the Austria-Hungary broke up, Bosnia would become part of the 
Kingdom of Yugoslavia, under the pre-war Serbian royal family.  Finally, after World War II, it 
would be an important part of Marshall Josip Broz Tito’s power base in the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia.  Through all the ebb and flow of empires, the various nations would 
sometimes fall on different sides of the border and in different armies, sometimes on the same 
sides. 
Throughout these periods, one or another nation would rule over the others.  Under 
Ottoman rule, this was the Bosniaks.  To this day, Serbs and Croats still refer to Bosniaks as 
“Turks” (Bosnia Respondent 2).  During World War II, a fascist Croatian state would oppress the 
other nations, and Serbs dominated during the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.  This history helped 
generate the resistance of Bosniak leaders to greater Serb centralization after Tito’s death 
(Hayden, 2000; Burg and Shoup, 1999).  Scholars have noted how national identities in Bosnia 
were at least as much about who was not a member as they were about finding members with 
shared language, history, and customs (Hayden, 2011, 2005; Balkan Battlegrounds: Volume 1, 
2002; Burg and Shoup, 1999), but it took a fiction writer to truly express the subtleties and 
complexities of the situation.  Ivo Andric, himself Bosnian, captured the tensions in his Nobel 
Prize winning novel The Bridge of the Drina (1945).  Based in historical events, the novel 
captures life in a small town in Eastern Bosnia, Visegrad.  No Croats are present in this town, but 
Serbs, Bosniaks, and Jews are present.  National identity is rarely discussed openly in the minds 
and discussions of the characters, but it is an ever-present factor in decisions on who can and 
cannot be trusted, on what places in society were accessible.  Town leaders always contained at 
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least one member from the present nationalities, though sometimes one member of that group 
would be closer to the ruling empire, so long as all three did not see that empire as an outsider.  
Cross-national relationships could form, but were rare.  Scholars have found this pattern where, 
mostly in cities, and in Sarajevo above the rest, national identity could fade away at the personal 
level, but only slowly (Burg and Shoup, 1999).  In 1981, 5.4% of the Yugoslav population self-
identified as “Yugoslav” (Ramet, 1984, 21).  By 1991, this had not expanded; throughout 
Bosnia, only six cities would see self-identification of “Yugoslavs” reach 10% of the population 
or more.  Table 4-1 lists those cities, including the neighborhoods and surrounds of Sarajevo, 
which are included as a comparison, since they follow similar patterns to the cities outside of the 
six with the largest “Yugoslav” populations (Burg and Shoup, 1999, 30-32). 
 
Table 4-1. Bosnian Cities with "Yugoslav" Populations of 10% or More in 1991 
City Percentage “Yugoslav” 
Banja Luka 12.0 
Bosanski Brod 10.6 
Mostar 10.0 
Tuzla 16.6 
Zenica 10.8 
Sarajevo  
 Centar 16.4 
 Hadzici 3.4 
 Ilidza 7.6 
 Ilijas 4.6 
 Novi Grad 11.4 
 Novo Sarajevo 15.8 
 Pale 2.4 
 Stari Grad 6.4 
 Trnovo 1.0 
 Vogosca 7.0 
 
The picture that remains is a complicated one.  It has a simple, primary rule; the members of the 
three separate nations live separately in the same communities.  Under the right conditions, the 
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members of the community can mix, and the lines between nations blur.  The Bosniak population 
actively sought peaceful relations between the various Yugoslav nations (Burg and Shoup, 
1999), but this blurring only happens slowly over time, at a rate that has been insufficient to 
generate any kind of Bosnian nation between a new set of events that re-solidify distrust among 
the members of the nation. 
4.2.1.2 Yugoslav Federalism 
Even while it is a simplification of the truth, the maxim that Yugoslav nations form 
separate communities and that politics falls into line with those is still accurate.  That the break-
up of Yugoslavia followed along internal national borders is a product of how Yugoslav 
domestic structures treated those borders and how domestic politics flowed from them (Hayden, 
2000).  Ethnic tensions persisted right through World War I, despite Austrian efforts to downplay 
it.  The tensions continued through the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, where the tensions between 
Croats and Serbs created multiple governmental and constitutional crises (Burg and Shoup, 
1999).  The Socialist Federation Yugoslavia had some success in addressing “the national 
question” by first suppressing nationalist expression (Burg and Shoup, 1999) while also 
providing separate, parallel political tracks and spheres for members of the different nationalities 
(Hayden, 2011). 
It still took Tito’s leadership and strength to hold the state together (Ramet, 1984).  When 
Tito died, no new leader was able to step up and fill the leadership role.  To fill this role, the state 
devolved more power onto several federal republics, including two independent provinces within 
the Serbian republic.  Each republic roughly matched the national homeland of one nation or 
another, including Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Montenegrins, and Macedonians.  The exception was 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, with no majority nation.  Ramet’s study (1984) aimed to find out why these 
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republics had separated.  Ramet’s study finds that the republics worked largely independent of 
each other, in a way that resembled an international balance of power system, with shifting 
alliances, and careful strategic calculations about when to negotiate and when to provoke a crisis 
to protect its own interests.  Even this formulation would begin to break down, and ultimately 
fail in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s when the first free elections since World War II saw 
support for nationalist political parties grow, with more willingness to use crises to defend their 
interests, which were more and more narrowly defined, until Yugoslavia would finally break 
apart amidst a series of constitutional and governmental crises; even popular leadership 
following Tito had been unable to hold the country together (Hayden, 2000). 
4.2.2 Economic Conditions 
Scholarship on the start of the Bosnian War largely ignores the economic conditions in 
Yugoslavia as the country broke up and the war began.  Researchers seem satisfied with 
explanations from nationalism and political crises.  These explanations, touched upon above, are 
rich and complete and generally do not require additional economic data to paint a full picture.  
Where the economic conditions loom larger is in establishing the immediate post-war conditions.  
Hayden (2000) makes it clear that the break-up of Yugoslavia was not inevitable, even with 
Tito’s death.  Economic ties remained across republican borders and the 1970’s and 1980’s had 
seen dramatic increases in the amount of cross-national marriage and individuals self-identifying 
as “Yugoslavs” (Hayden, 2000).  Still, the break-up occurred, severing those ties just as socialist 
economic models lost their legitimacy.  The economic rules changed as markets became freer, 
and some radically so as black markets asserted themselves under the cover of the war and sieges 
in Bihac, Srebrenica, and Sarajevo (Andreas, 2008; Balkan Battlegrounds, Vol. 1, 2002).  What 
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impacts these events had or would have had in Bosnia are difficult to assess, as the war quickly 
followed them, bringing its own dislocations, destruction, and new industry. 
This pattern then repeated as Bosnia ripped itself apart in the war, creating mass 
population dislocation and directly destroying infrastructure and economic bases, all at the same 
time as the war dramatically shifted the location of wealth and expanded organized crime, 
particularly in the besieged cities (Andreas, 2008; Balkan Battlegrounds, Vol. 1, 2002; Burg and 
Shoup, 1999).  The war did have some creative abilities, as nearly all wars do.  War requires the 
production of arms and munitions.  These industries, along with the majority of Yugoslavia’s 
industrial base had been located elsewhere, primarily in Slovenia and Croatia (Bosnia 
Respondent 2, 2011; Balkan Battlegrounds, Vol. 1, 2002).  Now largely cutoff from those supply 
bases, and, particularly for the Bosniaks, with a great need for those supplies, a small industrial 
base in munitions did develop, even as most efforts went into finding ways to import arms and 
munitions from abroad (Balkan Battlegrounds, Vol. 1, 2002).  Nevertheless, by 1995, the war 
had eliminated roughly 80% of Bosnian economic output and led to enormous unemployment 
(“Bosnia and Herzegovina”, 2012).  The result is that, at the time of the start of reconstruction, 
there was very little economic activity to speak of, despite the lack of economic causes to the 
war. 
4.2.3 Organizational Capacity 
The story on Bosnian organizational capacity is very similar to that of the economic conditions.  
The communist era had seen enough peace to support the development of a reliable infrastructure 
within the technology available in the early 1990’s.  Impressive communist-era infrastructure 
projects, particularly road and rail bridges through the mountainous region are still readily visible 
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today.
12
  The infrastructure technology used prior to the war was still that of most Eastern Bloc 
countries, electrical grid designs even through to today that have not been common in the cities 
of North America and Western Europe since before World War II, including streetcar designs 
and overhead electrical wires in the cities in portions of some cities.  The designs may be dated, 
but the electrical grid was reliable throughout the war, except in besieged cities; Sarajevo did not 
have reliable electrical power during the war, due to being cut off by the besieging Serb forces.  
Cellular technology is ubiquitous in Bosnia today, but had not yet been developed in the early 
1990’s.  Instead, military communications were conducted by radio (Balkans Battlegrounds, Vol. 
1, 2002).  While it was certainly damaged, infrastructure generally was not the main target of the 
military combatants, and so came through the war in better condition that might have been 
expected. 
The challenging aspect of the state of the organizational capacity in Bosnia after the war 
came from the transition to a market economy and the duplication of infrastructure and utility 
providers that resulted from each nation operating its own utilities and transportation firms.  
First, under Yugoslavia, these firms had been government-owned enterprises, a status that would 
not have time to change prior to the start of the war.  Instead, the international community, 
through the Office of the High Representative (OHR) would lead an effort to privatize 
government-owned businesses after the signing of the Dayton Accords (OHR Website).  During 
the war, the separate nations needed these separate utilities, since any other utility lay across 
enemy lines, and each side of the three-way war received different levels of support.  The Serb 
forces, the Vojska Republika Srpska (VRS) had received military material, both arms and 
logistical support from the Yugoslav National Army (JNA), as it retrenched after Croatian 
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 This study’s author observed them first hand during field work in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
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secession.  The Croat forces, the Croatian Defense Council (HVO) received a more grudging, 
and less thorough, support from the new Croatian Army (HV) that had just expelled the JNA 
from Croatia, but so far failed to assert control over the whole of the territory that Croatia 
claimed.  The Bosniak forces (ARBiH), organized under the official Bosnian government was 
left to fend for itself (Balkan Battlegrounds, Vol. 1, 2002).  After the war, the utilities continued 
operating in the separate geographic regions, and serving the same populations.  This led to 
separate telecom companies serving different segments of the population and different rail 
companies that operated the trains in different parts of the country, but not doing so in market 
competition, but as the utility provider to either the Bosniaks, Croats, or Serbs, but not to other 
two.  The post-war period would include efforts to unify these utilities (OHR Media Round-ups), 
particularly within the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH), where that entity 
contained both the Croat and Bosniak populations.  Utilities needed to be repaired and restored, 
but more than the physical infrastructure, the challenge was in addressing the duplication of 
utilities across nationalities. 
4.2.4 The 1992 – 1995 Bosnian War 
It is not necessary here to review the entirety of the military operations of the three year long 
war.  Several aspects are particularly important and have particularly important bearings the 
post-war period.  In broad strokes, the Bosnian War was a three way war between the three 
nations, the recitation of whose names should now be familiar.  It featured shifting alliances, 
particularly between the Bosniaks and Croats, who both opposed the Serbs in the first year, 
fought each other in the second, and then allied and coordinated together against the Serbs in the 
third year.  In that first year, the Serbs seized control of much of the country.  In the last year, 
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NATO began airstrikes against the Serbs to defend the UNPROFOR safe areas in eastern Bosnia.  
Most western observers credit those airstrikes with forcing an end to the fighting (Balkan 
Battlegrounds, Vol. 1, 2002), but this is only a truly convincing argument when the battlefield 
success of the Croat and Bosniak alliance is ignored (Bosnia Respondent 1, 2011). 
At the same time as the airstrikes, Croatia launched Operation Storm that conquered the 
Republic of Serb Krajina (RSK), the remaining Serbian enclave in the internationally recognized 
Croatian borders.  Croatia had been unable to seize control of this largely Serb-populated statelet 
during its own war for independence, and so had been forced to accept an autonomous region 
within Croatia.  In 1995, Operation Storm eliminated the RSK and exposed the VRS’s eastern 
flank.  That summer, Operation Mistral followed Operation Storm as a combined and 
coordinated Bosniak and Croat attack drove through Serb-controlled lands in western Bosnia, 
nearly reaching the large cities, including the Serb capital, Banja Luka, in the Bosnian Krajina, in 
northwest Bosnia.  This offensive relieved the Serb siege of the Bosniak-held Bihac pocket in the 
far northwest corner of Bosnia, thereby freeing the forces necessary to finally lift the siege of 
Sarajevo that had started in 1992, and put sufficient pressure on Serb forces and population 
centers to drive the Serbs to the peace table in earnest (Bosnia Respondent 1, 2011; Balkan 
Battlegrounds, Vol. 1, 2002).  The Dayton negotiations had already begun by the time this 
operation ended, so that it was a lasting ceasefire that would lift the siege of Sarajevo, not 
military force. 
This resolution asserted a military balance of power that left no clear winner to the war.  
The war had been fought over national goals, to establish and validate a national majority for the 
would-be winning side.  The remaining power of the VRS and the memory of its effectiveness 
from the first year of the war meant that the Croats and Bosniaks were ready to negotiate, even 
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as they had established an advantage on the battlefield of sufficient strength that the Serbs were 
forced to recognize their vulnerability (Balkan Battlegrounds, Vol. 1, 2002; Chandler, 2000; 
Burg and Shoup, 1999).  The result is that the main issue that led to the war was not resolved on 
the battlefield (Chandler, 2000).  Instead, the new state would have to find a way to peacefully 
include all sides of the former combatants, with each asserting some claims to victory. 
In this kind of ethnic war, infrastructure was not a main target, but the very population 
itself was.  It was that goal, the adjustment of the national balance and the establishment of a 
majority nation, which made the ethnic cleansing activities that would grab the attention of an 
international audience so desirable to the belligerents.  The most infamous event is, without a 
doubt, what happened in the UN enclave around Srebrenica, in 1995, but it is far from the only 
incident, and no side was innocent of ethnic cleansing (Balkan Battlegrounds, Vol. 1, 2002).  
Refugee populations streamed from every corner of Bosnia, drawing the attention of the UN 
High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR).  In connection with UNPROFOR, the UNHCR, 
already active in the region following humanitarian efforts in Croatia and based in Sarajevo, 
began humanitarian efforts to support civilian populations.  The most visible part of this effort 
was the UNHCR-organized and operated airlift, which ultimately delivered more aid than any 
airlift in human history, including the 1948 Berlin Airlift, to the population suffering under the 
longest siege in human history
13
 (Andreas, 2008; Balkan Battlegrounds, Vol. 1, 2002; Burg and 
Shoup, 1999).  Despite their efforts, UNPROFOR and the UNHCR would be unable to prevent 
ethnic cleansing, including failing to defend the UN Protected Area in Srebrenica. 
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 Andreas (2008) also argues that the airlift was a key factor in allowing the siege to last so long, since it allowed 
the citizens of Sarajevo to hold out against the siege far longer than they would otherwise have been able without the 
supplies that the airlift provided. 
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4.2.5 Post-War Political Organization 
Fighting in the Bosnian War ended with the 1995 Dayton Accords.  By the time the leaders in 
Bosnia reached this agreement, they had already negotiated several different cease fires with 
international involvement, none of which had held (Balkan Battlegrounds, Vol. 1, 2002; Burg 
and Shoup, 1999).  The various armies had, instead, used them as a way to try and buy time for 
themselves to gain tactical and strategic advantages on the battlefield while not courting the kind 
of international opposition that the Serbs would eventually garner following the events in 
Srebrenica.  In the end, a combination of strategic balance and war weariness allowed the 
ceasefire and accords to hold (Balkan Battlegrounds, Vol. 1, 2002).  The main document of the 
Dayton Accords contains little more than agreements to adhere to various main pieces of 
international law, such as the United Nations Charter, and to cooperate fully with all involved 
parties.  The main substance of the Accords is in the 11 Annexes, which defined the post-war 
political structure. 
4.2.5.1 The Bosnian Constitution 
The current Bosnian Constitution is Annex 4 to the Accords, signed by heads of 
government of Bosnia, Croatia, and Yugoslavia.
14
  The Bosnian Constitution is designed to 
protect the access to power for all three nations, while also balancing them against each other.  
The main feature split the country into two entities:  the Republika Srpska (RS) and the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH).  The RS was reserved as the Serb entity and 
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President Slobodan Milosevic and the international conference in Rambouillet, France that ended fighting in 
Kosovo. 
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accorded 49% of the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH).  The FBiH 
contains the rest of the territory of BiH and is further subdivided into 10 cantons, 5 of which are 
Bosniak majority, 3 Croat, and 2 mixed between Bosniaks and Croats.  The Constitution also 
features a tripartite presidency, with one seat reserved for each of the nations, and a bicameral 
legislature with one house, the House of Peoples, which has five members from each nation, and 
the House of Representatives, with five members from the RS and ten members from the FBiH.  
In line with the goal to protect the rights of each nation, the Constitution created a federal 
structure that placed the majority of governing powers at the entity level, with many of the 
powers further devolved to the cantonal governments in the FBiH (Dayton Accords, 1995).  This 
created a weak central government that is often undermined by uncooperative members of one 
nation or another and a lack of will for governing (Bosnia Respondents 8 and 9, 2011; OHR 
Media Round-ups; Chandler, 2000). 
4.2.5.2 The Office of the High Representative 
Annex 10 defines what it calls “Civilian Implementation.”  What this means in practice is 
the structure and powers of the Office of the High Representative.  The office is held by an 
international official, appointed in conjunction with the United Nations and the European Union, 
and answerable to various international bodies, but not any BiH official or organization.  The 
purpose of the office is to ensure nationalist pressures do not again create the atmosphere for 
war.  To this end, the OHR is granted the power to do what it deems necessary to implement the 
Accords (Dayton Accords, 1995).  Though these powers are not mentioned, that has meant in 
practice the ability to control access to the ballot, removing those who the office deems are 
unacceptable, and cancel laws and legislation that contravene peaceful goals and compel laws in 
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support of those goals in BiH (Hayden, 2011; Bose, 2002; OHR Media Round-ups; Chandler, 
2000). 
4.2.5.3 The IPTF, UNMIBH, and IFOR 
Annex 11 established the International Police Task Force (IPTF) that would later join 
with UNPROFOR to the United Nations Mission and Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH).  
Formally established in UNSC Res. 1035 (1995), its inclusion in Annex 11 gave the IPTF legal 
grounds under Chapter 6 of the UN Charter.  Under the IPTF, the mission had jurisdiction to 
advise, train, and support local law enforcement.  When the IPTF expanded into UNMIBH, it 
added UNPROFOR activities including demining, humanitarian relief and refugees, human 
rights activities, oversight of elections, and physical reconstruction.  These activities were to be 
done in close coordination with the OHR and NATO’s IFOR (“Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 2003), 
the military peacekeeping force, established under Annex 1A of the Dayton Accords (Dayton 
Accords, 1995).  Between the four major international actors, OHR, IPTF, UNMIBH, and IFOR, 
the international community would oversee or control a large portion of post-war governance. 
The mandates for all of these stated outright that the goal was to hand over these tasks to the 
local government as the government became ready to handle them (OHR; “Bosnia and 
Herzegovina,” 2003; “SFOR Mission,” 2003).  To date, only IPTF/UNMIBH has closed its 
mission.  OHR still operates; IFOR became SFOR in September, 1996, which, in turn handed its 
responsibilities to the EU Force (EUFOR) on 2 December 2004, which still operates.  These 
organizations formed a strong international contingent, legally established with ratification of the 
Dayton Accords. 
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4.3 INITIAL CONDITIONS IN HAITI 
In its broadest strokes, the initial conditions of the UN stabilization and reconstruction in Haiti 
lie in the turbulent, and frequently violent, political climate that emerged in Haiti during the 
Duvalier dictatorship, but which continued well after the dictatorship’s end.  The main cleavage 
of Haitian society is that between the rich and the poor (Haiti Informants 1, 2, 3, and 6, 2010), 
which, like the fracture lines in Bosnia, played an important role in driving the conflict (Haiti 
Informants 2 and 5, 2010; ICG, 2004).  The political, economic, and organizational conditions 
that existed in Haiti at the start of stabilization and reconstruction efforts will, therefore, be the 
conditions that existed following the on-going political instability that persisted after a series of 
electoral crises, and the level of infrastructure dilapidation following decades of neglect that 
were both cause and effect on decades of economic stagnation and extreme poverty. 
4.3.1 Political Conditions 
The roots of the 2005 uprising lie in the on-going turbulence of the Haitian polity following the 
ouster of the despotic Duvalier regime.  A popular uprising in 1986 drove out “Baby Doc” 
Duvalier (ICG, 2004), offering the promise of peace and democracy.  Instead, it ushered in a 
period of political turmoil and instability, with occasional violence, that has led many Haitians to 
remember the Duvalier years with surprising fondness, since, as repressive as it was, government 
at least functioned at that point, when today the political environment is defined by government 
and police corruption, organized crime, and a lack of faith in government by all segments of 
society (Haiti Informant 3, 2010). 
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4.3.1.1 Recent Historic Political Context 
Haiti saw its election to be considered fair and free in 1990.  It followed the departure of 
Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier in 1986 and four years of troubled transition.  Jean-Bertrand 
Aristide, the former Catholic priest and the leader of a center-left coalition, won a strong 
majority in the election, with 67% of the vote (ICG, 2004).  Bridging a fundamental divide in 
Haitian society by being able to speak Haitian Creole in addition to the French spoken by the 
standing Haitian Elite, Aristide provided promise for reform and advancement in the lives of 
non-elite Haitians.  He lacked, however, strong support from the very elite that had held power in 
Haiti, including the army and the business community.  This lack of support turned into a 
military coup in 1991 that controlled the government until a UN-backed, US-led intervention 
deposed the military rulers and restored Aristide, in September, 1994 (ICG, 2004).  The violence 
of the Duvalier’s had driven a mass revolt against them, but then dissatisfaction among the elite 
had driven out Aristide.  It required international intervention to restore him to power.  While 
presenting the appearance of success, this was to be only the first act of on-going drama that has 
yet to resolve. 
The second act would occur at the constitutional end of Aristide’s first term.  In an effort 
to promote the rule of law, the US secured Aristide’s agreement to resign at the end of his term, 
in 1995, without the additional three years in power to replace his time in exile that Aristide 
wanted.  This was only achieved, though, through strong diplomatic pressure.  Aristide’s desire 
to hold on to power would soon after produce a split between him and his hand-picked successor, 
Rene Preval (ICG, 2004).  Aristide then withdrew his supporters from the coalition that 
supported Preval and started a governing crisis that, in 1998, would prevent effective rule by 
preventing the post of Prime Minister from being filled, stalling the government and 
 96 
undermining foreign aid and credit (ICG, 2004).  This time also saw a rise political violence as 
paramilitary gangs rose in prominence and impact, and drug trafficking and corruption spread in 
the Haitian National Police (HNP).  The process finally ground to a complete halt when the 
Preval government was unable to organize local and parliamentary elections in late 1998.  When 
the elections finally did occur, along with a presidential election, in 2000, voter turnout was low, 
monitors reported widespread irregularities, and the opposition largely boycotted the election.  
Aristide was re-elected with a huge, but questionable electoral margin (ICG, 2004).  Aristide’s 
return to power and the economic impacts of five troubled years in an already desperately poor 
country set to stage the third act of political crisis starting in 2001, and culminating directly in 
the fourth act, the armed insurgency of 2004, both of which will be discussed below. 
4.3.1.2 Political Climate Prior to 2004 
 
Table 4-2. Pattern of Haitian Social Cleavage 
 Haitian Elite 
(the “Have’s”) 
Haitian General 
Population 
(the “Have-not’s”) 
International Actors 
Wealth Level High Very Low Variable/High 
Language French Creole English (Spanish in 
Caribbean interstate 
organizations) 
Political Power Yes No Limited 
 
 
Much of Haitian political and economic activity is defined by the politico-economic 
cleavages that define Haitian society.  Table 4-2 describes these cleavages.  There are three 
separate, primary groups operating in Haiti, the “Have’s,” the “Have-not’s,” and the international 
actors.  Their separation from each other is near complete, with only special cases and certain 
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sub-classes each group having much interaction across dividing lines, which will be discussed in 
Chapter 6.  The two fundamental divisions are language and wealth.  Wealthy Haitians, the Elite, 
of either race, whether white or black, live in large estates in the hills outside above cities like 
Port-au-Prince.  The property they do hold in the city is behind the walls of gated compounds, 
and their wealth allows them to hire private security firms to protect both, and to maintain 
private sources for utilities, such as electrical generators, so that they are not subject to 
inconsistent Haitian utility infrastructure.  Finally, they signal to all their status by speaking 
French.  In these ways, they create a segregated community for themselves, separated from the 
crime and poverty on the streets (Haiti Informants 1, 2, and 3, 2010), and do so in ways that are 
clearly observable from the street. 
This is set in opposition to the Haitian poor, who lack any resources to have recourse to 
escape the daily challenges created by overly crowded streets, unreliable utilities, and densely 
packed, overcrowded housing.  Theirs is the Haitian Creole that identifies them to each other in 
unregulated street business and any political discourse.  Aristide endeared himself to this 
population by using that Creole.  For the urban poor, they are subject to the crime and poverty in 
which they are perpetually embedded, and which makes it difficult for any one individual to 
escape this circumstance.  For the rural poor, access to utilities and services such as health and 
education is unlikely, living in small villages largely disconnected by poorly maintained roads 
that make travel difficult much beyond the village (Haiti Informant 3, 2010).  In some ways, 
these are two separate communities of the poor, who face different kinds of poverty, but still 
both face extreme poverty, and have more in common with each other than with either the 
wealthy or the international community. 
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Finally, the international community operates within its own sphere.  Though some small 
aid groups do embed themselves in the Haitian population, primarily outside of Port-au-Prince in 
both small cities and in rural areas, the international community generally walls itself off from 
the local population.  The aid community does this due to the history of crime and violence, 
including kidnapping for ransom (Haitian Informant 5, 2010).  Most interaction  with either of 
the other groups that does occur courts involvement and support of Haitian governing institutions 
under considerations of international law to gain legal basis for their operations.  They too 
separate themselves by language as well, primarily working in English, and sometimes in 
Spanish.  Though the separation here is not by means of geography and physical walls, the way it 
is for the Haitian wealthy, it is just as complete with language and security cordons. 
4.3.2 Economic Conditions 
The story of Haiti’s economic conditions is well known.  Among development researchers, 
Haiti’s status as being among the poorest of the poor is well established.  As of 2004, the World 
Bank listed Haiti officially as a Low Income Country.  That category is defined as the countries 
with annual per capita income of less than US$765 (Sachs, 2005, Map 9).  As of 2005, 54% of 
the Haitian population lived on less than US$1 per day, and 78% on less than US$2 per day, with 
a Gross National Income (GNI) per capita of only $450 per year.  Through the middle of the 
1990’s, Haiti saw four continuous years of economic contraction, with one of those, 1992, seeing 
a greater than 10% drop in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and GDP per capita, and another, 
1994 seeing almost a 10% drop in both GDP and GDP per capita.  Haiti did see small amounts of 
economic growth after 1995, but only until 2000, when it against turns negative, but only small 
amounts of contraction until 2005, when the data again shows growth (“Haiti at a Glance,” 
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2006).  The picture is even worse when viewing World Bank Governance Indicators.  These are 
five indicators that rank countries relative to each other on Voice and accountability, Political 
stability, Regulatory quality, Rule of law, and Control of corruption.  Ranked in 2000 and in 
2004, only Regulatory quality increased, and only the 2000 ranking on Voice and accountability 
reached the 25
th
 percentile of countries.  By 2004, Voice and accountability, Political stability, 
and Control of corruption all saw stark drops in the percentile obtained (“Haiti at a Glance,” 
2006).  A participant in the World Bank’s Heavily Indebted Poor Countries program (“Heavily 
Indebted Poor Countries,” 2012), the picture these data paint is a clear one of extensive poverty.  
There is, effectively, no middle class to speak of (Haiti Informants 2, 3, and 4, 2010).  A more 
detailed picture includes the large social and economic divide between Haiti’s rich and poor, 
discussed above.  In this revision, the picture shows a small portion of the population rich 
enough to completely control a country, the rest of whose population is too poor to be able to 
take a significant role in politics and policy. 
4.3.3 Organizational Capacity 
The organizational picture in Haiti is much the same as the economic picture, except that there is 
some more promise for future improvement.  By 2010, cellphones and cellphone coverage had 
become ubiquitous, particularly in Port-au-Prince, but it is unclear how thorough this penetration 
was in 2004.  In 2000, the most recent year with data, only 24.3% of roads were paved.  In 2005, 
54% of the population had access to improved water sources, and only 30% had access to 
improved sanitation facilities (“Haiti at a Glance,” 2006).  What infrastructure is present, 
including roads, power grid, and the hydroelectric plant that serves Port-au-Prince, is aging and 
dilapidated.  Road beds are heavily pock-mocked with holes, and sometimes the entire bed is 
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gone.  Foundations on power lines are insecure, and, even without earthquake trembling, will 
sometimes fall over, and remain upright only by the surrounding poles that are still standing.  
Sewage flows through the streets nightly, even in the relatively affluent Port-au-Prince suburb of 
Petionville, and rain collection cisterns are visible throughout the city.  The aging hydroelectric 
plant that serves the city only provides a fraction of the power it once provide (Haiti Informants 
3 and 4, 2010); during a week-long trip in May, 2010, our research team’s accommodations had 
power from the city grid for only about two hours on one day, over the course of the week.  The 
rest of the time, an on-site generator provided any and all electrical power.  The response to this 
pattern of those who ran these accommodations indicated that this had been the pattern since 
long before the earthquake that had devastated the country four months before the trip.  Similar 
to the economic conditions, the organizational structure in Haiti is in very poor condition, 
dramatically increasing the difficulty of operating in country. 
4.3.4 The 2004 Armed Insurgency and the Second Ouster of Aristide 
The immediate cause of the post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction mission that this study 
examines is the 2004 insurgency that drove Aristide from office a second time.  This insurgency 
flows from the third act of the Haitian political drama that would play out during Aristide’s 
second term, starting in 2001.  That year, the Organization of American States (OAS) stepped in 
to try and find a negotiated solution.  It soon became clear that no side, not international donors 
and financial institutions, nascent Haitian political opposition, nor Aristide, was truly willing to 
compromise.  A further increase in political violence, particularly in violence aimed at the HNP 
and at opposition groups, did much to undermine any willingness to compromise that might have 
developed and only further entrenched each side of the steadily growing conflict (ICG, 2004).  
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This culminated in a confused incident in which the leader of a pro-Aristide paramilitary group 
in Gonaives, Amiot Metayer, was killed in what is widely suspected as a government-sanctioned 
murder.  This turns the formation of the Gonaives group against Aristide and its initiation of the 
armed insurgency would become the fourth and final act of the political drama in Haiti prior to 
the initiation of the UN stabilization and reconstruction mission (ICG, 2004). 
Once the insurgency in Gonaives began, events moved quickly.  Metayer’s murder 
occurred as part of violence in the summer and fall of 2003.  Violent protests followed in 
October while pro-government armed groups attacked a demonstration at a university that was 
led by student-groups on 5 December.  OAS efforts at a negotiated settlement resumed in 
January, 2004, but found little traction prior the full uprising in February.  Metayer’s followers 
seized control of Gonaives on 5 February 2004, driving out police.  The HNP attempted to retake 
the following day, but failed.  At this point, prominent figures from the fight against the previous 
military coup returned from exile to join the fight against Aristide, and the insurgency began to 
take small towns beyond Gonaives.  On 22 February, the insurgency captured Cap Haitien, 
Haiti’s second largest city, unopposed, and, indeed, welcomed in places along the way as they 
drove out pro-government paramilitary groups and the HNP.  Despite preparing to defend Port-
au-Prince, starting on 25 February, Aristide signed a resignation on 29 February and left the 
country immediately.  He, nevertheless, insisted afterward that he had not actually agreed to the 
resignation and had been “kidnapped” (ICG, 2004).  Whether or not that was true, Aristide was 
now out of office, and the insurgency ended, even as violence continued in a less organized 
fashion.  The transitional government immediately invited UN peacekeepers, initiating the 
stabilization mission that study utilizes as a case.   
 102 
4.3.5 Prior UN Involvement and MINUSTAH 
UN involvement in Haiti was not new in 2004.  Four previous missions had operated in country, 
with the first entering in 1990 (“MINUSTAH”; ICG, 2004).  Despite the US efforts to restore 
Aristide in 1994, which was viewed as a success, the missions had been unable to affect much 
actual and lasting change in Haiti.  This left the UN viewed as unpopular and untrusted by both 
segments of the Haitian population; rightly or wrong, they were perceived as having made many 
promises but delivered on few (Haiti Informants 3 and 4, 2010).  At the request of the Haitian 
interim president, immediately after Aristide’s departure, the UNSC approved a military 
peacekeeping force, the Multinational Interim Force (MIF) and laid plans to establish a 
stabilization force at the end of the peacekeeping force’s three month tenure (ICG, 2005; ICG, 
2004). 
The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, its acronym being MINUSTAH under 
its French-language name, took over on 1 June 2004 (“MINUSTAH”) to support a newly 
established transitional government in its efforts to end the violence that would continue into 
2005 (ICG, 2005), begin the reform of the institutions that had been so heavily damaged in the 
insurgency, including the Haitian judiciary and the HNP (ICG, 2004).  To this end, the initial 
mandate empowered a broad mission for peace and security, reforming the HNP, disarming 
former army elements, promoting rule of law, supporting the transitional government, protecting 
UN personnel, and promoting and monitoring human rights (“MINUSTAH,” UNSC Res. 1542, 
2004).  As of 2012, the MINUSTAH mission is on-going, and complicated by the devastation of 
the 12 January 2010 Haitian earthquake.  This study examines MINUSTAH’s process and 
progress through the end of the 2010 calendar year. 
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4.3.6 The 12 January 2010 Earthquake 
While not strictly part of the initial conditions of this study’s Haiti case, since it occurred six 
years after the initial date of the case, the Haitian Earthquake did much to define the operating 
parameters of the last year of the case and to set the context for the case’s network analysis 
portion.  It undermined MINUSTAH’s operation by killing several of its highest officials in 
country.  It also destroyed much of what governance capacity the Haitian government had 
regained since 2004.  Despite all the damage that it did, the earthquake has the potential to help 
improve the situation with the massive influx of donor aid and organizations that it generated. 
4.4 BASELINE ANALYSIS 
The first point of possible comparison between these two cases is in identifying the similarities 
and differences between the two baselines.  It is largely inappropriate to say that one baseline is 
higher or lower than the other or that one is better or harder than the other.  This kind of 
comparison is the trap that has led the researchers applying the traditional approach to admit 
defeat on cross-case comparisons.  What can, instead, be compared is the systematic structures 
and challenges that each case faces that will bear on situation that the stabilization missions must 
face.  These are the same situations listed above, the political, economic, and organizational 
contexts, and how they converge and diverge from each other across the two cases. 
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4.4.1 Convergent Challenges to Coordination 
4.4.1.1 Legally-Established Peacekeeping 
The cases have some important similar aspects and challenges.  The first is a fundamental 
similarity that allows for their comparison at all, and, indeed, their inclusion in this study.  First 
and foremost, each is a case where a political conflict generated violence that drew international 
attention, and ultimately, international intervention.  In both cases, the peacekeeping missions, 
IFOR/SFOR in Bosnia and the MIF in Haiti, and the long-term stabilization and reconstruction 
missions, UNMIBH in Bosnia and MINUSTAH in Haiti, were formally invited by the local 
parties, even if they were less than truly welcome.  This gave the missions more latitude for legal 
action and a basis for expecting cooperation, at least from local officials, as they fit the definition 
of UN peacekeeping under Chapter 6 of the United Nations Charter.  Initial actions, particularly 
UNPROFOR’s maintenance of UN Protected Areas may not have met the requirements for 
Chapter 6, and may require creative arguments to meet Chapter 7 requirements, but the 
reconstruction and stabilization missions, technically, meet the requirements for Chapter 6 
peacekeeping.  This does not mean that local officials always delivered that cooperation or that 
the intervening missions always acted in their best way to court and promote that cooperation. 
4.4.1.2 Deep Social Cleavages 
In both cases, the conflict is driven by deep social cleavages.  In Bosnia, this is between 
the three main constituent nations, the Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats, and Bosniaks.  In Haiti, 
this is between the rich and the poor.  Interventions are inherently highly political.  Astute 
political operation and the shape of structural and governmental reforms are defined by 
sensitivity to positions relative to these cleavages.  The cleavages may be different, but their 
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presence and general impact are the same, though that says nothing about the how well the 
operators in each system will understand and account for these cleavages. 
4.4.1.3 Lack of Infrastructure 
In both cases, local infrastructure had been largely destroyed.  This was more extreme in 
Haiti than in Bosnia.  The pre-conflict state of Bosnian infrastructure had been much more 
advanced than the pre-conflict state in Haiti.  In Haiti the conflict did not target infrastructure in 
any way, but did contribute to its continued dilapidation.  In Bosnia, the war did target 
infrastructure, but only as tactical military targets.  Its strategic targeting was only as collateral to 
the strategic targeting of population centers.  The causes of a lack of infrastructure, and so what 
is needed to establish reliable infrastructure, may be different, defining a similar aid task with 
different requirements for its completion, but the fact of a lack of reliable infrastructure 
following the end of the conflict is the same across cases. 
4.4.2 Divergent Challenges to Coordination 
4.4.2.1 Economic Conditions 
On their surface, immediate post-war economic conditions in each case are similar, but, 
in fact, they have important structural differences.  In both cases, the immediate post-conflict 
period saw little formal economic activity and high unemployment.  In both cases, the immediate 
post-conflict period would see an enormous inrush of aid groups bringing donor monies and 
manpower.  In Haiti, this would enter a situation where the informal economy dominates the 
formal economy because many of the poor do not have access to the formal economy, and the 
government has long been too weak to drive informal economic activity into the formal economy 
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(Haiti Informants 2, 3, and 4, 2010).  In Bosnia, the majority of post-war activity was also 
informal and often illicit (Andreas, 2008; Dobbins et al, 2003; Balkan Battlegrounds, Vol. 1, 
2002), but this was a product of economic dislocation from the war, declaring independence 
from Yugoslavia, and the transition to a market economy.  While never among the richest of 
countries, Yugoslavia, and Bosnia included, had been an advanced communist country with an 
evident history of large engineering projects and functional economic oversight and relatively 
easy access to European markets, due to its location.  This provides a basis for economic 
restoration without the fundamental structural reforms required in Haiti. 
4.4.2.2 Political Paralysis 
Political paralysis played a role in both cases, but a very different role in each.  In Bosnia, 
events moved quickly to war when the Bosniak-dominated government declared independence 
from Yugoslavia.  After the war, continued animosity between the ethnic groups, and towards 
the international intervention (Bose, 2002; Chandler, 2000), led to political obstructionism from 
multiple sources.  In Haiti, the political paralysis aided and abetted the developing conflict, 
forming a more consistent structural feature of the Haitian political context, just as on-going 
poverty is a more structural feature of the Haitian economic condition than it is of the Bosnian 
economic condition. 
4.4.3 Taking Baselines Forward in the Analysis 
The next two chapters will build from the analysis presented here.  As discussed at the beginning 
of these chapters, the next of the analysis will assess system effectiveness relative to the 
baselines presented here.  Chapter 5 will analyze the UN stabilization and reconstruction mission 
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that occurred in Bosnia.  Chapter 6 will analyze the UN stabilization and reconstruction mission 
that occurred in Haiti.  Each of these chapters will measure effectiveness from these baselines for 
their respective missions.  Chapters 7 and 8 will then compare the extent of this effectiveness and 
its sources in each mission. 
 108 
5.0  CASE STUDY:  WAR IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 
Network and simulation analysis are useful tools, but they only produce meaningful results when 
they are interpreted in their context (Butts, 2009).  Providing this context is the role that the IAD 
and Harnessing Complexity frameworks play in this study.  These frameworks, though, do 
provide more than just the context for the network analysis.  They provide insights of their own 
in understanding the system that the network analysis and simulations cannot provide.  They 
provide unique substantive analysis that provides for richer results.  The role of the networks and 
simulation is to then take the substantive results and apply them to make a fuller model that is 
grounded in objective methodology.  For the final analysis, the frameworks provide the rules for 
how the simulation handles the actors and the results of the actions, while the network analysis 
provides the measurements necessary to program the simulation’s parameters.  Without either 
step, no simulation would be possible. 
This chapter applies the IAD and Harnessing Complexity frameworks to the UN 
stabilization and reconstruction mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina that first began initially in 
1992, and expanded in 1995.  Discussed in Chapters 1 and 3, the frameworks pose six questions: 
 Who are the actors? 
 What are the system rules? 
 What are the patterns of interaction? 
 How do actors select actions? 
 How do actors select which actors with whom they will interact? 
What are the patterns of variation in the data covered in the preceding questions? 
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This chapter will use the frameworks and network analysis to answer these questions in the 
context of the mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  After providing those answers, the chapter 
presents the lessons for the simulation design that this case provides. 
5.1 FRAMEWORK-GUIDED ANALYSIS 
Systems are built from several separate building blocks.  These blocks cross the borders of the 
questions above, but the questions are designed to elicit a description of the system that allows 
the contents of those building blocks to emerge.  There are only two primary blocks that can 
describe the whole of the system.  The two blocks are structure and process.  The first question 
speaks to structure, by defining who is involved.  The latter five questions all describe details of 
the process (Ostrom, 2005; Axelrod and Cohen, 2000).  The task of this chapter, then, is to 
present content and basis of the structures and process of the UN stabilization and reconstruction 
mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
It is not enough, though, to claim to be presenting the process of the mission, because 
there are two different types of process, formal and informal.  In natural systems, the only rules 
involved are those that are observed; natural systems have no mechanism for defining exogenous 
rules, so they must all be endogenous to the system.  Computer systems are the opposite.  In 
computer systems, an external programmer, or team of programmers that may or may not be 
coordinating with each other, define the rules that the computer must follow, though observed 
can still be complex, depending on the way the rules are written (Holland, 1995, 1992).  Human 
social and administrative systems lie somewhere in between these two extremes, where the 
systems can have exogenous rules that they actors may not always follow (Comfort, Wukich et 
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al, 2011).  These systems will have a combination of written and unwritten rules that the actors 
are supposed to follow, sometimes under the threat of sanction, but which they will not always 
follow.  The written rules constitute formal process.  They are the rules that the actors are 
expected to follow, and which will carry the most clearly defined sanctions for their violation.  
This set includes laws, but it is not necessarily limited to them.  Formal rules of action are those 
to which computer systems must adhere.  The unwritten rules are the informal rules.  These are 
analogous to the rules of natural systems; they are only identified by following the patterns of 
behavior that actors actually follow, regardless of what formal rules may or may not exist.  As a 
human system, stabilization and reconstruction missions will have both formal and informal 
rules of action.  To fully describe the system in Bosnia, this chapter describes the structure, 
formal rules, and informal rules of the stabilization and reconstruction mission in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. 
5.1.1 System Structure and Actors 
The overarching structure of stabilization and reconstruction missions comes from their 
conception as international administrative interventions in a given state, all within the context of 
the overarching international system of states (Dobbins et al, 2008; Hippler, 2005, Dobbins et al, 
2004; Dobbins et al, 2003).  This larger system is not of concern to this study, except to the 
extent that it is the context and source of some of the specific organizations that are involved in 
the specific mission.  This creates a situation with two, parallel administrative structures in those 
areas where the international bodies work during the mission.  The first structure is the local 
administrative structure that retains formal governing power, but is shadowed by the second 
structure, the international administrative oversight and support structure.  This forms a 
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complicated official structure, which can quickly morph into a range of different shapes, 
depending on the behavior of the specific actors while the mission proceeds. 
5.1.1.1 State Structure 
As discussed in chapters 1 and 2, the goal of these missions, often explicitly, but occasionally 
implicitly, is to expand the governance capacity of the local government.  For this reason, the 
intervention is nearly always designed in such a way to support or oversee local administration, 
not to replace it (Dobbins et al, 2008; Hippler, 2005, Dobbins et al, 2004; Dobbins et al, 2003).  
This is in addition to the dubious legality of any international administration that would seek to 
replace local administration (Malanczuk, 1997; UN Charter), and the political risks that any 
government choosing to turn over full administrative power and responsibility to any 
international body would face from its own polity.  Either way, organizations will continue to 
operate with bases in the international system or in the local system.  In Bosnia, the following 
jurisdiction levels were observed, along with their definitions: 
 
 International:  States, organizations, and groups with impacts in Bosnia, but whose actions 
have implications far beyond Bosnia or the Balkans, or organizations whose basis is in other 
international organizations 
 International – Regional:  States, organizations, and groups with impacts across the whole of 
the Balkans region, including but not limited to Bosnia; they typically have more direct 
involvement and interests in Bosnian conflicts due to geographic and/or ethnic ties, or at one 
time, directly governed Bosnia-Herzegovina 
 BiH State Level:  Actors whose actions and interactions have implications across Entity 
borders, but not state borders, whether those implications are formally established in the 
Dayton Accords or the product of the realities of Bosnia politics 
 Entity:  Actors whose actions and interactions have implications that do not cross entity 
borders 
 Canton:  Actors whose actions and interactions have implications that do not cross cantonal 
borders within the FBiH 
 112 
 Municipal:  Actors whose actions and interactions have implications that do not extend 
beyond the municipality in which the actor is located 
 
With the numbers taken from the network data sources listed in Chapter 3, Table 5 – 1 lists the 
count of each jurisdiction observed in Bosnia.  This list of jurisdictions is closely related to the 
structure of Bosnian administration.  Discussed in Chapter 4, the Dayton Accords split Bosnia 
and Herzegovina into two administrative jurisdictions, called Entities, the Republika Srpska (RS) 
and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH).  The FBiH is further subdivided in 
cantons, which are not used in the RS.  For the most local governance, the FBiH cantons and the 
RS are subdivided into municipalities that govern individual population centers.  This creates the 
several levels of local administration, below the state level, that are listed above.  Any aid project 
will have to take into account the administration that oversees the specific location of the aid 
project, along with any state-level structures and processes. 
 
Table 5-1. Frequency in Organization List:  Bosnian Jurisdictions 
Jurisdiction Count % of 
Dataset 
Municipal 15 7.25% 
Canton 5 2.42% 
Entity 36 17.39% 
State 61 29.47% 
Regional 2 0.97% 
International 88 42.51% 
Totals 207 100% 
 
 113 
5.1.1.2 International Actors 
Along with this state and local structure is the set of international organizations that 
function in the stabilization and reconstruction mission.  The foremost of these are the ones listed 
in the Dayton Accords:  the Office of the High Representative (OHR), the International Police 
Task Force (IPTF) that would later become the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(UNMIBH), and NATO’s Implementation Force (IFOR) that would later become the 
Stabilization Force (SFOR).  This is far from a complete list, and indeed a complete list is nearly 
impossible to compile.  To the extent that it is possible, that list is included in the up-coming 
network analysis.  Though not mentioned in the Dayton Accords, the United Nations High 
Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) played an integral role in the international response to the 
Bosnian War, carrying out an airlift that lasted longer and carried more goods than any other 
airlift in human history as a humanitarian effort to support the besieged population of Sarajevo 
(Balkan Battlegrounds, Vol. 1, 2002; Burg and Shoup, 1999).  Their efforts continued into the 
post-war period as the lead organization of several Dayton Accord annexes that included 
humanitarian goals, efforts that continue to this day (Bosnia Respondents 6 and 7; Dayton 
Accords, 1995).  These form an official core of the international organizations involved. 
5.1.2 Rules of Action:  Formal Processes 
Working within this structure, the organizations have several roles to fill, some defined by the 
Dayton Accords, some defined by established practice for humanitarian interventions.  These 
include how organizations determine what roles they will play, how they will obtain the 
resources and funding they need to carry out their actions, how administration will be organized 
and performed, and what powers and responsibilities the international organizations will have. 
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5.1.2.1 Funding and Organization Roles 
In addition to the administrative agencies so far discussed, which are working to extend 
governance capacity, there will be many organizations with non-administrative missions.  These 
include humanitarian aid groups, academic groups, and private businesses, to name a few of the 
types of organizations present.  These latter groups are unlikely to be included in official 
governance structures and processes, but will play key roles in developing observed processes 
and in completing the specific aid tasks that will be necessary for reconstruction.  This 
formulation indicates two characteristics of the actors, the actor’s source of funding, and its 
mission category which, along with jurisdiction, are known as actor attributes.  There are only 
three sources of funding that are possible, and align the economic sector to which the 
organization belongs:  public, private, and non-profit.  Table 5-2 reports the breakdown of 
sources of funding observed in the network data for Bosnia.  Mission categories are much more 
complex attributes, indicating what substantive area an organization works in and whether or not 
the organization is designed to work in the field directly, completing projects and engaging the 
local population, performing administrative tasks in government, organizing and directing field 
operations but not directly performing them, or engaging in advocacy and fund-raising that 
directs the resources necessary for the field and organizing actors to perform their tasks.  
Appendix C contains the list of mission categories observed in the Bosnia network data. 
 
Table 5-2. Frequency in Organization List:  Bosnian Source of Funding 
Source Count % of 
Dataset 
Public 130 62.80% 
Private 19 9.18% 
Non-Profit 58 28.02% 
Totals 207 100% 
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5.1.2.2 Rules for State and Local Administration 
The formal rules for state and local administration were set out in the Dayton Accords 
and many of these were discussed in Chapter 4.  Since they continued in force throughout the 
study period, they merit a brief a review here.  The fundamental logic of Bosnian political 
organization, presented in Chapter 4, “the Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs form separate groups and 
the politics fall into line accordingly” (Hayden, 2011) continues to hold in the Dayton Accords.  
In a case where the informal structures of Bosnian society dictated the formal structures, the 
Accords were designed to adhere to this rule under the belief that peace would only hold with the 
political protections assured by having national representation through all levels of government 
(Bose, 2002; Chandler, 2000; Burg and Shoup, 1999).  This formulation carries through all levels 
of Bosnian administration.  Individual jurisdictions are designated with a single leading 
nationality.  In the RS, this is the Serbs.  In the FBiH, each canton is designated as being either 
Bosniak, Croat, or Mixed.  The Dayton Accords then devolve most governing powers to these 
nationally-designated jurisdictions in a federal structure.  The principle applied is that by 
governing locally, the members of the ruling nationality will ensure their interests in the places 
that they control (Burg and Shoup, 1999; Dayton Accords, 1995). 
At the same time as they grant considerable local autonomy, the Dayton Accords provide 
additional protections for each nation at the state level and for the members of local minority 
groups in the nationally-designated jurisdictions.  In the state government, all three nationalities 
are represented in all the institutions, and their presence and support is necessary for actions to 
proceed.  The Bosnian presidency is a rotating tripartite presidency with a member from each 
nation, and a chairmanship that rotates (Dayton Accords, 1995).  The legislature requires that a 
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certain number of the membership from each nation be present, as well as a certain portion of 
each house’s membership overall, to have a quorum.  No legislation can be passed by the 
legislature without support from the membership of each nation without that legislation being 
sent to the Constitutional Court, which itself contains membership from all three main nations.  
At the local level, Annex 6 to the Dayton Accords defines a list of rights for all Bosnian citizens, 
regardless of nationality and location of residence.  This includes rights to life, liberty, education, 
and freedom of religion, assembly, and expression.  To protect this, the Annex creates a Human 
Rights Chamber, made of six Bosnian members, two from the RS, four from the FBiH and eight 
members who are not Bosnian, appointed by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of 
Europe.  Annex 6 also creates a Human Rights Ombudsman, who is appointed by Chairman in 
Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).  All citizens of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina have official recourse to these two bodies in the case of a violation of 
the human rights enumerated in Annex 6 to the Dayton Accords (Dayton Accords, 1995).  This 
creates a system where protections for all the nationalities are built into all levels of governance 
under the official rules. 
5.1.2.3 Rules for International Organization Activities 
Along with laying out the rules for action of the Bosnian state and local administration, 
the Dayton Accords laid out roles for a small group of specific international organizations and 
rules for the interaction between state administration and international organizations.  The main 
section of the Accords, the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
contains language that obligates cooperation and coordination between all of the official parties 
that are named in or signatories to the Accords.  This lays out an official obligation to cooperate 
between the various agencies of administration in Bosnia and Herzegovina with the OHR, 
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NATO IFOR/SFOR, and the IPTF/UNMIBH, which are, as mentioned above, the named 
international organizations in the Accords with defined roles in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  More 
specifically, the Accords give each of these organizations a specific role to play in the post-war 
regime.  The most expansive role is given to the OHR, which has the role of overseeing Bosnian 
administration to ensure that nationalist sentiments and voting do not threaten to rip the country 
apart again the way analysts and scholars believe it did in 1992 (Hayden, 2011, 2000; Burg and 
Shoup, 1999).  IFOR is granted explicit powers to maintain physical security, including seeking 
war criminals, while the IPTF is granted oversight and support powers over Bosnian police 
forces.  In doing this, the Dayton Accords defined a specific role for international institutions and 
for their relations with local institutions that both were expected to follow. 
5.1.3 Rules of Action:  Informal Processes and Observed Behaviors 
As discussed above, just because law and policy expects or obligates certain actions, does not 
mean that the identified local actors will necessarily meet those obligations and expectations.  
This section will review what expected patterns discussed above broke down and what patterns 
filled the gaps between expected and actual behavior of the actors. 
5.1.3.1 Administration 
As has been stated multiple times, the design of the Dayton Accords was to balance 
power among and ensure the security of the three main nationalities.  The role of suppressing 
nationalism in government fell to OHR.  In pursuit of that, the Dayton Accords include an 
Article V in Annex 10 that states, “Final Authority to Interpret:  The High Representative is the 
final authority in theater regarding interpretation of this Agreement on the civilian 
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implementation of the peace agreement” (Dayton Accords, 1995).  The holders of the Office of 
High Representative have interpreted this article in light of their goal of limiting nationalism to 
provide the OHR with the power to nullify and compel laws as well as to approve ballot access 
to candidates and remove officials from office who too flagrantly violate precepts of cooperation 
between the nations and with the international community and its representatives (“OHR Media 
Round-ups;” Bose, 2002; Chandler, 2000).  Even with that power, nationalist parties retained 
popularity and prominence, and so electoral victories.  For the analysis, this continued 
prominence indicates that it is important to record the nationality of the organizations involved.  
The nationality data extends well beyond the three main groups of Bosniaks, Bosnian Croats, and 
Bosnian Serbs, to include neighboring Serbian and Croatian actors, as well as international 
private and governmental organizations, and organizations from many different countries.  Like 
mission categories, this is a long list, and is reported as Appendix D.  The result of the continued 
prominence of nationalist sentiment in terms of administration was an ineffectual government 
with little will to govern that has been a challenge for international humanitarian organizations 
(Bosnia Respondents 8 and 9, 2011). 
5.1.3.2 Communication and Coordination Patterns 
The patterns of nationalist separation also have ramifications for patterns of 
communication and coordination.  The most immediate impact is the almost tautological 
implication that nationalist groups refuse to coordinate with each other.  This undermines 
information flow about the realities of the groups, generating and perpetuating high levels of 
distrust and misinformation.  This plays out in separate utility firms for the members of each 
nation that were discussed in Chapter 4, including telecommunications companies and railroads 
(“OHR Media Round-ups”).  Subtle linguistic differences would also aid in perpetuating this 
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pattern of distrust and misinformation.  The spoken language, Serbo-Croatian, is the same for all 
three groups.  Aside from small dialectic differences, the only difference between Serbian and 
Croatian is in the alphabet; Croatian uses the Latin alphabet while Serbian uses the Cyrillic 
alphabet.  There is no linguistic difference between the language spoken by Bosniaks and 
Bosnian Croats, nevertheless national politics is strong enough that the OHR website recognizes 
and applies a third local language, Bosanski, that Bosniaks claim as separate from Serbian and 
Croatian (Bosnia Respondent 2, 2011).  Additionally, the continued prominence of nationalist 
parties created strife between Bosnian government agencies and the OHR, as well as 
undermining any popular support that there might have been for the international organizations 
involved in administration (“OHR Media Round-ups;” Bose, 2002; Chandler, 2000).  Despite all 
of these tensions, periods of extended peace can lead to the growing patterns of nationally mixed 
marriages that were discussed in Chapter 4 (Burg and Shoup, 1999).  The nationalist divide has 
extensive ramifications through all aspects of Bosnian life, as listed throughout this section. 
5.2 NETWORK ANALYSES 
Network analysis can then provide documentation of the actual patterns of interaction, showing 
both the confirmation of the divide as well as its limits.  Network measures allow for identifying 
the patterns of interaction, the key actors in the network and the grouping patterns among the 
actors.  This section will run this analysis, looking first at the pattern for the overall network and 
then how those patterns changed over time using the time slices identified in Chapter 3 and 
recorded in Table 3-3.  Data for these networks come from three sources:   OHR Media Round-
ups, SFOR CIMIC reports, and situation reports from humanitarian organizations.  Table 5-3 
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contains the full list of data sources, including listing the specific organizations whose published 
situation reports were used, along with how many documents were used for the static network 
analysis and each timeslice of the dynamic network analysis. This will document the patterns 
observed in the framework-guided analysis while also extending the analysis to provide 
parameters and parameter measures for the simulation that will be developed in full in Chapter 8. 
 
Table 5-3. Breakdown of Network Data Sources for Bosnia-Herzegovina 
Data Source Static Network 
Analysis 
Timeslice 1: 
Dec., 2000 
Timeslice 2: 
July, 2001 
Timeslice 3: 
Jan., 2002 
OHR Media Round-ups 37 17 11 9 
SFOR CIMIC Reports 9 1 5 3 
DisasterRelief 1 1 0 0 
Global IDP Project 1 1 0 0 
International Committee of 
the Red Cross 
1 0 0 1 
Total for Each Timeslice 49 20 16 13 
 
5.2.1 Static Network Analysis 
Table 5-4.  Bosnian Network Map Key for Source of Funding and Jurisdiction 
Source of Funding  Jurisdiction 
Source Color  Jurisdiction Shape 
Public   Municipal Square 
Private   Canton Down Triangle 
Non-Profit   Entity Diamond 
   State Up Triangle 
   Regional Box 
   International Circle 
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5.2.1.1 Network Map Groups and Patterns 
 
Figure 5-1. Static Network Map for Bosnia-Herzegovina 
 
Network analysis typically begins with a review of the visual network map and basic 
network measures.  Figure 5-1 contains the network map for all the network interactions coded in 
all three timeslices of the Bosnia data while Table 5-4 presents the key for the shapes and colors 
that will represent different organizational Sources of Funding and Jurisdiction that will be used 
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throughout this chapter.
15
  This network contains 207 organizations in 429 network interactions.  
Of all the potential links between these observed organizations, only 241 links, or 0.56%, of the 
links were empirically observed.  This is the network density, and this is a remarkably sparse 
network. 
Visual inspection of the map reveals several relevant features of the reconstruction 
system.  Like many empirical response networks to extreme events, the network contains what 
network analysts refer to as a “great component” that contains the largest amount of the nodes in 
the network, as well as several separate components that are far smaller than and not connected 
to the great component and a list of isolates (Comfort, Oh et al, 2010).  However, the map also 
includes several unusual aspects, which are often more informative that commonalities across 
networks.  The clearest indication of the map is the large number of isolates, arranged in a 
column of organizations along the left side of Figure 5-1.  The network map also exhibits an 
unusual pattern amongst the disconnected components.  Typically, these components are made of 
only 2 or 3 nodes, often connected in series.  Figure 5-1 contains separated components that 
consistently contain a greater number of nodes with more complex patterns of links between 
them than is typically observed.  First indicated by the density measure, these patterns indicate a 
highly disconnected network that is unlikely to exhibit high levels of communication and 
coordination. 
Actors in a network are known to act with two, inverse properties in pursing links.  Either 
they prefer connections with similar actors to themselves, a property known as homophily, or to 
prefer dissimilar actors, a property known as heterophily (Hanneman and Riddle, 2005; 
Wasserman and Faust, 1994).  A careful inspection shows many groupings in the network where 
                                                 
15
 A different key will be used for Jurisdiction in Chapter 6 for the Haiti networks, since the relevant jurisdictions 
will be different. 
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organizations of like sources of funding, like jurisdictions, and, in one section, both attributes, 
group together.  This is the two sets of state-level non-profit organizations in that group together 
in chains moving upward from the central organization of the great component.  These are 
Bosnian political parties.  Though not shown in this map, the two separate strings of connections 
are of different nationalities; one is formed of Bosniak parties, the other of Bosnian Serb, and 
small set of Bosnian Croat parties form a separate group between the two others.  This is even 
more true to the separated components, where only one link is between two organizations with 
different values for both attributes presented in this map.  This provides the first evidence of a 
strong trend towards homophily in this network. 
5.2.1.2 Network Key Entities 
 
 
Figure 5-2. Most Central Organizations in Bosnia-Herzegovina
16
 
                                                 
16
 Organization Acronym Key:  ohr:  Office of the High Representative; sfor:  NATO Stabilization Force; bacm: 
Bosnian Council of Ministers; bapres:  Bosnian Presidency; unhcr: UN High Commission for Refugees; bagov: 
Bosnian Government; yugov:  Yugoslav Government; usamb:  US Ambassador to BiH; fbih: Federation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. 
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After reviewing network maps, the next step is to review centrality measures for the 
network to identify the network’s key actors.  This is done by producing a Key Entities report for 
the ORA network analysis program (Carley, 2011).  This report calculates the following 
measures: 
 
 Controlling Agency (total degree centrality) 
 Inter-organization Leader (eigenvector centrality) 
 Acts as a Hub (hub centrality) 
 Acts as an Authority (authority centrality) 
 Information Conduit (betweenness centrality) 
 Connects Agencies (high betweenness and low degree) 
 
The report includes the organizations with the ten highest values for each of these centrality 
measures while the graph contained in Figure 5-2, which is generated in the report, indicates the 
organizations that showed up in the top ten for each measure the most, including the percentage 
of the measures for which that organization has a top ten score.  The top four organizations in 
this graph are more thoroughly connected to other organizations than any other organization; the 
other six in the graph all have roughly the same level of centrality.  These top four contain two 
international organizations, OHR and SFOR, and two Bosnian state governmental organizations, 
the Bosnian Council of Ministers (bacm) and the Bosnian Presidency (bapres).
17
  These are the 
organizations that have the most connected locations in the network map, but this connectedness 
is only one aspect of effectiveness; it does not speak to the usefulness of the organization’s 
actions, the extent of its capacity, or its presence in the field actually attempting to complete aid 
tasks, repair the built environment, or build institutions.  These aspects will be examined later in 
this chapter and in Chapter 7. 
                                                 
17
 For this research, the data did not always clearly differentiate which member of the tripartite presidency took the 
reported action.  For this reason, the constituent parts of the presidency were left as one organization rather than 
being separated into three the nationally-defined offices that make up the presidency. 
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5.2.1.3 Network Structure 
Table 5-5. Small World Ratio Calculations for Bosnian Networks 
Small Word 
Measures  
Static 
Network 
Timeslice 1: 
Dec., 2000 
Timeslice 2: 
July, 2001 
Timeslice 3: 
Jan., 2002 
Node Count 207 83 104 77 
Density 0.0056 0.011 0.0101 0.0101 
Number of Ties 241 76 110 60 
Clustering Coefficient 0.271 0.218 0.132 0.231 
Average Distance 3.318 2.44 2.161 2.286 
Ave. Clustering 
(Random Graph) 
0.0065 0.00866 0.01044 0.0025 
Ave. Distance 
(Random Graph) 
3.977 2.704 3.023 2.36 
Clustering Ratio 41.69 25.17 12.64 92.40 
Distance Ratio 0.83 0.90 0.71 0.97 
Proximity Ratio 49.97 27.90 17.69 95.39 
 
Along with the node-level statistics just examined and the features of the network map 
before that, the final step of the network analysis is to examine the network’s macro-structures.  
These macro structures define the pattern of the links across the entirety of the network, with 
implications for patterns and rates of information flow through the network.  There are two 
relevant macro-structure types for any response mission to an extreme event like a conflict or 
natural disaster.  The first is referred to as a small world network.  Conceptually, this type of 
network is contains what network theorists call clusters and spanners.  That is, the network 
contains batches of nodes that are tightly interconnected while some nodes will have links that 
reach all the way across the network, allowing information to traverse the network by crossing 
only a few ties (Newman et al, 2006; Watts and Strogatz, 1998).  To determine if a network is a 
small world network, Watts and Strogratz (1998) proposed a Proximity Ratio that is a ratio of 
two other ratios, the ratio of the observed graph’s clustering coefficient to that of a random graph 
and the ratio of the observed graph’s average distance to that of a random graph: 
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After calculating this ratio, a research can conclude that a network is a small world network if the 
ratio has a value of 4.75 or greater (Kilduff et al, 2008).  Table 5-5 records the proximity ratio 
for the all four of the Bosnia networks, including looking ahead to the dynamic analysis by 
including the timeslices.  For all of the calculations, 50 random graphs were calculated using 
UCINet’s method of calculating Erdos-Renyi random graphs (Borgatti et al, 2002).  The formula 
uses an average of the distance measures and clustering coefficients from all 50 graphs to 
calculate its random graph values.  The resulting values are all well above 4.75, indicating that 
the static network and all the timeslices are small world networks. 
 
 
Figure 5-3. Histogram of Normalized Degree Centralities: Bosnia Static Network 
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The other kind of network macro-structure is a scale free network.  Conceptually, this 
kind of network structure features a limited number of hub notes, each with a large number of 
connections, and a large number of more non-hub nodes, each with a small number of 
connections.  The distribution of node centralities follows a power law distribution, where, if 
graphed, there is a spike in the centrality score near the X-origin and a long tail to the right of the 
graph (Newman et al, 2006).    This method uses the degree centrality measure for each node, 
which is nothing more or less complicated than the number of connections that each node in the 
graph has (Hanneman and Riddle, 2005; Wasserman and Faust, 1994).  For this study, that value 
is then normalized in UCINet to allow for comparability across networks with a vastly different 
number of nodes, since networks with far more nodes have far less central nodes that still have 
higher degree centrality measurements. The count of nodes with each degree centrality is plotted 
on a graph using either a line graph or histogram, which is less exact, but still as clear as a line 
graph.  Figure 5-3 includes the histogram of normalized degree centralities for the static network 
in Bosnia.  With a large number of nodes with a centrality less than 1 and with one node with a 
centrality of almost 5, this network is a scale free network as well as a small world network. 
5.2.2 Dynamic Network Analysis 
Table 5-6. Bosnian Dynamic Network Basic Measures 
Measure Static 
Network 
Timeslice 1:  
Dec., 2000 
Timeslice 2:  
July, 2001 
Timeslice 3:  
Jan., 2002 
Node Count 207 83 104 77 
Isolates 36 19 14 20 
Isolates (% of Nodes) 17% 23% 13% 26% 
Entering Organizations N/A 83 76 48 
Network Fragmentation 0.554 0.634 0.529 0.836 
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Figure 5-4. Bosnia Dynamic Networks:  Timeslice 1 (Dec., 2000) 
 
 
Figure 5-5. Bosnia Dynamic Networks:  Timeslice 2 (July, 2001) 
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Figure 5-6. Bosnia Dynamic Networks:  Timeslice 3 (Jan., 2002) 
 
The process of dynamic network analysis is fundamentally the same static network analysis.  The 
difference lies in examining the network at discrete timeslices to chart change across time with 
the goal of trying to correlate these changes with system events that precipitated the changes. 
5.2.2.1 Dynamic Network Maps and Groupings 
The first step is to repeat the first parts of the static analysis, examining basic measures 
and the network maps.  Table 5-6 reports the basic measures of for all of the timeslices and the 
static network.  This includes the percentage of network isolates, which remain very high, 
particularly in the third timeslice where more than a quarter of the nodes are unconnected.  
Figures 5-4, 5-5, and 5-6 contain the network maps for the dynamic network analysis.  These 
maps contain many of the same patterns of grouping and homophily as the static network, but 
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not all of them.  Homophily on Source of Funding appears consistent across all of the dynamic 
maps, but homophily on Jurisdiction only appears in the first timeslice of the dynamic networks.  
The maps also contain many disconnected network components.  The dynamic maps can indeed 
be expected to contain more of these, since the static network will often connect components that 
are disconnected in the dynamic networks by combining links across all the dynamic networks.  
The network fragmentation measure aids in assessing this by reporting the percentage or nodes 
that are disconnected from the network’s great component.  In the first and third timeslices, this 
figure is particularly high, correlating to periods where, based on network’s task categories, 
which code what of activities the actors are performing (See Chapter 3, Section 3.2.3.2, and 
Chapter 7), the data observed more political maneuvering by officials and political parties, while 
the second timeslice, which focused more on developing and enacting rule of law and enacting 
foreign policy.  Nevertheless, all three timeslices still contain a high number of isolates and more 
than half of their nodes separated from the giant component.  Timeslice 2 is a more coherent 
network, but they are all still highly disconnected and fragmented networks. 
5.2.2.2 Dynamic Network Key Entities 
To simplify the analysis somewhat, rather than reporting three separate figures for 
network centralities, Table 5-7 reports the top ten eigenvector centralities for each of the 
timeslices.  Eigenvector centrality is measure of centrality that is based in degree centrality but 
also factors the centrality of the other nodes to which a given node is connected (Hanneman and 
Riddle, 2005; Wasserman and Faust, 1994).  This aids in recognizing leaders between 
organizations and within groups in the network (Carley, 2011).  The patterns of inclusion reflect 
the activities noted above.  Timeslice 1 contains mostly political parties while Timeslice 2 
contains many governmental organizations, both Bosnian and international, while Timeslice 3 
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contains a mixture of these, since it saw a great deal of political activity on combining 
infrastructure organizations like railways and telecommunications companies as well as the 
governmental organizations involved in bringing about those combinations. 
 
Table 5-7. Top 10 Eigenvector Centralities in the Bosnian Dynamic Networks 
Rank Timeslice 1 (Dec., 
2000) 
Timeslice 2 (July, 
2001) 
Timeslice 3 (Jan., 
2002) 
 Organization Value Organization Value Organization Value 
1 ohr 0.838 ohr 0.879 ohr 0.825 
2 basbih 0.523 bapres 0.539 fbih 0.724 
3 picsb 0.436 bacm 0.438 fbhrail 0.295 
4 bapdp 0.367 rsmi 0.225 sfor 0.272 
5 basdp 0.362 oscembh 0.219 bahbr 0.247 
6 banhi 0.307 fbhpres 0.218 basr 0.247 
7 basds 0.233 rs 0.205 basrbcc 0.244 
8 usamb 0.215 fbhmi 0.203 bacm 0.244 
9 sfor 0.186 fbhconc 0.197 bacchr 0.201 
10 bamstr 0.181 bacss 0.193 bamstr 0.200 
5.2.2.3 Dynamic Network Structures 
 
Figure 5-7. Dynamic Scale Free Analysis:  Bosnia Timeslice 1 (Dec., 2000) 
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Like the other measures before this, the process requires taking multiple measurements of 
the same measures as the static analysis of structures.  Already reported in Table 5-5, during the 
static analysis, the proximity ratios of the small world analysis showed that all the timeslices 
contain small world networks.  Figures 5-7, 5-8, and 5-9 repeat the analysis for scale free 
networks in each timeslice.  Like so many of the measures already presented, the result remains 
consistent across the timeslices; each timeslice, along with the static network contains a scale 
free network, since all of the histograms exhibit the shape of a power law distribution in the 
centrality scores.  This pattern, networks in response to extreme events that are both scale free 
and small world, is common and holds through many responses to extreme events (Comfort, 
Siciliano, and Okada, 2011; Comfort, McAdoo et al, 2011; Comfort, Wukich et al, 2011; 
Comfort, Oh et al, 2010), and so is not a surprising result in this data, though it is certainly an 
important result for modeling and understanding the operation of the system, one that will be 
revisited in Chapter 8. 
 
 
Figure 5-8. Dynamic Scale Free Analysis:  Bosnia Timeslice 2 (July, 2001) 
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Figure 5-9. Dynamic Scale Free Analysis:  Bosnia Timeslice 3 (Jan., 2001) 
5.3 SITE VISIT LESSONS 
The kind of network data, formal reports, and academic studies that have so far been used are 
indispensable sources of data, but remain partially removed from the locality and the population.  
They provide detailed data on organizations, events, actions, and emerging processes.  They do 
not provide full data on how organizations acquire and process their data in the field, and how 
operators, particularly those below managerial levels, understand and assess their operations.  
This requires speaking with those operators, since these understandings are often politically 
sensitive and seldom committed to open source documents even as they provide context and 
validate the data in the open sources.  To gain access to some of this data, this study conducted a 
field visit to Bosnia and Herzegovina.  This trip occurred in September, 2011, and centered on 
the city of Sarajevo, where most of the international organizations involved have or had their 
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headquarters, while also including travel to city of Mostar, to gain additional views from another 
city and the from the country side in between.
18
  Interviews were conducted with current staff of 
several international organizations located in Sarajevo, following the interview protocol in 
Appendix A.  These were semi-structured interviews, focusing on how lessons learned during the 
post-war period influenced current practices, since no organization was able to provide staffers 
who had been part of the organization during the study period.  Those who were available still 
had important in-country experience, often for several years, and some were local Bosnians or 
from neighboring Balkan states who had experienced the war and study period first hand even 
while not working for international organizations during the study period.  Observations from 
this trip extend the analysis from above, providing insights into the functioning of the local 
economy and the practicalities and importance of local partnerships for international 
organizations. 
5.3.1 Economics 
The economy in Bosnia and Herzegovina began the study period in a difficult situation, 
attempting a transition from its communist-era economy to a market economy and then separated 
from economic links in the break-up of Yugoslavia, and finally badly damaged during three 
years of active war.  Today, the built environment is largely recovered but scars still remain and 
the economy is still weak.  Access to European markets aided recovery through the first decade 
of the 21
st
 century, but the world-wide downturn hit Bosnia hard following 2008; official 
                                                 
18
 These two cities, Sarajevo and Mostar, represent the local centers of the Bosniak and Bosnian Croat communities 
in Bosnia.  Several logistical aspects of the trip, including available travel time, travel funds, access to interviews, 
and logistics of local travel during the trip prevented visiting Bosnian Serb areas, including the primary Bosnian 
Serb city, and capital of the RS, Banja Luka. 
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unemployment stood at 43.3% for 2011, and at 43.1% in 2010 (“Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 
2012).  Nevertheless, there is little or no sense of idleness in Sarajevo (Bosnia Respondent 2, 
2011).  Shops and stores are not overly full during the day, but street cafes fill up every day 
around the close of regular business hours, and infrastructure is reliable.  Still, signs of damage 
and decay can be found throughout the city.  War damage has been covered over and hidden 
where it has not been fully mended, but communist-era high-rise apartment buildings in central 
and western Sarajevo show signs of external damage that does not display any signs that indicate 
whether or not is unaddressed structural decay or war damage. 
This appearance of economic progress, however, covers over a more fragile reality just as 
it hides last scars to the built environment.  The majority of economic activity in Sarajevo still 
focuses around international organizations and their local spending.  As the capital of BiH, and 
the focal point of both a long and brutal siege and the international response to the war that that 
siege partly brought on (Balkan Battlegrounds, Vol. 1, 2002), Sarajevo was the focus of the 
international response and locus of international headquarters and organizations, and news 
coverage.  In essence, Sarajevo became center stage for the both the people of BiH and for the 
international organizations attempting response and reconstruction, both during and after the war 
(Bosnia Respondents 2 and 7, 2011; Andreas, 2008; Bose, 2002; Chandler, 2000), and like the 
stage during a play, all parties worked hard to make sure the city looked like it was flourishing 
event when it was not clear if it actually was.  This had the goal of ensuring continuous inflow of 
funds from abroad from both donors and travelers; Sarajevo had long had a large tourist industry 
and is attempting to rebuild it (Bosnia Respondent 2, 2011), utilizing that influx of funds to 
rebuild the economy.  It is likely that if international involvement in BiH were to end, the 
economy, particularly around Sarajevo would suffer heavily. 
 136 
The picture, however, is starkly different outside of Sarajevo.  The international 
involvement in economic reconstruction has been sharply smaller in other cities and even more 
so in areas outside of the cities (Bosnia Respondent 7, 2011).  This pattern is even starker in the 
RS, where international views of the Bosnian Serbs as aggressors in the war led to greater 
reluctance amongst international aid groups to engage in aid projects in the RS (Bosnia 
Respondent 1, 2011).  War scars are far more evident today in Mostar than they are in Sarajevo.  
In that area, international involvement was not enough to drive the same kind of rapid 
reconstruction that occurred in Sarajevo.  Nevertheless, large firms are starting to emerge in BiH 
(OHR Media Round-ups), many centered in Mostar, where their headquarters are observable.  
Since these firms do not rely on international involvement to sustain their operations, they 
represent a slower but more robust firm of economic redevelopment. 
While this is promising, the economic situations remain particularly difficult outside of 
the cities where the people in more rural villages still face severe hardships (Bosnia Respondent 
7, 2011) that are exacerbated that weak transportation infrastructure that is reliable but has only 
limited capacity for moving goods and people and is subject a shortage of state support services 
in handling heavy weather that is frequent during the winter.  This has left a sense of unease and 
even foreboding amongst all segments of the Bosnian population for what events may develop in 
the future; all segments of the population are war weary, but fear that the current time is an inter-
war period, not a lasting peace (Bosnia Respondent 2, 2011). 
5.3.2 Local Partnerships 
In BiH, international organizations focused not on working in the field themselves but on 
establishing local partnerships where the international organization would supply and coordinate 
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the actions of local organizations which would work in the field.  Multiple international 
organizations reported focusing on this method of operation as a way of working with the three 
main Bosnian nations (Bosnia Respondents 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8, 2011).  Local partnerships with 
local organizations from each nation allowed the international organizations to access different 
segments of a distrustful local population through mechanisms that they do trust.  This method 
allowed the international organizations to bypass a government that lacked any will to govern 
and maintain effectiveness (Bosnia Respondent 8, 2011) and to gain the support of large sections 
of the population (Bosnia Respondents 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7, 2011) that is necessary for any 
international organization to provide humanitarian aid.  It was not enough, though, just to decide 
to reach out to local organizations.  Doing so required a great deal of professional courtship, 
most often carried out over coffee in the same cafes that operate on the streets of every Bosnian 
city today.  Only with this face-to-face outreach were international organizations able to arrange 
for local partnerships (Bosnia Respondent 8, 2011) without which they could not have completed 
any aid tasks. 
5.4 CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS FOR THE SIMULATION 
The UN stabilization and reconstruction mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been a difficult 
and complex mission operating in a complex situation.  It is built around a slate of international 
actors who are pursuing goals that are only sometimes shared by varying segments of the 
Bosnian population.  It is a mission with political, military, economic, and social dimensions 
since it pursues goals with political, military, economic, and social dimensions in stabilizing 
Bosnian politics, improving administration, protecting human rights, and supporting economic 
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development.  The relationship between the Bosnian Serbs and each of other segments of the 
mission, the Bosnian Croats, Bosniaks, and international organizations, are the most contentious 
(OHR Media Round-ups), though both of the other nations have also clashed with international 
organizations and with each other (OHR Media Round-ups).  Nevertheless, progress has been 
made; refugee populations are a small fraction of what they were at the height of the Bosnian 
War, though refugee returns remain contentious (Bosnia Respondents 6 and 7, 2011; OHR 
Media Round-ups).  The economy has shown signs of improvement but remains fragile, and on-
going political conflicts threaten to reignite violence (ICG, 2012).  Even though the formal UN 
mission departed Bosnia about a decade ago, marking the end of the study period for this 
analysis, the efforts remain on-going; the OHR is still in operation and international 
organizations still form a key piece of the local economy today, 17 years after the end of the war. 
5.4.1 Network Structures 
Still, the case remains instructive.  Details of the network interactions allow for measurements of 
resilience and effectiveness, using the definitions presented in Chapter 3, and will be analyzed in 
Chapter 7.  The results from the framework-guided and network analysis presented here also 
sheds light on the relationships between resilience, capacity, and effectiveness that will be 
detailed in Chapter 8.  These implications will be examined in through the use of simulation 
analysis built from these empirical conclusions.  The simulation tool to be used, AnyLogic, 
allows for agent-based modeling that includes networks of agents.  The network analysis 
performed here will provide several aspects of the data necessary in making validated choices on 
the parameters and rules chosen for the networks in the simulation.  This includes the small 
world and scale free network structure analysis performed above.  The software allows the use of 
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both of these structures, but only at separate times.  Since both accurately describe the empirical 
networks, both structures will be used at different times with the results analyzed and compared. 
5.4.2 Simulation Structures 
The framework-guided analysis provides additional directions for structuring a simulation that 
develop uniquely from this case.  This analysis provides several important aspects to the 
structure and functioning of a stabilization and reconstruction mission that are shared by both 
cases.  These results will be examined in Chapters 7 and 8.  The most important lesson this case 
provides is the presence of a reverse flow in aid completion.  With organizations, some shadowy, 
hidden organizations, others main organizations in the system, sometimes working against the 
aid agencies, it is important for any simulation of a post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction 
mission must include a function that describes this behavior and measures its rate.  This is not a 
situation the faces organizations responding to a natural disaster, and so marks a critical 
difference between the two types of extreme event response efforts. 
This is most extreme when conflicts resume or first become violent.  During the war, the 
humanitarian aid lift had to cease operations under Serb shelling many times (Andreas, 2008) 
and few organizations could maintain any meaningful operations through the war.  This indicates 
that should any violent conflict resume, aid agencies working in the field will be forced to exit 
the field and await a chance to resume operations.  This further indicates the importance of 
calculating the completion of aid tasks from the number of organizations operating in the field, 
as opposed to including only those that are organizing the response effort or running 
administration.  These are not unimportant tasks, but only field operations can complete tasks 
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which have their locus of operation in the field.  These, too, are key aspects of the functioning of 
the system that must be included in any validated simulation. 
5.4.3 Data for Simulation Parameters 
Finally, this case provides a great deal of detailed information that is necessary to define the 
specific, mathematical parameters of a simulation.  The network analysis performed here 
provides data on network densities that will guide the assignment of parameter values on the 
number of network connections and the rate at which organizations will contact each other 
during their efforts.  Coding the components of each of the concept variables provides insights 
on the necessity of using simulation analysis, discussed in Chapter 3, and provides guidance on 
what portions of the organizations should be involved in differing tasks of administration, 
organization, and field work, aid task completion, and anti-completion, rates, and the rates and 
uses of aid resources in the system.  The values for all of these parameters, taken from both 
cases, Bosnia and Haiti, will be presented in Chapter 8, along with how they are varied during 
the final simulation analysis to measure the impact on the final outcomes of the system dynamics 
that develop from the aggregate impacts of each aid agency attempting to complete its work in 
country. 
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6.0  CASE STUDY:  CIVIL CONFLICT AND NATURAL DISASTER IN HAITI 
Following the modeling methods and analyses presented in Chapter 3 and performed in Chapter 
5 on the UN stabilization and reconstruction mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, this chapter 
applies the IAD and Harnessing Complexity frameworks to the UN stabilization and 
reconstruction mission in Haiti that began in 2004, and then faced additional and extensive new 
challenges following the 12 January 2010 earthquake.
19
  The analysis in this chapter will extend 
the analysis of the previous chapter by adding additional data that will play the same roles for 
Haiti as the data presented in Chapter 5 did for Bosnia.  The frameworks provide insights of their 
own in understanding the system that the network analysis and simulations cannot provide.  They 
provide unique substantive analysis that provides for richer results.  The role of the networks and 
simulation is to then take the substantive results and apply them to make a fuller model that is 
grounded in objective methodology.  For the final analysis, the frameworks will provide the rules 
for how the simulation handles the actors and the results of the actions, while the network 
analysis will provide the measurements necessary to program the simulation’s parameters.  
Discussed in Chapters 1 and 3, the frameworks pose six questions: 
 
                                                 
19
 Much of the analysis of this chapter was first prepared for as Scheinert and Konstantinova (2011).  This includes 
the following depictions of the UN Cluster System, the Static Network Analysis, the Daily Dynamic Network 
Analysis, and the Site Visit Lessons.  Scheinert and Konstantinova (2011) focused their analysis on measuring gaps 
between the cluster system’s response plans and the responses actual structure.  This is a different question than 
those addressed here, though related; see Chapter 4, Section 4.3.  The text included has been re-edited to fit the 
analysis performed here. 
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 Who are the actors? 
 What are the system rules? 
 What are the patterns of interaction? 
 How do actors select actions? 
 How do actors select which actors with whom they will interact? 
What are the patterns of variation in the data covered in the preceding questions? 
 
This chapter will use the frameworks and network analysis to answer these questions in the 
context of the mission in Haiti.  After providing those results, the chapter presents the lessons for 
the simulation design that this case provides. 
6.1 FRAMEWORK-GUIDED ANALYSIS 
In a similar section, Chapter 5 presented a brief rationale of how the frameworks are applied in 
this study.  This chapter is repeating the same kind of analysis and analytic steps performed in 
Chapter 5, analyzing a different UN mission in Haiti.  In this way, Chapters 5 and 6 are parallel 
chapters; the rationales for each step of the analysis in this chapter are the same as those in the 
previous chapter, and so this chapter will refer back to those rationales, rather than repeat them.  
In that vein, the task of this chapter is to present the content and basis of the structures and 
process of the UN stabilization and reconstruction mission in Haiti.  To fully describe the system 
in Haiti, this chapter describes the structure, formal rules, and informal rules of the stabilization 
and reconstruction mission in Haiti. 
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6.1.1 System Structure and Actors 
Just as was discussed in the Bosnian context, stabilization and reconstruction missions exist in 
the greater context of overarching system of states and the laws that those states have developed 
for that system.  The relevant details of that system for the structure of stabilization and 
reconstruction missions is the differentiated legal standing that it creates for local and 
international organizations operating in country.  The result is that in both Chapters 5 and 6, the 
structure of the system is defined by the structures of the local administration and the presence of 
the international community. 
6.1.1.1 State Structures 
The formal state structures for Haiti are deeper than those in Bosnia, with a greater 
number of local jurisdictions, but their organization is simpler, since it is consistent across the 
country.  Haiti utilizes four levels of political subdivision below the state level.  In descending 
order, these are:  départements, arrondissements, communes, and sections communales.  There 
are 10 départements, and each covers a large portion of the country.  Communes generally 
correlate to municipalities and sections communales to villages or sections of municipalities 
(Haiti Informant 7, 2010).  However, as will be discussed more directly below, these 
jurisdictions were not necessarily those observed in the network.  These are the jurisdictions that 
were observed with their definitions: 
 
 International:  States, organizations, and groups with impacts in Haiti, but whose actions 
have implications far beyond Haiti or the Caribbean, or organizations whose basis is in other 
international organizations.  The role of the United Nations is so extensive in Haiti that a data 
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point is recorded for the number of UN organizations present, as a subset of the international 
organizations. 
 International – Regional:  States, organizations, and groups with impacts across the whole of 
the Caribbean region, including but not limited to Haiti 
 National:  In the Haitian context, the term nation is used synonymously with the term state.  
Organizations with National jurisdiction have impacts across the whole of the area of Haiti, 
including state governmental bodies. 
 Subdepartmental: organizations with impacts across a part of a département, but not 
affiliated with any administrative divisions below département. 
 Local:  Roughly equivalent to municipal jurisdiction, but including organizations that cover 
neighborhoods of Port-au-Prince, since those neighborhoods can be similar in size to more 
rural villages and towns. 
 
Table 6-1 lists the frequency for each of the observed jurisdictions in Haiti. 
 
Table 6-1. Frequency in Organization List:  Haitian Jurisdictions 
Jurisdiction Count % of Dataset 
Local 20 3.62% 
Subdepartmental 3 0.54% 
National 49 8.86% 
Regional (Caribbean) 79 14.29% 
International 402 72.69% 
International Subset:  
UN Organizations 
91 16.46% 
Totals 553 100% 
 
6.1.1.2 International Actors 
In Bosnia, the international community was built around two main international bodies, 
the United Nations and NATO.  In Haiti, the international community has a larger base.  The UN 
is still present, maintaining the main stabilization mission, the United Nations Stabilization 
Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH).  Following the earthquake, the UN’s Office for the 
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Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) initiated the UN Cluster System, which will be 
more fully explained below, that formed the backbone of the international humanitarian response 
to the earthquake.  This system is designed to facilitate and coordinate a wide base of 
international aid donors and humanitarian aid groups, coordinating aid appeals and the aid 
received, as well as coordinating field operations.  The donor community, however, is made up 
of both large and small donors, with differing resources and differing access to the international 
humanitarian aid community, which will be discussed in more detail below. 
Separate states play a larger role in Haiti than they do in Bosnia.  They do play a role in 
the international community in Bosnia, but they did so largely through either NATO or the UN.  
In Haiti, the United States is a major, direct player.  It is located geographically close to Haiti, 
and the United States Army played a leading role in the military forces present in Haiti (Dobbins 
et al, 2003).  In the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, then-Haitian President Rene Preval 
invited the US Army to take control of Port-au-Prince’s airport and coordinate its operations.  
The US 82
nd
 Airborne Division stepped in to fill this role (Comfort, McAdoo et al, 2011).  While 
the US’s role in Bosnia, particularly during the peace negotiations was substantial, the direct 
involvement of US military forces under US, and not NATO, banners, gives the US a much more 
direct, and so more relevant, role in the Haiti stabilization and reconstruction mission. 
6.1.2 Rules of Action:  Formal Process 
As with the analysis of the stabilization mission in Bosnia, this list of organizations sets the main 
structure of the system by establishing the actors who work in the system.  The formal rules of 
action then describe the kinds of actions that the organizations are established to take and the 
legal structure in which they can take their actions. 
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6.1.2.1 Funding and Organizational Roles 
The organizations in Haiti have the same list of attributes as the organizations in Bosnia 
have, and for many of the same reasons.  The two attributes relative to formal roles are the same 
as in Bosnia, the organizations’ sources of funding and mission categories.  Like in Bosnia, the 
sources of funding match to economic sectors, and their observed frequency is reported in Table 
6-2.  Mission categories are reported in Appendix E. 
 
Table 6-2. Frequency in Organization List:  Haitian Source of Funding 
Source Count % of Dataset 
Public 371 67.09% 
Private 42 7.59% 
Non-Profit 140 25.32% 
Totals 553 100% 
6.1.2.2 Devolved State Powers 
After years of trying different political and economic development strategies, the Haitian 
state is currently organized under one of the popular decentralization models.  The model used is 
the devolution model where powers are transferred from the central government to the local 
governments, similar to a federal system, except that devolved systems still maintain a unitary 
system where the central government can recall those powers (Olowu and Wunsch, 2004; 
Schroeder, 2000).  This devolution has been done such that the powers are confused and often 
the powers necessary to maintain any one policy or program are spread across multiple 
governments.  Two examples of this are illustrative of the point.  Communes and sections 
communales are supposed to do most of the policing, and the sections communales are supposed 
to do so without having the use of weapons (Haiti Informant 7, 2010), all alongside the HNP.  
Education is even more convoluted.  Communes build the schools, sections communales 
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maintain the schools and départements pay for the teachers (Haiti Informant 7, 2010).  This 
creates a structural challenge and requires arrangements with multiples levels of government in 
order to complete any one aid project. 
6.1.2.3 Rules for International Organization Activities 
Over the days following the earthquake, OCHA and the World Food Program (WFP) 
initiated the UN’s system for disaster response coordination, the UN Cluster System (WFP, 
2010; USAID, 2010, 2010a), forming the context in which response and recovery efforts took 
place.  As soon as a disaster happens, a huge number of organizations mobilize to provide aid 
both locally and internationally.  In Haiti, using software from the Sahana Foundation, the WFP 
documented nearly 700 organizations taking part in the response (Sahana, 2010).  Since 
resources and information are distributed throughout the response system and no organization 
has all the information or resources that it needs for its response efforts, all the organizations to 
continue to respond appropriately and effectively, it must learn what tasks other organizations 
have and have not been able to complete and why (Comfort, 1999; Hutchins, 1995).  The goal of 
the cluster system is to facilitate this kind of coordination between organizations. 
Based on the functional needs and experience as outlined in the OCHA guidelines, the 
clusters organize around substantive areas of response.  In Haiti, these areas are Agriculture; 
Camp Coordination/Camp Management (CCCM); Early Recovery; Education; Shelter and Non-
Food Items; Emergency Telecommunications; Food; Health; Information Management; 
Logistics; Nutrition; Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene (WASH); and Protection.  Each cluster has 
a either a non-governmental organization (NGO) or a UN organization that oversees and 
manages that cluster as the cluster lead.  In principle, the clusters are supposed to coordinate with 
the appropriate local administrative agency.  In Haiti, each cluster holds regular meetings on the 
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United Nations Logistics Base (Logbase) to coordinate the activities and resources of the 
organizations that are working in that cluster’s substantive area. 
In addition to the clusters, OCHA operates two different websites where it and the 
international organizations publish documents related to their operations.  The better known and 
longer-standing of these is ReliefWeb,
20
 which maintains records well back into the early and 
mid-1990s.  The second and newer site, having only begun with Haiti, is OneResponse.
21
  
ReliefWeb contains data from many different response efforts and collects all the documents 
together in a database that can be searched by a variety of characteristics, such as country, type 
of document, crisis or disaster, and several others.  OneReponse organizes its documents by 
cluster within pages specific to each disaster or crisis.  These websites are aimed at facilitating 
communication and coordination between cluster meetings, and as a way to share information 
across clusters, much as might happen in an Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in the United 
States operating the Emergency Support Function (ESF) system, though over a longer time 
period.  The rest of this paper will document the shape of this coordination both through and 
outside of the cluster system, as documented by direct observation and the situation reports that 
many organizations published during their response efforts. 
6.1.3 Rules of Action:  Informal Processes and Observed Behavior 
Just because law and policy expects or obligates certain actions does not necessarily mean that 
the identified local actors will necessarily meet those obligations and expectations.  This section 
                                                 
20
 ReliefWeb is online at: www.reliefweb.int. 
21
 OneResponse’s main site is http://oneresponse.info.  The Haiti-specific site can be found at: 
http://haiti.humanitarianresponse.info. 
 149 
will review which expected patterns discussed above broke down and what patterns filled the 
gaps between expected and actual behavior of the actors. 
6.1.3.1 Social and Political Segregation 
In Bosnia the defining rule for understanding the function of local administration and 
social organization was the cleavages between the nationalities.  In Haiti, the analogous rule is 
the separation between the Haves and the Have-nots.  In different language, that is the gap 
between rich and poor, including the gaps between those two and the international community, 
which forms a third group (Table 4-2).  The most visible aspect of this split is the language 
differences.  Rich Haitians speak French.  Poor Haitians speak Haitian Creole.  The aid agencies 
speak primarily English.  Language choice, in this way, becomes a marker to which community 
any one individual belongs.  This split is then reinforced through political and physical barriers.  
The poor are left to rely on a largely ineffectual government, some of whose subdivision 
institutions, particularly the arrondissement assemblies, have never actually sat, and so do not 
actually exist in practice even when they do on paper (Haiti Informant 7, 2010), and other 
institutions are at least viewed as, if not actually, highly corrupt (Haiti Informants 2 and 3, 2010).  
The Haitian rich are able to sidestep these issues by being able to hire private security forces or 
being able to afford the construction of high walls, topped by broken glass, barbed wire, or razor 
wire.  This private security at the gate and razor-wire topped walls enforces a physical separation 
between the rich and the poor in the cities.  The rich are further able to afford to live in large 
country estates, up in the hills, completing the physical separation between rich and poor.  This 
pattern continues even into the international aid community.  Despite the requirement to work 
with the local government, only two clusters actually maintained closer interaction: the WASH 
cluster with the National Directorate of Water Supply and Sanitation (DINEPA) and the health 
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cluster with the Haitian Ministry of Health.  Humanitarian principles dictate that humanitarian 
workers are to be embedded in the local population, with little to no separation, but in Haiti 
security fears lead the aid groups to rely on the US Army and MINUSTAH to provide a security 
cordon around aid workers and projects (Haiti Informant 6, 2010).  Only small groups, ones who 
chose not to connect to the major UN aid apparatus will work without security cordons, and, 
even then, only in places well away from Port-au-Prince.  The result from all of this is a clear 
distinction and differentiation between the three groups. 
6.1.3.2 Communication and Coordination Patterns 
Like the national split in Bosnia, the ramifications of this split in Haiti are extensive.  As 
Table 4-2 notes, governing power is held in the hands of the Haves alone.  Indeed, much of the 
conflict that surrounded Aristide’s tenure stemmed from the appearance to the Haves that 
Aristide would meaningfully spread power to the large majority of Haitians who are poor, and 
the threats that this implied to the wealth and safety of those who are rich (Haiti Informant 4, 
2010; ICG, 2004).  Without the promise of access that Aristide provided, poor Haitians remain 
very distrustful of both their government in general and of the specific officials and politicians 
who make it up (Haiti Informants 1, 2, 3 and 4, 2010).  In addition, just as in Bosnia, the split 
creates a situation rife with false and misleading information that reinforces distrust across 
groups.  There is extensive belief among the wealthy of Aristide holding dark rituals to maintain 
power (Haiti Informant 4, 2010) or of Preval selling out the country to the United Nations, which 
no segment of the Haitian population has any trust in, due to historic underperformance, lack of 
access, corruption, and impunity amongst officials.  Meanwhile, the international aid community 
fears poor Haitians, as just discussed above, for the prevalence of crime and violence, 
particularly kidnapping, which is not as widespread as feared, though it does occur.  Like in 
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Bosnia, patterns of distrust have led to a lack of communication which has reinforced the 
patterns of distrust that have continued to undermine communication and coordination. 
6.2 NETWORK ANALYSES 
Table 6-3. Breakdown of Network Data Sources for Haiti 
Organizational Source Static 
Network 
Timeslice 1a: 
Jan., 2010 
Timeslice 1b: 
1 Feb. 2010 
Timeslice 2: 
June, 2010 
Caribbean Disaster Emergency 
Management Agency (CDEMA) 
11 11 0 0 
UN Health Cluster 13 12 1 0 
UN Logistics Cluster 24 20 1 3 
United Nations Stabilization 
Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) 
1 1 0 0 
UN Office for the Coordination 
of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) 
20 17 1 2 
Pan-American Health 
Organization (PAHO)
22
 
17 17 0 0 
United Nations Environmental 
Program (UNEP) 
1 1 0 0 
United Nations Children’s Fund 
(UNICEF) 
7 6 0 1 
Office of Foreign Disaster 
Assistance (OFDA), USAID 
24 19 1 4 
Water, Sanitation, Hygiene 
(WASH) Cluster 
12 10 2 0 
World Food Program (WFP) 13 12 1 1 
Totals 144 126 7 11 
 
Just as with the analysis of the system in Bosnia and Herzegovina, network analysis can 
document the observed cleavages, and chart their details.  For the Haiti analysis, data comes 
                                                 
22
 PAHO is also the local division of the World Health Organization.  Most actions by either PAHO or WHO were 
reported as having been done by PAHO/WHO or WHO/PAHO. 
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from 144 situation reports downloaded from ReliefWeb.  Table 6-3 details the number of sources 
or each of the timeslices for Haiti, including the static network.  Haiti’s first timeslice is broken 
into two parts through much of the analysis.  This is a product of how the software used to 
construct the data, ORA, treats time data.  ORA allows for time stamping by date, all the way 
down to the second.  The first Haiti time slice covers the three weeks immediately following the 
12 January 2010 earthquake; that is, the timeslice runs from 12 January through 1 February.  The 
change in month leads to another time slice being created in ORA, creating Timeslices 1a and 
1b, that will be included below.  Additionally, the first timeslice provides sufficient data for a 
daily analysis of that timeslice, which will be conducted below.  This was not done for the 
Bosnia data, as the data did not provide sufficiently complete data to support such an analysis. 
6.2.1 Static Network Analysis 
Table 6-4. Haitian Network Map Key for Source of Funding and Jurisdiction 
Organizational Source of Funding  Organizational Jurisdiction 
Source Color  Jurisdiction Shape 
Public   Local Square 
Private   Subdepartmental Down Triangle 
Non-Profit   National Up Triangle 
   Regional Box 
   International Circle 
6.2.1.1 Network Groups and Patterns 
Figure 6-1 visually depicts the results for the static network model for all the situation 
reports.  Coding these situation reports reveals 3344 unique network interactions from one or 
more of 552 organizations identified in the data.  The color of each node in the network map 
represents its source of funding while the shape represents the jurisdiction.  Table 6-4 contains 
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the full list funding sources, jurisdictions, and the colors and shape used to represent each.  The 
most striking feature of this map is its degree of fragmentation.  As is typical, and which has 
been observed in previous disasters, there is a single, large interconnected map that contains 
most organizations (Comfort, Oh et al, 2010).  What is not typical is the number of small side 
groupings that contain only one or two dyads.  What is even less typical is the large number of 
isolates, the organizations that are not connected to any other organization in the network.  These 
are the nodes organized in a list down the left side of the network map.  Isolates are common in a 
response network (Comfort, Oh et al, 2010), but there are rarely this many of them.  A response 
system this disconnected will have difficulty managing itself as the lack of linkages undermines 
the ability of organizations to learn from, and adapt to, each other’s actions. 
 
Figure 6-1. Static Network Map for Haiti 
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6.2.1.2 Network Key Entities 
 
Figure 6-2. Most Central Organizations in Haiti
23
 
 
Again, using ORA (Carley, 2011), a “Key Entities” report calculates a set of centrality 
measures to identify which organization or organizations are the most connected.  These 
organizations have the most ability to monitor and direct information flows and reach to other 
organizations to perform tasks and gain resources.  As mentioned in Chapter 5, the centrality 
measures taken in the Key Entities report are: 
 
 Controlling Agency (total degree centrality) 
 Inter-organization Leader (eigenvector centrality) 
 Acts as a Hub (hub centrality) 
 Acts as an Authority (authority centrality) 
 Information Conduit (betweenness centrality) 
 Connects Agencies (high betweenness and low degree) 
                                                 
23
 Organization Acronym Key:  wfp:  World Food Program; unlog:  UN Logistics Cluster; unwash:  UN WASH 
Cluster; unicef:  UN Children’s Fund; ocha:  UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs; paho:  Pan-
American Health Organization; mnst:  MINUSTAH; htgov:  Haitian Government (General); htcd:  Haitian Civil 
Defense; ukdfid:  UK Department for International Development 
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Figure 6-2 presents the percent or measures for each organization in the figure that measured in 
the top ten organizations for each centrality measure.  Under the cluster system’s official 
organization, the lead organizations are OCHA and the Logistics Cluster.  The data show that the 
most central organizations during the response were the WASH Cluster and UNICEF, closely 
followed by the World Food Program.  OCHA only reaches a position where it is tied with 
several other organizations that are in the top ten of only 15% of the centrality measures. 
6.2.1.3 Network Structure 
This section repeats the structural analysis that was performed in the previous chapter on 
the Bosnian static network.  Table 6-5 repeats the small world small world network structure 
analysis.  In this case, the proximity ratios are enormous, particularly for the static network and 
Timeslice 1a, though this timeslice dominates the static network, containing the vast majority of 
its data, as seen from the data source counts presented in Table 6-3.  The results here are far 
stronger than they were in the Bosnia data; the Haitian networks are small world networks. 
 
Table 6-5. Small World Ratio Calculations for Haitian Networks 
  Static Timeslice 1a: 
Jan., 2010 
Timeslice 1b: 
1 Feb., 2010 
Timeslice 2:  
June, 2010 
Node Count 552 487 117 98 
Density 0.004 0.0044 0.0086 0.0136 
Number of Ties 1214 1042 118 131 
Clustering Coefficient 1.27 1.198 0.299 0.4 
Average Distance 3.694 3.762 1.641 3.454 
Ave. Clustering (RG) 0.00496 0.00478 0.0145 0.01156 
Ave. Distance (RG) 7.513 7.528 4.409 6.872 
Clustering Ratio 256.05 250.63 20.62 34.60 
Distance Ratio 0.49 0.50 0.37 0.50 
Proximity Ratio 520.76 501.52 55.40 68.84 
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Figure 6-3. Histogram of Normalized Degree Centralities:  Haiti Static Network 
 
Figure 6-3 presents the results of the analysis for a scale free network structure in the 
Haiti Static Network.  In matching the results of the small world analysis, the graph shows the 
pattern of power law distribution of network centralities that is both the same substantive results 
with a more extreme mathematical result; this graph approaches the intercept of the axes much 
more steeply from the horizontal while having a shorter vertical tail.  This shows a clearer result 
than the Bosnian networks did; the Haiti networks are clearly both small world and scale free 
networks. 
6.2.2 Dynamic Network Analysis:  Timeslice 1 Daily Networks 
The richness of the data in Haiti Timeslice 1 allows for a deeper analysis than was possible for 
any of the Bosnia data.  Timeslice 1 corresponds to the immediate aftermath of the 12 January 
2010 Haitian Earthquake.  During this time, a huge number of organizations rushed into Haiti to 
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establish response operations.  Current practice includes publishing a large number of widely 
available situation reports on the ReliefWeb site.  The study period for the Bosnia analysis closed 
before this website was initiated, following the 2004 Indonesian Tsunami, so this level of detail 
is not available for Bosnia.  This provides a detailed look at the initial development of a response 
network, providing insights that the Bosnia data cannot. 
6.2.2.1 Network Fragmentation 
As was discussed in Chapter 5, a static network will look more thoroughly connected, 
and so have a higher network density than will the separate dynamic networks.  All the 
connections that appear in any time slice of the dynamic network will appear in the single static 
map.  This can give a false impression of the degree of connectedness by showing connections 
between organizations that may only have occurred briefly and at widely separated time frames, 
limiting the amount of actual interaction.  Figure 6-4 presents the basic node counts for each time 
slice, including the total number of nodes in each time slice, the number of isolates, and the 
number of new organizations that enter the system each day.  The network maps for each time 
slice for the dynamic network analysis are contained in Appendix G.  These maps contain the 
same pattern of highly disconnected networks and a large number of isolates that are observed in 
the static map, and indeed, the separated network sections show even more clearly in the 
dynamic maps than the static map.  Though using news reports from the Caribbean News Online, 
Figure 6-4 confirms the pattern of organizational entry into the system that Comfort, Siciliano, 
and Okada observed (2011), that is, an initial rush of organizations followed by a steady decrease 
in new organizations, representing a steady decrease in additional personnel, knowledge, and 
skills. 
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Figure 6-4. Haiti Daily Dynamic Networks:  Node Counts 
 
Nevertheless, a continual measure of new organizations entering represents an expanding 
response system.  Taken together, the network graphs and Figure 6-4 show that the total number 
of nodes in the main components of the networks remains roughly constant.  The spikes tend to 
match rises in both new organizations and isolates in the first half of the response and large 
donor meetings in the second. The valleys in the number of nodes match to periods of few new 
organizations and smaller numbers of isolates.  This suggests a pattern of organizational exit 
from the official coordination structures, even as the data show that few organizations completed 
their goals, when those actions included more than making statements of sympathy and support.  
The network interactions were coded by status of the task.  A code of 7 indicated completion.  Of 
3088 network interactions in Timeslice 1, only 650 entries recorded a completed action or 
interaction.  Of those, the few that do not represent damage assessments or the initiating of a 
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cluster primarily refer to opening refugee camps or the delivery of food, fuel, or medicine, and so 
represent the completion of the tasks necessary to perform other tasks. 
 
 
Figure 6-5. Haiti Daily Dynamic Networks:  Network Fragmentation 
 
Figure 6-5 shows the network fragmentation, the percent of nodes that are disconnected 
from the main portion of the network, for each time slice of the dynamic network, while Figure 5 
provides the percentage of isolates for each time slice.  In comparison, the fragmentation of the 
static network is 0.24, well below the lowest fragmentation of any time slice in the dynamic 
network.  The network for all of Timeslice 1 has 52 isolates.  Figure 6-6 shows that while this 
may be higher in absolute count than any time slice, the far greater number of organizations in 
the static network produces a smaller percentage of isolates, often much smaller, than are found 
in all of the time slices. 
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Figure 6-6. Isolate Percentage of Haiti Daily Dynamic Networks 
6.2.2.2 Daily Dynamic Network Centralities 
The time slices of the dynamic networks also show a similar pattern to the static networks 
in which organizations were most central, while showing the change across the time period of the 
response.  Figure 6-7 presents the eigenvector centralities from the time slices of the dynamic 
network.  This measure of centrality includes two parts: how many connections the given 
organization has to other organizations (degree centrality) and the degree centrality of the 
organizations to which that organization is connected.  This allows for greater accounting for 
hierarchical network structures that commonly develop.  Using a selection of the organizations 
that emerged in Figure 6-2, Figure 6-7 shows both the initial and continuing prominence of the 
WFP as a central organization, but also the emergence of PAHO and the UN WASH Cluster 
later in the response, and the episodic, but inconsistent centrality of OCHA. 
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Figure 6-7. Eigenvector Centralities across Haiti Timeslice 1 
6.2.3 Dynamic Network Analysis:  Changes in Timeslice 2 
Along with allowing for an in-depth analysis of the initial formation of a response system, Haiti 
provides data that shows how that system changes after the initial rush of organizations.  Access 
to sufficiently detailed data to support a network analysis in Bosnia do not become available 
until five years after the end of the war, and eight years after the start of the study period.  This 
means that the initial rush of organizations is already long past.  Events at the start of the Haiti 
study period follow this same pattern; sufficiently detailed data are not available until the period 
following the earthquake, but it is the earthquake that provides the catalyst for a new rush of 
organizations and a large reshuffle of the system.  Section 6.2.2 took advantage of this to 
examine the initial rush of new organizations and aid.  This section will examine the network as 
it existed in June, 2010, after the earthquake rush, but before the complicating events of the 
cholera outbreak that struck Haiti in the fall of 2010. 
 162 
6.2.3.1 Haiti Timeslice 2 (June, 2010) Network Map and Groupings 
 
 
Figure 6-8. Haiti Timeslice 2 Network (June, 2010) 
 
Figure 6-8 contains the network that existed in June, 2010 in Haiti.  At this point, the 
network has undergone several changes, some of which increased its separation, some of which 
brought the network closer together.  Table 6-5 provides evidence of these changes, along with 
providing evidence that this is a small world network.  First, the number of organizations has 
dropped precipitously; Timeslice 1b is exactly 1 day long, and has 117 nodes while Timeslice, at 
a month long, has 98 nodes.  The network has also lost nearly all of its private organizations, and 
the few that remain are in either separate network components or only on the fringes of the great 
component.  Additionally, the clustering coefficient has dropped from Timeslice 1a and the static 
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network, showing less grouping.  However, the network density has increased, suggesting a 
greater number of long paths across this network.  This fits with a network map that shows 
several different clusters in the map, none of which are closely connected to the others. 
6.2.3.2 Network Key Entities for Timeslice 2 
 
Figure 6-9. Key Entities in Haiti Timeslice 2 (June, 2010)
24
 
 
Figure 6-9 presents the key entities for Timeslice 2.  While several key organizations 
have remained on the list, several important organizations for the long term development have 
not.  The most important of these organizations not on the list is the Haitian government; this set 
of key entities contains no Haitian government bodies.  The Haitian Government (htgov) remains 
near the center of the map and shows up in four lists of top ten centralities, but its highest 
centrality is only as a connecting agency, with high betweenness and low degree centralities, and 
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 Organization Acronym Key:  mnst:  MINUSTAH; usofda:  OFDA (USAID); unlog:  UN Logistics Cluster; ocha:  
OCHA; mnstjtc:  MINUSTAH Joint Operations Tasking Center; unicef:  UNICEF; hi:  Handicap International; 
fratlog:  Atlas Logistique 
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still only ranks 4
th
 on the list of connecting agencies.  This is the highest that any Haitian 
organization reaches in that timeslice on any centrality measure, and only two others, Haitian 
Civil Defense and the Ministry of Public Transportation and Communication,
25
 even show up 
more than once in the top ten centrality scores.  The organizations that have become more central 
in this time slice are military and logistical organizations, suggesting a greater focus on aid 
logistics and identifying high capacity organizations that can support actions.  OCHA has also 
become more central by showing up in the top ten of more centrality measures, suggesting that 
its coordination activities have increased. 
 
Figure 6-10. Histogram of Centralities:  Haiti Timeslice 2 (June, 2010) 
 
6.2.3.3 Network Structures 
Network structures have now been discussed several times, allowing for a move directly 
to the results.  As mentioned twice above, Haiti Timeslice 2 is a small world network, as shown 
from the proximity ratio calculated in Table 6-5.  Figure 6-10 reports the histogram of 
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normalized degree centralities across the organizations in that timeslice.  It is the one histogram 
that does not follow a strict power law distribution, with a small rise in normalized degree 
centrality at a measure of 3.  This indicates the presence of the intermediate hub organizations 
that have been hinted at in the network grouping and key entities analysis.  The pattern of the 
graph still closely fits a power law and the idea of intermediate hubs fits with the definition of a 
scale free network presented in previous chapters.  These two points allow for the conclusion that 
the network in this time slice is also a scale free network. 
6.3 SITE VISIT LESSONS 
On-site observation took place during May, 2010.  It involved attending cluster meetings at 
Logbase, and visiting and interviewing officials in the Haitian government and at Logbase to 
gain their insights and understandings of the response and reconstruction effort.  Earlier 
publication documented the primary conclusions from this trip (Comfort, McAdoo et al, 2011).  
Some of the observations bear repeating here.  Two of the primary observations of this effort 
were the extremely rapid turnover in cluster leads and the separation between international 
responders, the Haitian government, and the Haitian population.  In the network maps for both 
the static and dynamic networks, this pattern continues to hold.  While few groups in the network 
map are completely homogenous, they do tend towards being primarily from one jurisdiction or 
another.  This is based on inspection of the patterns of the shape of the nodes (See Appendix G).  
At the same time, those organizations which are not public tend to group together and enter the 
network through only one or two public organizations.  Similar to jurisdiction, this finding is 
based on pattern of color locations in the network maps (See Appendix G). 
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6.3.1 Methods of Communication 
Many organizations did not take part in the cluster system.  Some of their actions are recorded in 
the various situation reports published on ReliefWeb, or they would have been left out of this 
analysis.  They emerged as the unusually high portion of isolates in both the static and dynamic 
networks.  Despite the essentialness of communication and coordination to be effective 
(Comfort, 1999; Hutchins, 1995,), these isolates took part in the coordination.  Still other 
organizations, either unable or unwilling to pass through the security checks at Logbase, or 
simply too small to be noticed or too cutoff to reach internet-based communications, were 
completely overlooked by any part of the central international response and its efforts to register 
all the aid actors that were either already present in Haiti at the time of the earthquake or entered 
following the earthquake.  The steady number of organizations in the system, despite a continual 
flow of newly-entering organizations, suggests that many others were unable to maintain 
communication and coordination in the field, indicating that the communication system did not 
meet the challenges which conditions in Haiti imposed on the response. 
6.3.2 Content of Communication 
When coordination did occur, its content was often unproductive or untimely.  Events change 
faster than weekly meetings can often accommodate.  Wide-spread internet communication 
between meetings can mitigate that delay, but only if the communication carries the proper 
information, focusing on organizational activities and coordination, and can reach all the actors, 
including those in the field, who need the information.  All too frequently this did not occur.  
Figure 6-5 shows more than just the large proportion of isolates in the network.  It shows the 
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early pattern of a development of coordination.  Through the first three weeks, the percentage of 
isolates first dropped towards the percentage of isolates shown in Timeslice 1, and would 
approach that level three more times over the course of the response, even though it never 
reached it.  This finding shows intervals of coordination where organizations would coordinate 
once every few days.  This observation fits the pattern of cluster meetings at Logbase.  Each 
cluster would meet once per week, providing a venue for mass coordination.  Some clusters 
would take advantage of this, with organizational representatives making requests or announcing 
projects at the meetings.  Others, however, spent the meeting discussing policies, often in the 
most general of terms, such as agreeing to pay attention to issues of gender while mentioning no 
specifics.
26
  Nevertheless, much of the content of cluster meetings was determined by documents 
that aid workers edited in advance and passed among each other using email and GoogleGroups.  
Even then, the aid workers, who quickly came to resemble “bureaucrats for hire,” often took a 
surprisingly long amount of time to fill out documents and respond to email requests. 
An example of this pattern occurred shortly after the CDM’s reconnaissance trip to Haiti 
that illustrates common patterns in the response community, including another issue, the 
language divide.  One cluster, attempting to coordinate aid projects, generated a word document 
where each member of the cluster was to fill in boxes indicating details of the project.  The 
document was published to the membership through the GoogleGroup
27
 with the request to the 
membership to complete it.  The cluster leadership would then compile the responses and send 
out a completed document.  This was in addition to the on-going Consolidated Appeals Process 
documents which OCHA published, and was not for use with donor agencies, but only for the 
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 This occurred at one cluster meeting, directly observed by an author of this paper. 
27
 The author of this study had joined the group as part of observing and monitoring the response efforts and so 
received this document directly throughout its lifespan. 
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use of the cluster and its membership.  After requesting for several weeks that organizations fill 
out the document, only a small fraction of the cluster membership returned any data.  A partially 
completed document was published for the group, in French.  No English-language version was 
ever compiled.  Haiti is a French-speaking country, and earlier works have critiqued the over-
reliance on English in the international response (Comfort, McAdoo et al, 2011).  Excluding 
English, however, particularly in the primarily English-speaking aid community commits the 
same sin as excluding French while working in a French-speaking country.  Indeed, it may even 
be worse in this case, since it alienates much of the aid and donor community while still not 
being accessible to the majority of Haitians, who actually speak Haitian Creole, and not French. 
6.4 CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS FOR THE SIMULATION 
As was discussed in Chapters 3 and 5, analysis will conclude with the use of a simulation to test 
the relationship between resilience, capacity, and effectiveness.  For that simulation to be valid, it 
must be based in empirical data.  Bosnia provided insights into the impacts of groups struggling 
between each other.  Haiti is conceptually simpler than Bosnia.  Its groups are more easily 
defined by socio-economic status and each group’s access to government and policy making is 
easily identifiable.  Additionally, Haiti saw a new crisis force the development of a new response 
system that allows for observation and measurement of a system that has yet to mature, as the 
Bosnian system has done by the time network data becomes available.  The result is that the 
Haiti case offers corroborating evidence for many conclusions about the simulation structure 
already drawn in Bosnia, and to be fully reviewed in Chapter 8.  Further, it offers unique insights 
that make key contributions to developing an empirically-validated computer simulation model. 
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6.4.1 Network Structures 
The results on network structures are corroborating results.  All of the timeslices observed in 
both cases proved to be both small world networks and scale free networks under the 
mathematical definitions provided in the network methodology literature (Newman et al, 2006).  
What Haiti does offer that is unique is network growth and development.  It shows how networks 
start with a small number of organizations with few connections.  As the network grows, the 
number of organizations increases throughout the first few weeks, though Figure 6-4 shows that 
the rate of increase peaks in the first few days after the event, though the total number of 
organizations in the system remains relatively stable after a few days. This indicates that 
organizations will go in and out of the system, even in the first few days following an event.  The 
second Timeslice, from June, 2010, shows that network density increases over time, though it 
does not necessarily centralize under any organizational leadership, let alone the one that the 
response plans might call for as the organizational lead.  Any valid simulation will have to mirror 
these developments in order to be valid. 
6.4.2 Simulation Structures 
The Haiti data also provides a qualitative basis for several structures that must be included in the 
simulation.  Logbase’s insularity provides the implication that no organization that is only 
involved in organizing the response of other organizations can directly complete an aid task.  
Only organizations that are actively working in the field can complete aid tasks.  These 
organizations can direct access to the field, and can move to the field to complete tasks, but only 
those that are in the field can complete tasks.  The Haitian government is also known for 
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inefficiency and corruption (Haiti Informants 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, and 7, 2010).  The impacts of this 
corruption will have to be operationalized in the simulation model in some manner.  Finally, all 
aid organizations entering aid brought their own resources with them.  The lack of local 
resources required this of these organizations.  This means that organizations entering the aid 
system will bring resources into the system in the simulation model.  In these ways, the Haiti 
analysis provides three key simulation structures for which the Bosnia analysis did not provide 
an empirical basis. 
6.4.3 Data for Simulation Parameters 
Chapter 5 indicated several parameters that the case study analysis will provide.  These include 
aid completion rates, resource accumulation rates, the percentage or organizations that will be in 
the field versus the number that will be engaged in organizing a response, among others.  
Chapter 8 will provide the full list, along with the specific values that each case provides, which 
is chosen for the model, and why that value is chosen.  In the final version of the model, these 
values will serve as guideposts in building a model that will endogenously generate many of 
these measurements.  This will allow for a flexible model to test variations and generate 
empirically-valid hypothetical data while specific values generated in the empirical case studies 
will allow for validation tests of the model that will validate that those hypothetical results.  In 
this way, the empirical case studies presented here in Chapters 5 and 6 will support analysis that 
extends behind the specific details and contexts of these two specific case studies. 
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7.0  MODELING RESILIENCE, CAPACITY, AND EFFECTIVENESS 
Analyzing complex adaptive systems requires building a clear conception of the situation under 
study.  Under IAD, these are the rules of the action arena (Ostrom, 2005).  Under Axelrod and 
Cohen’s framework, this is the process of identifying the patterns of variation, selection, and 
interaction in the model (2000).  The analytic chapters to this point, Chapters 4, 5, and 6, have 
performed this analysis for the two empirical cases upon which this study builds.  While each 
case has been examined, they still stand as separated cases, independent of each other with their 
own sets of conclusions and observations.  This chapter draws these two cases together.  First, it 
builds a single, conceptual model for post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction from the 
observations and analysis from each case, making conclusions where the cases support common 
conclusions and pointing out unique conclusions and deviations between the cases.  The study 
then applies this conceptual model to support the component variables for this study’s conceptual 
variables, and their measures, that were presented in Chapter 3, and analyze the correlations 
between the measured values for each of the component variables and the concept variables to 
draw conclusions about their relationships.  The next chapter will recombine these results with 
the conceptual model to define and perform the simulation analysis. 
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7.1 A CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 
Each of the previous two chapters examined a specific, empirical case of a United Nations-led 
post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction mission.  As large and complex missions, this 
required careful analysis to understand each in its own context.  One of the purposes of this 
study, though, is to expand beyond these individual case studies and draw cross-case conclusions 
that can provide guidance for the structure of future stabilization and reconstruction missions.  
This requires stepping beyond the individual cases, using their empirical results to define a cross-
case model.  This section develops the first part of that model.  That first part draws together the 
results of the frameworks to develop the conceptual model that will lay the ground work for two 
ever more mathematically rigorous parts of the model, one that will follow in the next section of 
this chapter, and the other in the next chapter. 
7.1.1 International Intervention in a Local Conflict 
Chapter 1 laid out the primary context of stabilization and reconstruction missions that bears a 
brief review at this point.  The kind of missions currently under study are international 
interventions designed at stabilizing the many aspects that can and do precipitate conflict within 
a state and lead to that conflict spilling over into other, usually neighboring, states.  A great 
number of events can precipitate international involvement, and shape its initial format and 
function that are the initial conditions of each mission.  There is already an extensive literature 
that examines how and when the UN and individual states decide to intervene (Beardsley and 
Schmidt, 2011), and it is not the intention of this study to expand on that literature.  Chapters 6 
and 7 of the UN Charter, along with the unwritten versions known as Chapter 6 and a half and 
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Chapter 7 and half, define peace keeping and peace making processes that can and often do lead 
to these missions.  In Haiti, international involvement began with a US-led intervention in 1994, 
while the conflict which this study focuses on had largely played out in 2004 before accepting 
international intervention, even as many international organizations and missions were already 
present in Haiti, including at least one that was attempting to mediate the conflict (See Chapter 4, 
Section 4.3).  The conflict had generated instability that undermined Haitian efforts at 
development, both economic and democratic, exacerbating an already desperate humanitarian 
situation that had already seen large numbers of refugees during the earlier phase of the crisis 
(Dobbins et al, 2003).  This process provided for the most traditional arrangement, utilizing 
Chapter 6 peacekeeping, where the local government invites international intervention to help 
stabilize the situation after a settling a conflict.  In Bosnia, events occurred differently, with the 
UN and NATO entering an on-going conflict and acting to bring about a peace that did not 
previously exist (See Chapter 4, Section 4.2; Hayden, 2011).  This was a case of the unwritten 
Chapter 7 and a half peace keeping, that is really more of a peace making situation, though it is 
arguable that it was NATO or UN involvement that hastened the end of the conflict, as opposed 
to Bosnian Serb losses to Croatian, Bosnian Croat, and Bosniak military forces.  With one being 
a civil conflict, and the other a civil war, and each ended by different conceptions of peace 
keeping, and indeed from opposite ends of the peace keeping spectrum, the cases included 
considerably different initial conditions for international involvement while still both being cases 
of international involvement in a local conflict, designed to stabilize the situation. 
In whatever way the international intervention is initiated, by the time of the post-conflict 
situation, the intervention will have arranged for international legal standing.  Despite being from 
opposite ends of the peace keeping spectrum, both cases saw their international interventions 
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clearly legitimated under international law.  This occurred effectively automatically for Haiti, 
since the MINUSTAH mission began with an explicit invitation from the local government, even 
as many local Haitians from multiple segments of society saw that invitation as ill-gotten, 
illegitimate, or illegal (Haiti Informants 2 and 4, 2010).  For Bosnia, the legitimation was written 
into the Dayton Accords.  International forces faced mixed popularity there, since memories of 
the UN’s failures in the UNPA’s remained strong and NATO was popular with the Bosniak 
population, though less so with Bosnian Serbs (Bosnia Respondent 1, 2011).   However they 
entered, international forces will be legitimated under international law in the post-conflict 
situation, though it is likely that only some segments of the local population will actually 
welcome them, if any segments do. 
7.1.2 Political and Governance Aspects 
Once the post-conflict portion of the intervention begins, its goals will be to reform and 
strengthen governance.  This is the primary mission, since it is what brings about stabilization 
(See Chapters 1 and 2).  In the initial phases, the international institutions will lead in 
administrative tasks, since they are often the only ones with enough capacity left after the 
conflict for full governance, and even then, only after a period of build up while aid agencies and 
international bodies dispatch teams and delegations to support reconstruction and stabilization 
(Haiti Network Data, 2010).  The challenge in this part is for the international organizations to 
guide administrative development while empowering the local government to take over 
administration.  At this point, much of the literature conflicts with itself, suggesting differing 
guidance on how to establish democracy and empower local government.  The only current 
consensus is that local government agencies must be involved in order to gain capacity (See 
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Chapter 2).  If the local government bodies are not involved, then governance will remain in the 
hands of the international organizations indefinitely as the international organizations will never 
perceive the development of those local institutions as being ready to fully take over 
administration, whether that perception is accurate or not.  Current practice, as seen in both 
Bosnia and Haiti, involves international organizations partnering with local administrative 
agencies, matching local and international institutions by substantive fields, usually following 
the UN Cluster System’s format for what those fields are.  These partnerships then provide 
policy and practice guidance and material resources to the local administration from the 
international agencies.  If this partnership breaks down, then the flow of resources and 
knowledge breaks down, and the system will lose its primary means of supporting the growth in 
governance capacity 
This method remains controversial both internationally and within the targeted country as 
it assumes the international organizations have superior information about carrying out 
governance that is applicable within the borders of the local country.  It is, nevertheless, the 
method upon which the OHR and Peace Implementation Council (PIC) in Bosnia, both defined 
and established in the Dayton Accords, are built and the implicit rationale upon which the 
international presence in Bosnia is predicated; the international actors understand better than 
local Bosnians how to balance Bosnia’s mixture of nations and their relationships.  With legally 
defined powers, such as that the OHR holds or has assumed, it is critical that the international 
organizations understand the realities of local administration, culture, and history, since, however 
inappropriate the assumption is that the international organizations know best is, and it is almost 
inherently false, their defined powers mean that they will certainly be part of the decision making 
and policy making process, to the extent that either exist.  Indeed, if there is no domestic policy 
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process, then the international organizations will formulate a process themselves since they 
expect there to be one and will see its absence as a vacuum that must be filled at all the 
jurisdictional levels mentioned in chapters 5 and 6, even when local politics might suggest that 
such a process is left largely unutilized at any given level.  It is then necessary for the 
international organizations with formalized influence to find ways to recognize when their 
understandings and expectations in a given theater are in fact misconceptions and require 
adjustment and adaptation to achieve any long term stabilization and to leave a government that 
is legitimate in the eyes of all segments of the local population. 
7.1.3 Social and Humanitarian Aspects 
7.1.3.1 Aid Task Categories 
 
Table 7-1. Task Category Frequencies in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
General Task 
Category 
Static 
Network 
Timeslice 1:  
December, 2000 
Timeslice 2:  
July, 2001 
Timeslice 3:  
January, 2002 
Count % Count % Count % Count % 
Administration 152 35.43 54 33.33 65 40.12 33 31.43 
Business 19 4.43 0 0.00 1 0.62 18 17.14 
Communication 4 0.93 2 1.23 2 1.23 0 0.00 
Field 78 18.18 25 15.43 37 22.84 16 15.24 
Organization 106 24.71 33 20.37 38 23.46 35 33.33 
Politics 60 13.99 48 29.63 9 5.56 3 2.86 
Reconstruction 10 2.33 0 0.00 10 6.17 0 0.00 
Total 429 100 162 100 162 100 105 100 
 
While much of the focus on post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction is on the 
rebuilding of political and administrative organizations, the administrative tasks only take up a 
limited portion of the effort.  The rest of the effort involves the physical reconstruction and 
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humanitarian aid tasks that international organizations engage in.  Tables 7-1 and 7-2 detail the 
empirically observed task categories from both Haiti and Bosnia.  Field tasks are those that 
involve performing a specific aid task in the field, whether the activities involve psychological 
support, humanitarian activities, or physical construction.  The count totals in each timeslice are 
equivalent to the total number of network interactions in that timeslice.  Like the mission 
categories described in Chapters 5 and 6, these categories detail both the broad area of operation 
and the specific substantive categories that, in this case, each network interaction aims at 
achieving.  The charts only include the broad areas of operation, as there are many specific 
categories, and so a chart including them all requires extensive space.  The complete charts of the 
task categories for both static networks are included in Appendix H and Appendix I, for Bosnia 
and Haiti, respectively.  Administrative tasks are particularly common in the Bosnia data, 
accounting for a third or more of all network interactions.  In Haiti, the majority of tasks involve 
organizing field aid operations, with the next most common activity being engaging in field aid 
activities.  Building governance capacity and legitimacy may be the main objective of 
stabilization and reconstruction missions, but the majority of tasks focus around reconstruction. 
 
Table 7-2. Task Category Frequencies in Haiti 
General Task 
Category 
Static 
Network 
Timeslice 1:  12 
Jan – 1 Feb 2010 
Timeslice 2:  
June, 2010 
Count % Count % Count % 
Administration 12 0.36 10 0.33 2 0.71 
Business 2 0.06 2 0.07 0 0.00 
Communication 24 0.72 23 0.75 1 0.35 
Field 1334 39.89 1209 39.50 125 44.17 
Organization 1971 58.94 1816 59.33 155 54.77 
Politics 1 0.03 1 0.03 0 0.00 
Total 3344 100 3061 100 283 100 
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This makes it very important to understand how aid tasks are completed in the field.  Any 
effective modeling of stabilization and reconstruction will focus on these activities.  Including 
the Field and Organizations categories in Tables 7-1 and 7-2, aid activities make up typically 
around 50% of the activities in the Bosnian network and around 98% of activities in Haiti, at 
least within the organized UN-based systems.  Really, these figures should be higher.  Every case 
of a natural disaster response contains a set of organizations that do not integrate with the main 
system structures.  This means that situation reports will miss their involvement, since they do 
not coordinate in any way with the organizations that publish situation reports.  News reports are 
more likely to reach these organizations and publicize their activities so that studies like this can 
learn of them.  However, most of those organizations are small, so it is still difficult for news 
organizations to learn of them and reach them (Comfort, Siciliano, and Okada, 2011; Comfort, 
Wukich et al, 2011; Comfort, McAdoo et al, 2010; Comfort, Oh et al, 2010).  All of these 
organizations work towards completing aid tasks, which is the most easily measurable of the 
tasks that a stabilization and reconstruction mission must complete. 
7.1.3.2 Aid Organization and Coordination Activities 
Organization activities in Tables 7-1 and 7-2 correspond to missions explicitly aimed 
coordinating or preparing field activities.  This is the role that OCHA is intended to play in the 
UN Cluster system but which the WFP largely did play, as discussed in Chapter 6.  It is the role 
the UNHCR took in the earliest days of the reconstruction mission in Bosnia, as discussed in 
Chapter 5.  These organization activities often happen at centralized locations where aid agencies 
gather and base themselves in theater.  In Haiti, after the earthquake, this is the Logbase 
discussed in Chapter 6.  In Bosnia, there are two locations in Sarajevo that serve this purpose.  
One is the Business Center UNITIC, a pair of twin tower office buildings near the center of the 
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city.  The other is the UN Country Team, located in an office building in the Austrian portion of 
the old city, near the western edge of the old city.  In both cases, the central coordination location 
is separated from the surrounding areas and from open, public access by a security cordon.  In 
Bosnia, this was nothing more than standard building security that required check in and an 
appointment.  In Haiti, this included armed guards along with the similar check in requirements.  
No actual aid tasks are completed by the people working at this site; this is the location of the 
bureaucrats-for-hire discussed in Chapter 6.  Still, the work done here is important, in principal, 
for coordinating aid activities in the field, but, as discussed in Chapter 6, performance in that 
coordination is inconsistent.  This separation between the field operators and the organizational 
backfield must be included in the final model. 
7.1.4 Unified Conceptual Model 
The above sections describe the aspects of model of stabilization and reconstruction missions.  
This model must include separation between administrative, organizational, and field tasks that 
direct organizations to take task category appropriate actions for whatever category in which 
they operate.  Field operating organizations perform aid tasks, driving one arm of a loop where 
organizations complete aid tasks while other organizations undo aid tasks in an effort to oppose 
and undermine the stabilization and reconstruction mission, as well as some completed aid tasks 
decay, leaving them to be recompleted.  Organizations performing organizational tasks funnel 
resources and information to field organizations and administrative organizations and agencies 
while all organizations that enter the system bring resources with them for their own use or for 
sharing as a common pool resource for the aid community.  This creates a resource flow where 
resources enter the system and are then either utilized for aid activities, transferred to 
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government, where they may be lost due to corruption, or remain in reserve for the organization 
owning them until that organization leaves the aid system. At that point, those organizations are 
removed from the system.  Their transfer to government increases government capacity and 
allows government to both govern and complete aid tasks alongside aid agencies.  This activity 
improves government legitimacy since it represents the actual delivery of goods and services to 
those in need of them.  Since this delivery of goods and services, whether by government or aid 
agencies, is the actual completion of aid tasks, this brings together the full set of activities 
required of an effective stabilization and reconstruction mission. 
7.2 MEASURING RESILIENCE, CAPACITY, AND EFFECTIVENESS 
With the conceptual map laid out, the next step is to design and implement a system of 
measuring activity within the model of a stabilization and reconstruction mission.  It would 
indeed be ideal if the measures could be simple and easily definable and identifiable.  In a 
complex mission, the measures must be able to meet and address the complexity to be valuable.  
Moreover, this means that the measures must utilize a certain amount of complexity to fit 
common concepts across the varying forms and operations of the system.  To do this, the 
measures require careful but thorough definitions.  This section reviews the concepts and their 
definitions, all presented earlier in this study, that this study uses to measure the system and then 
presents the measurements found and analyzes their patterns and relationships. 
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7.2.1 Study Variables in the Conceptual Model 
Table 7-3. Component Variables and Ranges 
 Resilience  Capacity Effectiveness 
Components Range Components Range Components Range 
Presence on the 
Ground 
1 – 8 Initiating 
Organization 
Resources 
1 – 5 Completion of 
Aid Tasks 
1 – 5 
Internal 
Coordination 
1 – 2 Initiating 
Organization 
Knowledge 
1 – 4 Promoting 
Government 
Legitimacy 
1 – 5 
External 
Coordination 
1 – 4 Responding 
Organization 
Resources 
1 – 5 Expanding 
Government 
Resource Access 
1 – 5 
Adaptation 1 – 5 Responding 
Organization 
Knowledge 
1 – 4   
 
Presented early in Chapter 1, this study examines the relationship between a mission’s resilience 
and effectiveness, while controlling for its capacity.  These represent the study’s three main 
conceptual variables, which have been referenced many times throughout.  Built from literature 
in Chapters 1 and 2 and presented in detail in Chapter 3, this system focuses on the key tasks that 
define effectiveness, the behaviors the constitute resilience, and the resource stocks that allow for 
capacity.  Each of these conceptual variables contains several component variables which define 
and measure the constituent parts of that variable and which allow for measures of the 
performance of the system across all the components.  Table 7-3 contains the list of components 
and their measurement ranges.  Chapter 3 fully defines the ranges and how each value is defined 
and assessed.  The earlier chapters carry complete discussions of the theoretical underpinnings 
for each conceptual variable and for its components, making it unnecessary to reestablish the 
grounds for each definition.  More important for the discussion in this chapter is the location and 
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role that each of the component variables play in the conceptual defined above.  This will 
establish their basis for being included in this study. 
7.2.1.1 Conceptual Variables in the Conceptual Model 
  Each of the conceptual variables plays a key role in the model described above.  The 
most obvious of these roles belongs to effectiveness, even as Chapters 1, 2, and 3 showed that 
effectiveness is probably the most complicated variable in the model to actually define and 
operationalize.  The system that develops in the stabilization and reconstruction mission aims at 
completing aid tasks, stabilizing the governance and security situation, and establishing and 
expanding government legitimacy.  The main action loops in the model, the aid task loop and the 
resource flow, feed directly into these goals, and so directly define the system’s effectiveness, 
just as each organization’s ability to drive these loops defines the organization’s effectiveness. 
Slightly less obvious than effectiveness is the role of capacity in the model.  Chapter 3 
provided a clear and direct definition of this conceptual variable, since it is the relatively easiest 
variable to define.  Completing aid tasks requires resource input in terms of knowledge, 
manpower, and materiel.  These make up the content of the resource flow; a flow that must 
progress in order for the aid task flow to progress.  Without resources, the entire system would 
grind to a halt.  In this way, resources take a critical role in the system.  Knowledge fills an 
equally critical role, but, in the current model, only in the aid task loop.  Organizations must have 
adequate knowledge of the tasks upon which they are working in to be able to properly complete 
that task.  Any task improperly completed effectively remains uncompleted, as it will be 
unreliable, non-functional, or insufficient to meet the needs of those for whom the project was 
done.  This includes being able to successfully navigate local political and cultural climates in 
which the organizations are working.  Knowledge, in this way, is just as much of a resource as 
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manpower, money, or heavy lifting machinery, though its impacts and functioning is different 
from other types of resources. 
Resilience is a more complex variable than both capacity and effectiveness in this model.  
Like effectiveness, resilience is a difficult concept to define and measure.  Unlike effectiveness, 
it is also a complex variable to place in the model.  This model operates at both a system level 
and an organizational level, otherwise known as an agent level.  Resilience is not an explicit 
process in the model on either of these levels, but a characteristic of how organizations operate in 
attempting to complete their tasks.  Each of the behaviors that constitute resilience must be 
operationalized separately, and some in different ways, since they have differing impacts on 
operation of the model and agent behaviors in the model. 
7.2.1.2 Component Variables in the Conceptual Model 
The relative simplicity of identifying effectiveness and capacity components in the model 
allows for a brief explanation of them at this point.  Aid task completion follows from the aid 
task completion loop and connecting the government to resources is a key piece of the resource 
flow.  Legitimacy then comes from the government’s ability to secure support by delivering 
services.  Capacity components have already been reviewed above, with the difference between 
the resources and knowledge of an initiating organization and a responding organization being 
only their position in the network dyads.  For both sets, they represent the resources necessary to 
complete the tasks that make up effectiveness. 
Resilience is left with four components that have four differing operationalizations in the 
model.  The role of presence on the ground fits with other observations on the structure of the 
model.  This component is designed to measure the mixture of organizations that are working 
together on any one aid task.  This is part of the observation that only organizations working in 
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the field can complete aid tasks, and only those organizations will be able to recognize the 
information on changing situations and events that are occurring at or near the location of that 
aid task.  Presence on the ground expands on this by factoring in coordination occurring between 
organizations in the field.  Internal and external coordination are the most similar; they both 
correspond to the pattern and frequency of network connections, where greater coordination 
correlates with greater frequency of actual network ties (Comfort, Siciliano, and Okada, 2011; 
Comfort, Wukich et al, 2011; Comfort, McAdoo et al, 2010; Comfort, Oh et al, 2010; Comfort, 
1999) between actors.  In the model, these ties occur at a level below the agent-modeling level, 
defining the operation of the agent-modeling level.  Finally, organizations utilize adaptation by 
responding to changes, changing their method of operation or the structure of their organizations.  
This is part of the process that they utilize to complete aid tasks, and so lies along the connection 
between organizations working in the field and the rate at which aid tasks are completed.  With 
these three different spaces for operationalization in the model, resilience is a more complex 
variable to operationalize than capacity and effectiveness.  Capacity and effectiveness can be 
located in the model at or near the conceptual level; resilience can only be operationalized 
through each of its components. 
7.2.2 Correlations between the Components 
Each of the four components for resilience, the three components for effectiveness, and the two 
initiating organization components for capacity are observed in every network interaction.  The 
two responding organization components for capacity are only observed for interactions that 
have a responding organization, all for every timeslice.  This produces an extensive amount of 
output; there are nine frequency tables for each of 5 timeslices and 2 static networks, making for 
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63 frequency tables for all of the components for all of the timeslices.  For this reason, the output 
is not included directly in this chapter.  Some review can still be made.  For each of the resilience 
and effectiveness components, there is one ordinal category that pertains to either the behavior 
not being observed, for resilience, or no progress made or lost, for effectiveness.
28
  These were 
always the most common codes for each component.  In only one case of one component, 
external coordination in Haiti Timeslice 2 (June, 2010) was this measure not an absolute 
majority of the observed data; in June, 2010, in Haiti, no external coordination was observed at a 
low of 41% of network interactions, though it still represents the plurality of interactions in that 
case.  In Bosnia Timeslice 2 (July, 2001), no internal coordination was observed in 100% of 
network interactions; in that timeslice, this component variable showed no variation.  Together, it 
remained unclear if any of these component variables correlated with any of the others. 
Moreover, despite careful efforts to define each concept and component such that they 
are clearly distinct from one another, there is still some overlap that cannot be avoided.  Aid 
completion is almost inherently correlated with presence on the ground, as some presence is 
often required in the context of the network interaction for completion to occur, since 
organizations must be in the field to complete tasks.  Additionally, presence on the ground will 
likely closely overlap with external coordination, since both involve the mixing and cooperation 
of organizations towards completing some common activity or task.  Each component is also 
measured on an ordinal scale of different ranges and for which it is unclear, and, indeed, 
unlikely, that the transitions between any two values within one component has the same 
absolute change in value as the transition between any two values of another component 
                                                 
28
 For resilience, the corresponding ordinal code for “Not Observed” is always 1; for effectiveness, the “No 
Progress” code is always 2.  For effectiveness, values of 1 are reserved for lost progress or undermined gains.  See 
Chapter 3, Sections 3.2.3.1 and 3.2.3.3. 
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variable.  These two factors make it impossible to simply combine the measures directly.  
Instead, a more complex method of combination is required, and which this study applies. 
7.2.2.1 Factor Analysis Method 
This problem and its solution were first presented in Chapter 3.  At that point, it was 
noted that Cutter et al (2003) faced a very similar problem in identifying and measuring the 
social vulnerability of geographic locations in the United States.  They solved it by using a 
principal components analysis to combine demographic and economic data.  This method 
provides a guide that is used here to assess the correlation and overlap between the component 
variables and then to combine those into a single measure that, while its absolute value carries 
little explicit meaning, its relative value across network interactions and across timeslices can tell 
us something of how the system performed in during that timeslice.  This analysis is performed 
in two steps that will be presented separately below. 
7.2.2.2 Component Correlations 
Table 7-4. Variable Names for Component Variables 
Variable Name Variable Label 
ground Resilience Component: Presence on the Ground 
icoord Resilience Component: Internal Coordination 
xcoord Resilience Component: External Coordination 
adapt Resilience Component: Adaptation 
aidtask Effectiveness Component: Completion of Aid Tasks 
govtlegit Effectiveness Component: Government Legitimacy 
govtresource Effectiveness Component: Government Connection to Resources 
iresources Capacity Component: IO Resource Level 
iknowledge Capacity Component: IO Knowledge Level 
rresources Capacity Component: RO Resource Level 
rknowledge Capacity Component: RO Knowledge Level 
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Table 7-5. Factor Results in the Bosnia Networks 
Bosnia 
Static Analysis 
Factor 1 Factor 2 
ground Adapt 
xcoord iknowledge 
aidtask   
Period 1 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
icoord govtlegit ground iknowledge 
aidtask govtresources adapt rknowledge 
        
Period 2 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
ground adapt govtlegit rresources 
xcoord iresources 
 
  
  iknowledge     
Period 3 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
xcoord adapt ground govtlegit 
aidtask iknowledge iresources rresources 
govtresources     
 
The first step of the factor analysis aims at determining the amount of overlap between 
the component variables and identifying the number of underlying factors that lead to overall 
performance of the system.  Tables 7-4 through 7-6 present the patterns in these results.  Table 7-
4 provides a key for reading the variable names in Tables 7-5 and 7-6.  Assignments to each 
factor are determined by the factor loadings.  Each variable is assigned to a factor based on their 
factor loadings.  Each variable is assigned to the factor for which it has the highest absolute value 
of its factor loadings, provided the variable had a maximum uniqueness score of 0.5 in a 
principal components version of a factor analysis.  In these tables, variable names listed in italics 
have a negative relationship with the overall value of the factor while the rest have a positive 
relationship with the factor value. 
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Table 7-6. Factor Results in the Haiti Networks 
Haiti 
Static Analysis 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
icoord ground adapt 
xcoord aidtask iknowledge 
Period 1 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
icoord ground adapt 
xcoord aidtask iknowledge 
Period 2 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
ground adapt icoord 
aidtask govtresources xcoord 
 
The pattern of how the components fall across the various factors determines which 
components overlap while the method allows for combining the variables in a way that will 
control for that overlap.  The key result, however, is that there is little to no pattern of overlap.  
There are only two sets of two components that consistently appear assigned to the same factor, 
even as that is not always the exact same factor.  The first set is a combination of internal and 
external coordination.  These two variables typically occur with opposite impacts on the same 
factor, indicating that organizations are typically engaging in either internal or external 
coordination when they are engaging in any amount of coordination.  This is not a meaningful 
result, but rather an artifact of the coding process, which codes each separate organizational 
action as a separate network interaction.  Since internal and external coordination are separate 
actions, they will very rarely be coded in the same network interaction.  The other set is ground 
and aidtask, representing presence on the ground the completion of aid tasks.  This is a 
meaningful result; it fits with the conclusion that has been reached twice before, providing for a 
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third, independent basis for the conclusion that only organizations working in the field can 
complete aid tasks.  The indication is that the components are largely independent of each other.  
A further factor analysis was performed where the analysis examined the components for each 
concept separately, so that factor results pertained to only one component at a time.  In four of 
the seven time slices, none of the analyses produced any results; all uniqueness scores exceeded 
the thresholds for being combined.  Only Bosnia Timeslices 1 (December, 2000) and 2 (July, 
2001) were there any results, and the results produced only one factor for each analysis, with no 
more than two components included.  This provides further evidence that these are separate 
components of their respective conceptual variables that the literature tells us are important 
components of those concepts. 
7.2.2.3 Unified Measure of Performance 
Table 7-7. Descriptive Statistics of Combined Performance Measure 
Timeslice Number 
of Factors 
Average Combined 
Performance Score 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Bosnia Static 
Network 
2 0.00 1.03 -2.98 2.81 
Bosnia 
Timeslice 1 
4 0.00 2.12 -6.35 2.95 
Bosnia 
Timeslice 2 
4 0.00 2.19 -5.28 5.28 
Bosnia 
Timeslice 3 
4 0.00 2.00 -7.97 3.41 
Haiti Static 
Network 
3 0.00 1.73 -3.81 9.17 
Haiti 
Timeslice 1 
3 0.00 1.59 -3.69 8.46 
Haiti 
Timeslice 2 
3 0.00 1.75 -8.38 8.28 
 
Analyzing the component variables concludes with producing a measure of performance 
that is similar to the social vulnerability score that Cutter et al (2003) produced with their 
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method.  In their method, after acquiring the factor loadings and predicting factor scores from the 
loadings, they combined their factors using basic mathematical methods.  That is, using theory as 
a guide, they either added or subtracted each factor score to the other factor scores to produce an 
overall score for each jurisdiction.  This method is repeated here; after using the principal factors 
version of factor analysis to determine the number of factors, this study applies a principal 
components analysis to actually combine the variables into a single measure.  Each component is 
designed such that it is an ordinal scale with higher values of the component indicating higher 
measures of the conceptual variables.  For this reason, in this analysis, the predicted factor scores 
are all summed to produce the final performance score.  This analysis includes the responding 
organization components for capacity.  Since these components are only measured when a 
responding organization is present; any interaction that lacks a responding organization produces 
missing values for the factor scores and resultant performance score.  Therefore, in this analysis, 
network interactions refer only to network dyads, and not to network monads.  This was done 
since the initial factor analysis that produced the number of factors for the principal components 
analysis included the responding organization components.  The result is a rough measure of 
performance for each network interaction that can be compared within and across networks. 
This is a performance score as it represents the overall levels of resilience, capacity, and 
effectiveness that are observed in each network interaction.  The greater this score is, the greater 
change from the baseline that any individual network interaction generated.  The more 
consistently higher scores are observed, the more effective a mission will be.  This allows for 
comparison of change from the baselines presented in Chapter 4; the end of the study periods for 
each case are too different to assert comparability in levels of change, a difficulty that the events 
of the Haitian earthquake, so close to the end of the time period of the case study exacerbated.  
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Instead, the baselines set context for the case studies while the studies guide definition and 
measurement of the concept and component variables.  The measures of the component variables 
then measure change from the baseline.  Table 7-7 presents the basic descriptive statistics for 
each of these analyses, by timeslice.  A 0-value for each timeslice indicates an average level of 
progress for that timeslice.  With tighter standard deviations and higher maximum values, the 
Haiti system shows relatively better performance than the Bosnia system does. 
7.3 RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN VARIABLES 
This analysis shows relatively little correlation between the various component variables.  The 
conceptual model described at the beginning of the chapter lays out the general functioning of 
the system that develops between the organizations that take part in stabilization and 
reconstruction missions.  These organizations split between several different task categories that 
require attention.  Most of them split between three task categories:  administration, organization, 
and field operations.  The mission is then oriented to support the operations of the organizations 
working on administration and field operations.  It is within this context that resilience, capacity, 
and effectiveness operate, as measures of the method of operations and the degree to which they 
achieve their goals, while controlling for the amount of materiel, knowledge, and manpower they 
have to pursue their goals.  Each of these three conceptual variables is defined and 
operationalized through a range of component variables, whose role as a component are 
developed from theory, presented in Chapters 1 and 2, and operationalized from empirical data, 
presented in Chapter 3.  This analysis in this chapter shows that these components largely do not 
overlap with each other.  It does connect the ability to complete aid tasks with the location of an 
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organization’s operational efforts; organizations in the field can and do complete aid tasks.  This 
includes a factor of resilience, indicating some level of coordination in the field produces results. 
However, there are three important shortcomings in this analysis method for the 
situations under study.  First, the coding effort showed that many of the impacts of resilience fall 
in network interactions that occur later than the resilient behaviors.  This disconnects the resilient 
behavior from its results.  Second, like all statistical analyses, factor analysis and principal 
components analysis assume each observation is independent.  In this analysis, each observation 
is a network dyad.  It is a principle of complex adaptive systems and network theory that the 
network dyads are not independent of each other.  Third, the inconsistent presence of interacting 
organizations prevents statistical analysis from using all the data available.  Either responding 
organization capacity components are included, which results in network monads being excluded 
due to missing data in the observation.  This excludes an extensive amount of data, since all 
these networks had very low densities and many isolates, meaning that much of the data is 
monads, and not dyads.  Or, responding organization capacity components are excluded from the 
data, which allows for all observations to be used, but which directly excludes valid and relevant 
data as well as many of the effects of network connections.  Either method excludes relevant 
data, undermining the validity of its results.  Taken together, these three shortcomings in this 
analysis method lead to results that are likely to miss connections that are present in the data, 
while also limiting the validity of the conclusions that the data does support.  This requires using 
an analytic method more aligned with the needs of complex systems.  Network analysis allows 
for the case-specific, empirical analysis that Chapters 5 and 6 performed.  Simulation allows for 
a generalization of the network results.  The next chapter will expand on the analysis performed 
here to further test the relationships between the conceptual variables. 
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8.0  SIMULATING STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION MISSIONS 
The models in Chapter 7 provided some basis for concluding that post-conflict stabilization and 
reconstruction missions are more effective when the organizations attempting them utilize 
resilient behaviors.  This evidence, though, is not truly compelling evidence, due to the 
limitations of the analysis methods for studying the kinds of complex systems that stabilization 
and reconstruction missions are.  Networks, applied in Chapters 5 and 6 go further than 
conceptual models and factor analyses, but are limited to specific cases and, even with dynamic 
network analysis, can only provide snapshots of the system.  Like the factor analysis, this has the 
potential of still disconnecting the results for resilient action from the actual resilient action, 
depending on how granular the timeslices are made and where their borders fall; resilient action 
at the end of the timeslice is very likely to be disconnected from its results.  This requires 
developing an analysis that utilizes continuous time.  Simulation analysis allows for this; it 
applies complex system methods using continuous time chart developments in a system.  As an 
analogy, dynamic network analysis is much like algebra, with discretely measured timeslices 
while simulation is the result of shortening those timeslices to an absolute minimum duration, 
which makes simulation resemble calculus in its relationship to network analysis.  Like calculus 
in relation to algebra, simulation analysis rests on top of the conceptual, network, and factor 
analyses already performed.  Simulations require developing an empirically-based and 
mathematically rigorous model.  Building a model without those bases will result in little more 
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than a “toy community” that may or may not resemble the actual action sphere under study 
(Gilbert and Troitzsch, 2005).  For this reason, all of the analyses of the previous chapters have 
led up to this analysis, and this study will draw on all them to perform a simulation analysis. 
Chapter 7 opened with developing a conceptual model from the empirically observed 
cases in Bosnia and Haiti.  This empirical model served as basis for describing and measuring 
resilience, capacity, and effectiveness using the factor analysis.  It also serves as the basis for 
defining the structures of the simulation.  Since it is empirically based, the simulation analysis 
uses it as a guide, developing a model that mirrors the empirically observed structures, processes, 
and linkages that defined the model.  That model focused on the organizations in the system and 
how their individual actions and behaviors produced organization-level and system-level 
outcomes; resilience is a defined by organizational behavior but effectiveness is both an 
organizational attribute and a system attribute.  This defines the largest structures of the 
simulation, that it must be able to model organizational behaviors as well as their systemic 
outcomes.  This requires a simulation that uses two types of simulation methods.  Agent-Based 
simulations model the actions of actors while system dynamics simulations model systems and 
their processes, outputs, and outcomes (Gilbert and Troitzsch, 2005).  Envisioned in Chapter 1, 
with a study that focuses on organizations as the unit of analysis, but still examining the system 
that develops between the organizations, this study uses a simulation that builds a systems 
dynamics model on top of an agent-based model.  Agent actions and behaviors in the agent-
based tier will define the dynamics of the system tier; resilient action will occur in the agent-
based tier while their resultant effectiveness will be determined by the observed processes of the 
system dynamics tier. 
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8.1 SIMULATION PARAMETERS 
Each tier of the model is initially defined by a set of model parameters.  These parameters 
provide the mathematical values and relationships that will determine how the model behaves 
and what results it shows, and so play the role of variables in the model.  Each tier has its own 
set of parameters that define the model on their respective tiers.
29
  The values reported below are 
measured as monthly rates, the empirical timeslices occur as months.  The simulation allows for 
far shorter rates, while the longest available is weeks.  Model time was, therefore set to weeks 
and the rates reported in the charts below set a ¼ of the numbers reported and model time 
interpreted in weeks. 
8.1.1 Agent-Based Parameters 
Table 8-1 lists the parameters that define the functioning of the Agent-Based tier of the 
simulation model.  The operation of each parameter will be explained with the full exposition of 
the model in Section 8.2.1.  Each parameter has some basis in the empirical data.  The table lists 
that basis, including the actual measured values in both empirical cases and the explanation for 
why the model value was selected.  Two parameters merit a more detailed explanation than that 
provided in the table.  The OfficeOrgEnterRate and the FieldOrgEnterRate rely entirely on the 
Haiti data.  This was done since the network analysis of the Haiti system examined a developing 
                                                 
29
 In AnyLogic, all experimental parameters are placed in the “Main” tab of the model, which is also the location of 
the system dynamics tier when constructing a combined agent-based and system dynamics model.  Therefore, all 
agent-based parameters are defined in the system dynamics tier, while their variable definitions in the agent-based 
tier refer back to the system dynamics tier.  These are still agent-based parameters that define action only on the 
agent-based level; placing them in the system dynamics tier in the program allows for their manipulation during 
simulation experiments. 
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system, meaning that its measures representing entrance rates for various organizations at the 
start of a mission.  These were the data needed for these two parameters.  The Bosnia data, on the 
other hand, examined a mature system, and so presented a target for where the values should 
resolve during the model’s operations. 
 
Table 8-1. Definition and Explanation of Agent-Based Parameters 
Parameter Name Data Definition Bosnia 
Value 
Haiti 
Value 
Model 
Value 
Explanation 
ContactRate Degree 
Centralities 
2.5/mo 6/mo Increase 
with time 
Increasing activity with 
time (Section 6.4.1) 
HelpResponseRate Error Correction 
(adapt = 5)
30
 
14.5% 18.2% 16.4% Average of empirical 
cases 
OfficeOrgEnterRate Organization 
Task Categories 
27.6% 32.7% 32.7% Match to Haiti 
FieldOrgEnterRate Field Task 
Categories 
17.9% 34.5% 34.5% Match to Haiti 
HighKRate 3 or 4 in 
Knowledge 
Component
31
 
82.1% 86.2% 84.0% Rounded average of 
empirical cases 
LowKRate 1 or 2 in 
Knowledge 
Component
32
 
17.8% 13.9% 16.0% Rounded average of 
empirical cases 
PublicOrgRate Local Public 
Agencies  
21.7% 10.5% 15% Rounded average of 
empirical cases 
 
8.1.2 System Dynamics Parameters 
Table 8-2 repeats for the system dynamics tier what Table 8-1 did for the Agent-Based tier.  In 
this tier, the parameters are less directly observed, and many fill the roles of exogenous factors 
that determine the impacts of the processes on the agent-based tier.  In this way, they form parts 
                                                 
30
 See Table 7-4 and Section 3.2.3.1. 
31
 See Section 3.2.3.2. 
32
 See Section 3.2.3.2. 
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of the links between the tiers, translating the number of organizations that are engaged in each 
type of action on the agent-based tier into tangible results on the system dynamics tier. 
This allows many of them to be defined using simplifying assumptions.  This includes the 
number of organizations in the system and the number of aid tasks that must be completed.  
These numbers vary widely between the cases, and it is unclear that any of the documentation 
has a clear assessment of the total number of aid tasks that must be completed or how difficult 
those tasks will be to complete.  For the number of organizations and aid tasks, this is resolved 
by interpreting the numbers as percentages of the organizations and tasks.  For task size, the 
specific is less important that the variations across the model.  Being able to change this value 
allows for adjusting the difficulty during the simulation, due to exogenous shocks, which should 
highlight the resource requirements and resilience requirements for effective action, and thereby 
take a key part of operationalizing resilience within the simulation model.  The result is that the 
system dynamics parameters are largely experimental while the agent-based parameters are 
largely empirical. 
 
Table 8-2. Definition and Explanation of System Dynamics Parameters 
Parameter Name Data Definition Bosnia 
Value 
Haiti 
Value 
Model 
Value 
Explanation 
OrgCount  Size of Network 207 553 100 Set as 100% 
NetConnections Normalized 
Degree Centrality 
0.796 0.415 0.606 Average of average 
normalized degree 
centrality across all 
networks 
CrisisSize Not Determined; cannot assume field 
assessments are complete 
100 Set as 100%; Can be 
varied in experiment 
TaskSize Determine task 
difficulty 
Not measured 10 Allows for changing 
task completion 
requirements 
CorruptionFactor Government 
resource loss 
(govtresource = 1) 
None 3% 3% Only available data 
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8.1.3 System Shocks 
Ogata (2005) discusses at length the unexpected developments and difficulties that she and the 
UNHCR faced in attempting to respond to refugee crises throughout her tenure as the High 
Commissioner for Refugees.  These developments included the breaking out of new wars, 
changing political conditions that increased the difficulty of performing their tasks, and many 
more complications.  The model builds this kind of development into the system by 
incorporating events that impact the functioning of the model.  Some of these events last for only 
a short time, while others permanently change some parameters. 
This model includes one shock, which occurs once in the model and utilizes two events to 
complete the shock.  At a model time of 30, a brief war breaks out that lasts for 5 weeks, ending 
at a model time of 35.  During this time, the rate of completed aid task loss is greatly increased, 
the initial allotment of tasks doubles, since the new war creates new tasks as well as undermining 
current tasks.  Moreover, the organizations present in the field are forced to exit as it is no longer 
safe for them to operate.
33
  Additionally, during the war, the local government spends as many 
resources as it can to pursue its war effort.  At the close of the war, organizations are allowed to 
reenter the aid system and resume completing aid tasks that have now increased in size, since 
new information and resources, as well as adjustments to changed political situations will have 
increased their difficulty.  This provides the simulation with a built in method of assessing 
change in aid task size during the operation of the model. 
                                                 
33
 The parameters WarActive and SafeToEnter are dummy variables used to indicate war and peace states and 
facilitate the functioning of forcing all organizations from the field or allowing them entry, depending on the state of 
conflict in the model. 
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8.2 SIMULATION STRUCTURAL TIERS 
As discussed above, the simulation model is designed as a model with two tiers, an agent-based 
tier and a system dynamics tier.  The parameters just defined determine the flow of 
organizations, tasks, and resources through their portions of the model, following the processes 
that the also define the model and give structure to each tier.  The full operation of the model 
requires that both the parameters and structures be in place for the simulation to be complete. 
8.2.1 Agent-Based Tier 
 
Figure 8-1. Agent-Based Tier Statechart 
 
In an agent-based model, many uniform agents perform actions in the model that the model then 
measures and aggregates to determine the outcome.  This includes determining such processes as 
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grouping behaviors or the perpetuation of species (Gilbert and Troitzsch, 2005).  AnyLogic, the 
simulation program chosen for this study, defines its agent-based models by establishing a set of 
agents that move through a statechart.  Defined as a percentage, the program sees 100 discrete 
agents.  The agent’s location in the statechart determines its actions and so also determines its 
impacts on the system dynamics model.  Figure 8-1 provides the depiction of the statechart that 
this study developed based on the empirical observations discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, and the 
conceptual model in Chapter 7.  The ‘K’ in the LowKFieldAid and HighKFieldAid states refers 
to knowledge levels, using the same definition of low and high knowledge that define the 
HighKRate and LowKRate parameters in Table 8-1.  AnyLogic also uses a network between the 
agents that allows for interaction, allowing the model to utilize many of the network analysis 
results, including the network structures examined in Chapters 5 and 6.  These are the tools that 
this study uses to define the first tier of its simulation model. 
The task of specifying an agent-based simulation model is determining the mixture of 
these tools that will be applied.  The arrows between the states in Figure 8-1 indicate the state 
transitions.  Arrows within the states, as seen in OrganizeAid and LowKFieldAid, indicate 
message transmissions to other organizations with which the transmitting organization has a 
network connection.  Table 8-3 lists the states in this model, how organizations enter them, and 
how they exit.  All but two states have either multiple entry sources or multiple exit locations.  
Dashed lines indicate multiple entry or exit directions to the state listed in the first column of the 
chart.  Exit rules regarding the breakout of a conflict have been discussed above.  Timeout exits 
occur when an organization has remained in a given state for the required length of time.  The 
three week timeframe comes from direct observation of the response to the Haitian earthquake; 
aid organizations involved in the response cycled their on-site staff members on a regular basis 
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where no staff member remained for more than three weeks (Comfort, McAdoo et al, 2011).  
Additionally, if the mission runs out of operational resources, then the organizations are forced to 
abandon their efforts until new resources can be attained.  This applies to all organizations except 
administrative organizations, while, even under conflict conditions, agents with organizational 
missions are able to continue operations.  Administrative agencies are never forced to leave the 
system, and indeed, enter until they reach a maximum percentage of the number of 
organizations, set by the PublicOrgRate parameter, listed in Table 8-1, while having no defined 
exit conditions.  Finally, the model uses a small world structure between the agents, based on the 
network structure analyses in Chapters 5 and 6.  Together, these rules define how organizations 
move through the system, and so provide the underlying mechanics for the system dynamics tier. 
 
Table 8-3. Statechart Transitions 
State Entry From Entry Rules Exit To Exit Rules 
Potential 
Aid Giver 
Initial State Starting Position 
Admin Aid Exit until reach 
PublicOrgRate 
Organize Aid OfficeOrgEnterRate 
Field Aid Message from 
Organize Aid 
Admin 
Org 
Potential 
Aid Giver 
Entry until reach 
PublicOrgRate 
No Exits No Exits 
Organize 
Aid 
Potential 
Aid Giver 
OfficeOrgEnterRate 
Potential Aid 
Giver 
Timeout (3 weeks); 
Out of Resources 
Field Aid Message from Low 
K Field Aid 
Field Aid 
Potential 
Aid Giver 
Message from 
Organize Aid 
Potential Aid 
Giver 
Timeout (3 weeks); 
War Breaks Out 
High K Field HighKRate 
Low K Field LowKRate 
High K 
Field Aid 
Field Aid HighKRate 
Potential Aid 
Giver 
Timeout (3 weeks); 
War Breaks Out; 
Out of Resources 
Organize 
Aid 
Message from Low 
K Field Aid 
Low K 
Field Aid 
Field Aid LowKRate Potential Aid 
Giver 
Timeout (3 weeks); 
War Breaks Out; 
Out of Resources 
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8.2.2 System Dynamics Tier 
 
Figure 8-2. System Dynamics Tier Layout 
 
System dynamics simulations utilize sets of stocks and flows to measure change in a system 
(Gilbert and Troitzsch, 2005).  Stocks represent inventories of some item that exist in a certain 
quantity in the system.  Flows measure the movement rate of those stocks into, out of, and within 
the system.  These stocks and flows are set by the parameters of the model.  Figure 8-2 contains 
the system dynamics model that this study applies.  The model features two major processes, the 
aid task loop, to the left, and the resource utilization flow to the right.  Parameters are listed in 
two columns, right or left, depending on which process they govern.  The parameters for the 
agent-based tier are also listed here, allowing for greater control in the program, though they 
only govern the agent-based tier.  Stocks are indicated by the squares.  The arrows with the 
triangles depicting valves represent the flows, and the arrows without the valve indicate 
dependency relationships.  Circles with a triangle in them indicate parameters.  Circles without 
the triangle indicate auxiliaries.  The difference between auxiliaries and parameters is that 
 203 
auxiliaries are continually recalculated in the model while parameters are constants that only a 
direct command, such as those that events, like the WarBreaksOut and WarEnds events, can 
issue.  The system dynamics tier is the aggregate of all of these processes and dependencies. 
8.2.2.1 Aid Task Loop 
The aid task loop determines the completion of aid tasks.  It is made up of two stocks and 
two flows.  The CrisisSize parameter determines the initial AidTasks stock, to the left side of the 
loop, by setting the two equal at the start of the model.  The stock then expands when the conflict 
occurs.  The AidCompletion flow determines the rate at which tasks move from the stock that yet 
requires completion, AidTasks, to the stock of completed tasks, called CompleteAidTasks, to the 
right of the loop.  The number of organizations in the HighKFieldAid state in the agent-based 
tier determines this flow rate.  In a simplifying assumption, each organization in that state applies 
1 resource unit per week to aid tasks.  The rate is then the quotient of the number of 
organizations in the HighKFieldAid state divided by the size of the aid task, set under the 
parameter TaskSize. 
A key aspect of the analysis of this model is contained in the second half of the aid task 
loop.  The obvious assumption is that once an aid task is completed, it is removed from the list of 
tasks to be done, and organizations move on to other tasks, with no need to revisit completed 
tasks.  The first half of this is true; when a task is done, organizations will move on, even though 
it is not always clear when a task is done.  The second half of the assumption is not necessarily 
true.  As discussed in several places in this study, conflicts include actors who seek to undermine 
the stabilization and reconstruction mission.  Even in natural disasters, completed aid tasks decay 
and can reach a state of sufficient disrepair such that they are effectively undone.  This is 
especially true when the local public sector is unable to lay out sufficient resources to maintain 
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the projects after the aid organizations complete them.  The flow from CompleteAidTasks to 
AidTasks models this impact.  The component variable aidtask defines the flow rate; the rate is 
equal to the percent of network interactions where the variable takes the value ‘1’ in the 
empirical data.  The analyses for both Haiti and Bosnia found an average of 1% of network 
interactions across all of their timeslices that took a value of ‘1’ on the aidtask component 
variable.  For this reason, the model also uses a 1% per month, or 0.25% per week, rate for the 
AidAntiCompletion flow.  Representing the clearest measure of effectiveness, the model 
continues until there are no more aid tasks to complete.  The model time at this point determines 
the number of weeks that the mission requires for completing its goals. 
8.2.2.2 Resource Utilization Flow 
The resource utilization flow determines and charts the path of resources through the 
system.  It is made up two stocks, one that stores the resources available for aid tasks, and the 
other the resources that have been provided to the local government for its capacity building.  It 
includes five flows.  Three flows define resource use in the system.  Field organizations use the 
resources to complete tasks while organizing agencies provide resources to the local government 
while coordinating aid agency activities.  Discussed in the above section, all aid organizations in 
the field use 1 resource unit per week, whether FieldAid, HighKFieldAid, or LowKFieldAid, 
though only those in the HighKFieldAid can complete tasks.  Aid resources flow to the local 
government from the organizations in the OrganizeAid state.  The logic is similar to ask tasks, 
that organizations in OrganizeAid pass one resource unit per network connection, assuming that 
their connections contain a representative number of public organizations.  That is, the flow rate 
is the product of the number of organizations in OrganizeAid, the NetConnections parameter, 
and the percentage or administrative organizations in the system.  The final use is the loss of 
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government resources.  There two driving forces for this flow, corruption and war spending.  
Mentioned above, during the conflict modeled, the organization fully spends all of its resources 
in each time period.  As discussed in Table 8-2, corruption is measured in the corruption factor.  
The flow is the product of the CorruptionFactor parameter, the number of administrative 
organizations, and a constant value, 4, which translates the number of organizations into the 
ordinal code used to measure organizational resources in the capacity components.  These three 
flows, ResourceUse, ResourcesToGovt, and LossOfGovtResources define how organizations use 
resources in the system. 
Resource entry and exit from the system is modeled in two flows that are actually 
placeholders in the system dynamics tier.  They are listed in the system dynamics to indicate 
their presence, but organizational actions in the agent-based tier entirely define their rate.  These 
are the ResourceDonation and ResourceDeparture flows.  When organizations enter the system, 
they bring resources with them.  A statistical distribution defines each amount, using the 
empirically distribution of the resource capacity components.  These variables showed a 
distribution with a mean of 3.75 and a standard deviation of 1.1.  Each time an organization 
enters either the OrganizeAid or FieldAid state, from the PotentialAidGivers state, the model 
randomly determines a resource value based on that distribution, and adds that value to the 
AidResources stock.  When an organization leaves any of the field states or the OrganizeAid 
state, the model performs the same random calculation to remove resources from the system.  
This models the knowledge and resources, especially personnel resources, which organizations 
take with them when they leave the system.  However, organizations will have spent some of 
their entering resources on aid tasks or transfers to government, so at departure, organizations 
take only ¼ of the randomly determined resource value out of the system.  Over the course of 
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their three weeks of operations, organizations will have spent 1 unit per week of the potential 
units they brought with them.  This leaves one remaining unit, based on a mean of almost four 
units, from entering.  The statistical distribution accounts for the variation in how completely 
organizations use their resources and the range of the amount of personnel in each aid team.  The 
model accounts for how organizations deposit the resources that fill the flows discussed above 
and the GovtResources stock with these two flows, while also removing the resources lost to the 
system when organizations depart for home. 
It is an important aspect of stabilization and reconstruction that missions do not have 
access to unlimited resources.  The model includes an algorithm for accounting for this dynamic.  
The organizations involved publish a consolidated appeals document through the OCHA to 
request aid.  While they have undergone development over the years, with earlier documents 
containing far less detail, current versions contain full lists of the tasks and funding requirements 
for all the UN Clusters in a response mission, importantly including the level of met and unmet 
need (OCHA, 2010, 2010a, 2002, 2001, 2000).  For the cases understudy, this level is as low as 
about 14%, of need that is met in Bosnia during December, 2000, and as high as 64% of need 
met in Haiti during June, 2010.  Based on these numbers, the model applies a 30% funding rate, 
which is a rough median of the funding levels of all the study’s empirical data; after calculating 
resource needs from the AidTasks stock and the FundingLevel and TaskSize parameters, it 
determines if the total resource stocks in the resource utilization flow exceed 30% of the resource 
need using the ResourceOpen and ResourceMaxOut events.  When the system contains more 
than 30% of the needed resources, organizations cease to bring new resources with them, and 
continue to bring in resources until that threshold is met.  This allows the simulation to model 
empirical limits on the resources available for this study’s observed empirical cases. 
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8.3 OPERATIONALIZATION AND VARIATION OF CONCEPTUAL VARIABLES 
As important as it is to clearly lay out the whole of the simulation model, it is only possible to 
assess the relationships between capacity, resilience, and effectiveness when those variables are 
operationalized in the model.  Without that, it is unclear that the model can be effective for the 
study; if the variables are not operationalized, it is not certain that the variables will be present, 
no matter how accurate the model is to the real-world data generating process, the empirical 
cases of post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction missions.  This study developed the model 
with an eye on both the empirical cases and the model’s fidelity to the empirical data as well to 
the study’s conceptual variables.  The model handles each component of each variable 
separately, matching them to how they operate in the conceptual model presented in Chapter 7.  
While the variables have been referenced above, this section explicitly lays out just how each 
variable operates in the model and how the study assesses their variation. 
8.3.1 Effectiveness 
Effectiveness has three components in the factor analysis and serves as this study’s dependent 
variable.  The three components are the completion of aid tasks, connecting the local government 
to resources, and promoting and extending government legitimacy.  Two of the components, the 
completion of aid tasks and the connection of the government to resources are directly identified 
and measured in the model.  The third, government legitimacy, is a less clear and very difficult to 
measure concept.  For this reason, this simulation model does not address government 
legitimacy.  This is an extension of the current model that future research will pursue.  The 
model does address the other two components of effectiveness. 
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The model examines the two clearly measurable components of effectiveness, aid tasks 
and government resources.  As mentioned before, the most clearly identifiable and measureable 
component of effectiveness is the completion of aid tasks.  It is still the case that some tasks lack 
a clear completion point.  It is easy to see when a road is complete or a sewage system rebuilt.  It 
is less obvious when an aid task aimed at rehabilitating social structures after extensive war 
crimes is complete, or when a town is safe for refugees to return, or even when refugee returns 
are complete, since many will chose to remain in their new locations (Bosnia Respondent 7, 
2011; Ogata, 2005).  Nevertheless, each of these cases poses identifiable actions and a 
measurable number of how many tasks must be done and a number of how many are done, even 
if that number is fuzzy.  This is handled in the aid task loop, discussed above.  The mission is 
effective on this component to the extent that it moves aid tasks from the AidTasks stock to the 
CompleteAidTasks stock.  Resource availability is also easily quantifiable by counting the 
amount of money, materiel, and personnel available in the model.  The model operationalizes 
connecting the local government to resources using the resource utilization flow.  The mission is 
effective on this component to the extent that resources reach the local government to allow it to 
have sufficient capacity to govern. 
8.3.2 Capacity 
As has occurred throughout this study, capacity is the easiest conceptual variable to 
operationalize.  However, splitting it into each component and operationalizing each has created 
additional challenges, since knowledge cannot necessarily be operationalized the same way as 
resources can be.  Discussed in several sections above, the study operationalizes resources 
through the processes and dynamics of the resource utilization flow in the system dynamics tier.  
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This flow charts money, manpower, and materiel through the system.  It can be interpreted as 
operationalizing knowledge, since increases in aid task size, which is operationalized in the 
TaskSize parameter, can represent new knowledge requirements from changing situations as well 
as greater money, manpower, and materiel requirements.  The model takes on knowledge more 
directly in the agent-based tier.  The separation of field organizations into Low- and High-
Knowledge states, LowKFieldAid and HighKFieldAid, operationalizes knowledge.  The model 
assumes that high knowledge is required to complete aid tasks, even while organizations in all 
field aid states attempt to complete tasks and so use resources, including Low- and High-
Knowledge and the FieldAid state, where the model differentiates between Low- and High-
Knowledge organizations.  Differences in knowledge then lead to different behaviors; high-
knowledge organizations complete tasks while low-knowledge organizations seek help, in a 
process that will be discussed further in the next section, which is on resilience. 
8.3.3 Resilience 
Where capacity and effectiveness each have at least some system level measures, leading to 
operationalizations in the system dynamics tier, resilience exists only in organizational actions 
and behaviors.  With four components, this concept requires some extensive operationalization 
throughout the model, all of which operate on the agent-based tier.  These four components 
break into three separate approaches that are operationalized separately, since internal and 
external communication and coordination are fundamentally the same activity, determined only 
by the location of organizational borders.  The other two approaches, presence on the ground and 
adaptation require a different approach than communication and coordination. 
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8.3.3.1 Communication and Coordination 
Throughout the agent-based model, organizations send messages to other organizations.  
The rates and patterns are determined by two parameters and the network structure.  Network 
connections in the networks in Chapters 5 and 6 are defined as verified instances of 
communication and coordination, either in the field or in the local coordination centers, such as 
Logbase in Haiti or UNITIC in Bosnia.  In this model, organizations can only pass messages to 
those organizations with which they have a network connection; following the definition of a 
network connection in the empirical cases, these are the only organizations with which they have 
active professional relationships.  The rates at which these messages are sent and the number of 
organizations which receive them are governed by the NetConnections and ContactRate 
parameters.  Greater resilience comes from greater communication and coordination (Comfort, 
Siciliano, and Okada, 2011; Comfort, Wukich et al, 2011; Comfort, McAdoo et al, 2010; 
Comfort, Oh et al, 2010; Comfort, 1999).  The model can increase this coordination and 
communication by increasing the values of both of those parameters, providing an 
operationalization for the internal coordination and external coordination components of 
resilience. 
8.3.3.2 Presence on the Ground 
Chapters 5, 6, and 7 developed three different rationales for why only organizations in the 
field could complete aid tasks.  Chapters 5 and 6 observed this directly during the field visits, 
whose lessons are included in those chapters.  In Chapter 7, the conceptual model built on the 
conclusions of Chapters 5 and 6 provides a conceptual basis for this requirement while also 
providing further empirical evidence for the requirement with the factor analysis results.  
Discussed above, the agent-based model establishes several field aid states from which the 
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system dynamics model draws the rates for aid task completion; only those organizations that are 
operating in the High-Knowledge category for field operations, HighKFieldAid, can complete 
aid tasks, even as all field organizations consume resources in an attempt to complete tasks. 
8.3.3.3 Adaptation 
Adaptation comes from organizations recognizing deficiencies in their practices and 
changing to address them.  The model, as it currently exists, provides space for determining 
changes in efforts to complete aid tasks for the organizations that are able to complete them.  The 
highest level of adaptation comes from error correction (adapt = 5), where organizations 
recognize that they lack the knowledge to complete a task and seek out other organizations 
which have the requisite knowledge.  Organizations in the Low-Knowledge field aid state can 
send messages to other organizations asking for help.  When this reaches an organization in 
OrganizeAid, the organization enters the High-Knowledge state and begins completing tasks.  
This is the very process of error correction; a low-knowledge organization reaches a high-
knowledge organization to find the knowledge and skills that a task requires to be completed.  
Like coordination and communication, error correction can be increased or decreased by 
changing the values of the NetConnections and ContactRate parameters, providing at least a 
partial operationalization of the adaptation component of resilience. 
8.4 MODEL OUTPUTS AND RESULTS 
With the structures, processes, and parameters set, running the model provides interpretable 
results that give further guidance on the relationships between resilience, capacity, and 
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effectiveness.  In this model, both resilience and capacity components undergo certain changes 
that allow for conclusions to be drawn from a single run of the model.  Density analyses in 
Chapters 5 and 6 showed that the number of network connections increased over time, lending 
support for a steadily increasing ContactRate in the model, which provides for measuring steady 
increase in resilience over time.  Funding rates discussed above allowed for placing a cap on 
resources, allowing for an analysis of the impact of capacity.  These are examined in this section. 
8.4.1 Model Outputs and Patterns 
Once the model runs, it produces a set of outputs that allows observation of the simulated 
interactions among the components and analysis of the results.  To attain this output, I 
preprogrammed the simulation to display continuous graphs of the location of organization in the 
agent-based tier and to chart the quantities in all the stocks in the system dynamics tier.  In 
addition, the simulation records the particularly important flow rate for aid tasks moving from 
the stock of incomplete tasks to the stock of complete tasks.  In all the graphs in this chapter, the 
horizontal axis measures time out to 185 weeks over two graphs, covering a little more than three 
and a half years. 
8.4.1.1 Organizations 
The patterns in the model must be identified before any analysis of how the patterns 
compare with the steadily increasing resilience and capacity limits.  These patterns start with the 
progression of organizations through the model.  Figures 8-3 and 8-4 present this progression of 
organizations through the agent-based tier of the model.  Each color in the graph represents the 
organizations in a given state, identified in the key in each figure.  In figures 8-3 and 8-4, the 
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vertical axes are the percentage of organizations in the system.  Three notable processes occur.  
First, the model starts with a ramp up where organizers enter the system at the same time as 
administrative agencies and begin to signal field operators that it is safe to enter.  Second, at 
Week 30 (Model Time 30), the shock for initiating a war triggers and all field operators leave the 
system, as the model requires.  Field operators return upon the termination of the conflict and 
resume their activities.  Third, at approximately Week 102, roughly two years after the start of 
the mission, resources in the mission begin to systemically reach the resource maximum, 
indicating the time frame for donor exhaustion.  At this point, the mission ceases to be able to 
maintain steady and consistent field operations.  In effect, donor exhaustion determines the end 
of the mission; the mission still continues, but at only a very low level. 
 
Figure 8-3. Organizations by State:  Through Week 100 
 
 
Figure 8-4. Organizations by State: Weeks 85 - 185 
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8.4.1.2 Resource Flows 
 
 
Figure 8-5. Resource Utilization Flow:  Through Week 100 
 
 
Figure 8-6. Resource Utilization:  Weeks 85 – 185 
 
Following the movement of organizations, the next key input is resources.  These play the 
dual role of being measures of both mission input and mission effectiveness.  Figures 8-5 and 8-6 
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present the graphs of resource flows in the model.  The vertical axes in these graphs represent 
total resource units available by interpreting each additional step along the ordinal scale of the 
organizational resource capacity component as an additional resource unit.  This interpretation 
provides the basis for measuring resources based on organization size and resource base; the 
study calculates the mean and standard deviation of the distribution of observed values and then 
calculates a random value of resources with that distribution for each entering organization to 
bring into the system.  The numbers for these values were reported above during the initial 
presentation.  The axes in these graphs are the sums of the resources that organizations bring into 
the system and then how much they passed to the local government. 
These graphs demonstrate donor exhaustion even more clearly than do the organization 
state graphs.  At around week 70, or just short of 18 months, the model reaches the conditions for 
the consistent inability to obtain any further steady stream of new resources.  The assembled 
stock of resources is not exhausted until around week 102, when figures 8-3 and 8-4 showed the 
mass exodus of organizations and the stock of aid resources reaches zero in figures 8-5 and 8-6.  
At this point, the flow of resources to the government also decreases in rate, though it does not 
cease. 
8.4.1.3 Aid Task Completion 
With a progression of organizations through the system and a predicted stop time for the 
model, the next question to examine is the patterns in aid task completion.  Figures 8-7 and 8-8 
present the graphs of task completion up through 185 weeks.  In these graphs, the vertical axes 
are the absolute count of aid tasks, where 100 represents 100% of the initially-assessed aid tasks 
with which the mission starts.  In these graphs, task completion displays a very consistent push to 
completion, even after the size of the task increases following the war that causes the sudden 
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spike in the stock of aid tasks and a drop in the stock of completed aid tasks.  This holds up until 
the model reaches resource exhaustion at around two years into the system.  At this point, as 
mentioned above, the mission is unable to maintain sufficient activity to progress, and the aid 
decay process becomes dominant over the aid completion process; from this point on, the 
mission fails to make any further progress and slowly, but steadily loses what progress it did 
make. 
 
Figure 8-7. Aid Task Stocks:  Through Week 100 
 
Figure 8-8. Aid Task Stocks:  Weeks 85 – 185 
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8.4.2 Resilience 
 
Figure 8-9. Focus on Aid Task Completion Flow Rate 
This study’s key relationship is the one between resilience and effectiveness.  Figure 8-9 presents 
a graph on the flow rate of tasks from the incomplete aid task stock to the complete aid task 
stock.  It focuses on the time during which the mission has sufficient operating resources, ending 
at about Week 85, about three months after the donor exhaustion point, but prior to the resource 
exhaustion point at around Week 102.  This does cover the time of the armed conflict shock, 
from Week 30 through Week 35.  During that time period, no tasks are completed.  Through the 
rest of the graph, field operators see a slow and steady, if somewhat inconsistent growth in their 
numbers leading up to the conflict and in the period following the conflict.  The inconsistency 
comes from the noise that organization turnover generates, since no organization lasts in the field 
for longer than three weeks at a time, and some do not return directly to the high-knowledge field 
states, but to either the low-knowledge or the organizers state.  The steady increase the rate of 
task completion is a function of the steadily increasing value for ContactRate, which increases in 
a linear relationship with model time.  Since an increasing contact rate corresponds to an 
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increasing resilience, as explained in Section 8.3.3.1, above, this indicates increase effectiveness, 
at least with regards to aid tasks, for increasing resilience. 
8.4.3 Capacity 
The graphs describing the resource utilization flow above indicates that the mission cannot 
continue to operate at its full capacity forever, and the graphs depicting the progression of 
organizations through the model and the rate of aid task completion show that it does not.  These 
graphs indicate that the mission will come to an effective end when the resources run out.  They 
also show that the mission never completely ends.  Organizations remain involved and a trickle 
of resources continues even after the points of donor and resource exhaustion that produce the 
effective end.  The most immediate indication of this result is that these missions can only expect 
to be effective within the time frame of donor interest and participation.  This may be extended if 
donors are made to understand that a great deal of time is needed to complete these missions.  
More likely will be that the mission passes enough resources to the local government to establish 
the government’s capacity to complete aid tasks and lead development, since only the local 
administrative agencies will have the resources to maintain meaningful operations.  Still, the 
trickle of resources, which also includes a trickle of resources to the local government, indicates 
that international organizations will remain as a resource base and support for the local economy 
so long as they are present.  This matches the observations made during field research in 
Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina.  If the government does not wisely use these resources, then the 
aid agencies will become a critical source of funds, without which the government will be unable 
to function, but it is insufficient to generate sustained efforts at growth and development for 
more than a few years following a conflict. 
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9.0  A NEW UNDERSTANDING OF POST-CONFLICT STABILIZATION AND 
RECONSTRUCTION 
This study builds three separate models of post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction missions 
in an effort to better understand how resilience in the system can lead to a more effective 
mission.  The study begins with modeling these missions as closely to empirical cases of 
stabilization and reconstruction as possible.  These are the framework-guided analyses and 
empirical network analyses of the missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Haiti.  These analyses 
examine how organizations act in their attempts to pursue stabilization and reconstruction.  This 
understanding allows for the expression how those actions build a system with certain processes 
and parameters that describe and define how that system behaves.  This model then provides the 
basis for a network and statistical model that combines the lessons of each empirical case to 
support measures of the concepts and components of resilience, capacity, and effectiveness.  
Finally, the study combines the logically rigorous network model with the empirically-driven 
conceptual model to generate a computer simulation model that can provide understanding of 
past cases of stabilization and reconstruction and guidance for future cases without being so 
bound by the idiosyncratic contexts of each case that its lessons are limited to only one case of 
stabilization and reconstruction.  This model shows how increasing network activity leads to 
increasing effectiveness in completing aid tasks while also showing how donor exhaustion limits 
the length of any mission. 
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9.1 AN EXPANDED MODEL OF STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 
Chapter 7 developed the analyses in Chapters 4, 5, and 6 into a unified conceptual model of post-
conflict stabilization and reconstruction.  This model focused on observed behaviors; it focused 
on how organizations conduct themselves and how those behaviors combine to form of single, 
identifiable, and measurable system.  It only concerned itself with coordination activities 
between organizations to the extent that they were observed.  This took the form of the set of 
organizers in the system that monitor and maintain organization entry into the system and 
coordinate aid requests and, in Haiti, the UN Cluster system.  This model provided the bases for 
the factor analysis that established the independence of each of the components of resilience, 
capacity, and effectiveness, with the single exception of the correlation between agency presence 
in the field and the completion of aid tasks.  This model also provided the structural components 
of the simulation model, for which the factor analysis supplied the measurements and 
mathematical relationships. 
9.1.1 Non-Cooperative Organizations 
These two extensions to the conceptual model provide additional insights that the conceptual 
model was unable to provide.  Research and theory on disaster management and response 
provides guidance on what it means for a response system to be resilient; as discussed in 
Chapters 1, 2, and 3, this literature provided the set of component variables that define and 
measure the resilience conceptual variable.  The conceptual model then provided the framework 
for adapting a definition developed following disasters for the systems that follow conflicts.  
This did not require extensive redevelopment, though, since post-conflict and post-disaster 
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situations are largely similar.  In both cases, effective governance and large portions of 
infrastructure have been destroyed.  If the disaster is large enough it can also rip through social 
structures the way an armed conflict does.  So, while the source of the destruction is different, 
post-disaster and post-conflict situations have many relevant similarities. 
This difference in cause does lead to some important differences in the situation that bear 
further study, and which this study took aim at better understanding.  In post-disaster situations, 
every organization involved has the same goal; all organizations are involved to provide 
humanitarian assistance in one form or another, from social support to physical reconstruction to 
economic rehabilitation, even when the label applied is more often “disaster relief” in US 
domestic responses.  This unity of purpose has provided support for policy recommendations that 
call for maximal information sharing for the largest possible common operating picture 
(Scheinert and Konstantinova, 2011; Comfort, Siciliano, and Okada, 2011; Comfort, Wukich et 
al, 2011; Comfort, McAdoo et al, 2010; Comfort, Oh et al, 2010; Comfort, 1999). 
There is no such unity of purpose in a post-conflict situation.  It is likely that most 
organizations involved will support the primary goals of the stabilization and reconstruction 
mission, to rebuild the physical infrastructure and rehabilitate the economy.  In the cases 
analyzed, only the Bosnia network data found organizations fundamentally opposed to this 
mission, and even then, only a few openly opposed and pursued activities contrary to the 
mission.  What is more likely, and more common in the data, are organizations that will resist 
cooperation or inadvertently undermine the mission through poor planning or poor execution of 
their actions.  In the Haiti network data, all the interactions that undermined overall 
effectiveness, that is all the network interactions that saw a score of ‘1’ on one or more on the 
effectiveness components, received that coding because the transaction produced unintended 
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adverse actions or because an organization took resources with it when it left the system.  This 
matches the unity of mission in a post-disaster situation, which was what the network analysis in 
Haiti observed, even as that response was embedded in a long-standing, unresolved political 
conflict.  This was not the case in the Bosnia network data.  In these data, organizations from 
across the system, including organizations from all the Bosnian nations, and Bosnian state-level 
administrative agencies, sometimes acted to undermine aid tasks and government legitimacy, 
though none ever undermined resource flow.  Interestingly, it was the Bosnian state-level 
agencies that did this the most, followed first by Bosnian Serb organizations, then Bosnian Croat 
organizations, with Bosniak organizations being the least frequent, but, again, all the nations had 
organizations that sometimes undermined the mission.  Only the Bosnian Serbs, though, had 
organizations whose only efforts were to undermine the mission, and then, only a very small 
number of very small organizations did so.  The lack of extensive efforts to undermine these 
missions in the cases observed prevented extensive analysis of the effects of greater 
communication and coordination that matches with greater resilience in a situation with 
implacable adversaries, even as these data confirmed the presence of these non-cooperative 
organizations. 
9.1.2 Re-conceptualizing Field Operations and Coordination 
The computational models, the factor analysis and simulation model, which extended the 
conceptual model, did allow for careful analysis of the development of a stabilization and 
reconstruction mission over time and the patterns and roles of communication and coordination 
in those missions.  Direct observation showed that integration with the system required 
registration upon arrival, though neither OCHA nor Sahana kept complete and up to date records 
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in Haiti.  Nevertheless, the organizations involved required careful collaboration to reach local 
populations.  This was especially true of the organizations in Bosnia, such as OSCE and 
UNHCR, which relied on local implementing partners that could reach local populations (Bosnia 
Respondents 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7, 2011), which were often fearful of outsiders, including other 
nationalities and international agents.  Without these partners, it is likely that these organizations 
could not have completed the work which they have completed. 
The computational models then places this communication and coordination in their 
larger roles and context.  The system requires coordination for field entry as a way of ensuring 
that organizations would know when it was safe to enter and so that the model stuck to the 
empirically-observed official systems.  Organizations attempting tasks that they did not know 
how to handle could appeal for assistance by sending messages to other organizations, with 
which they shared a network connection.  If this was successful, they would receive that aid in 
the form of an organization leaving the organizers’ back room and entering the field.  Greater 
contact rates leads to greater quantities of organizations entering the high-knowledge field aid 
state in the simulation, and so increases the rate at which aid tasks complete.  The model includes 
this as a built-in process as each separate step in the process was observed empirically; the result 
may be relatively easy to predict without a simulation model to demonstrate it, but it is still a key 
piece of the operation of the model. 
9.2 REVIEW OF ANALYSES AND RESULTS 
This study builds its analysis over several steps, with each step leading to and informing the next.  
Each step presents one type of analysis that provides its own conclusions.  Some of the 
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conclusions speak directly to the overarching research questions, presented in their short version 
in Chapter 1, and in their full version in Chapter 3.  Other conclusions from each step only 
provide guidance for the next step.  The conceptual model provides a necessary grounding for 
both of the computational models that followed.  The factor analysis, as the first computational 
model, built measures that were necessary to specify the computer simulation.  The computer 
simulation, in turn, provides access to conclusions that are not subject to the specifics of any one 
case, providing the study with some access to forecasting and providing grounds for external 
validity.  These results are the kind which this study seeks, to provide policy guidance on post-
conflict reconstruction and stabilization missions, which, as Chapter 1 shows, are an increasingly 
common policy tool for international affairs and foreign policy. 
9.2.1 Case Studies and Networks 
For any research to be relevant to actual policy making, it must be based in empirical data.  If it 
is not, then there is no reason to expect that its results will be applicable to actual policy 
problems.  To ensure its relevance, this study builds all of its analysis from the two empirical 
cases of post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction.  The first case that this study examines is 
the mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina that began with the establishment of UNPROFOR in 1992 
and took full form in a post-conflict environment with the establishment of UNMIBH in 1995.  
This case ends with the termination of UNMIBH and its mandate in 2002.  The second case is 
the mission in Haiti that began with the establishment of MINUSTAH in 2004, and suffered an 
enormous shock to its system with the 12 January 2010 Haitian Earthquake.  This study ends this 
case at the end of 2010, though events in Haiti continue on well after the end of the study period.  
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These cases provide the study with that empirical grounding that is necessary not only for policy 
relevance but also its internal validity. 
Examining the cases takes two steps to provide conclusions.  The first step is the 
framework-guided analysis.  This step identifies the classes of actors and how they operate 
within the mission.  This analysis defines the key structures and processes in the empirical cases.  
It identifies the UN Cluster system and OCHA as central defining aspects of the Haitian case 
while identifying the social cleavages of both cases: the nationality divide in Bosnia and the 
divides between rich, poor, and international aid workers in Haiti.  The frameworks also define 
the methods by which organizations establish and execute their aid programs, providing a guide 
to the structure of donor agencies, organizers, and field operators.  The network analysis then 
examines detailed data of organizational interactions that allows for documenting the specific 
patterns of interaction that actually occurred and the gaps between planned and actual 
performance in each mission.  Together, these methods define the initial conditions for each case 
and chart the path from those conditions that each takes.  These analyses provide wide-ranging 
conclusions and implications that form the basis for the structures and processes that the 
conceptual model specifies in Chapter 7. 
9.2.2 Factor Analysis 
The framework-guided analysis and network analysis showed that not only do stabilization and 
reconstruction missions have a structure that develops between the organizations involved, but 
also that the elements of the structure are similar across missions, including classes of actors, 
such as field operators and organizers, aid appeals and self-financed organizations, and changing 
patterns that respond to shocks and organizations reevaluating their efforts in pursuit of aid tasks 
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and increased government stability.  It develops from a combination of conscious and considered 
policy decisions in organizations like OCHA, WFP, UNHCR, and USAID, and it emerges as a 
property of the system as organizations select their own actions and interactions in pursuit of 
their goals.  These consistent elements define the operation of the system and support the 
definition of variables that measure both organizational actions and system-level emergent 
characteristics.  These actions and characteristics include both organizational and system level 
resilience, capacity, and effectiveness. 
Each of these three conceptual variables combines several components, with each having 
a different number as is appropriate for each concept.  Chapter 3 presents the full definition and 
operationalization of each concept and of each component.  Using those definitions, this study 
measures each component in the network data, using each network interaction as the independent 
observations of a factor analysis that seeks out the correlations between each component.  This 
method uses a principal factors analysis to explore those correlations and only finds consistent 
correlation between presence on the ground and aid task completion.  With those correlations, 
this study then constructs an overall performance score.  This score is the sum of the factor 
scores calculated using a principal components analysis and measures the relative performance 
of each interaction to the others in its timeslice, scoring higher those interactions with larger 
measurements across all eleven component variables.  Although the absolute value of the score 
has little meaning, the size and shape of the distributions show greater performance in Haiti than 
in Bosnia, at least during the period immediately following the earthquake, even as reports show 
weak performance of the Haitian response (Comfort, McAdoo et al, 2011; Comfort, Siciliano, 
and Okada, 2011; Scheinert and Konstantinova, 2011).  This provides a potential route for future 
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research to identify a means to measure network performance in response missions that could be 
comparable across cases and events. 
9.2.3 Simulation Analysis 
As interesting as the results of the factor analysis are for this study, and as promising as they 
potentially are for future research and policy analysis, the method has fundamental flaws for 
analyzing stabilization and reconstruction missions.  The frameworks and networks methods for 
analysis were chosen precisely because they are designed to analyze a particular type of system 
whose definition accurately describes stabilization and reconstruction missions.  Described in 
detail in Chapters 1 and 2, complex adaptive systems include unique properties of multiple 
threads and directions of causality, self-aware and learning actors that seek to maximize their 
performance in the system while responding to the actions of other actors, and a pattern of 
emergence that show evolving orders that arise organically and which no one actor does or can 
maintain.  Stabilization and reconstruction missions are a grouping term and concept that 
researchers and policy professionals use to refer to efforts by a set of organizations that are 
seeking to maximize their performance in pursuing the goals of stabilization and reconstruction.  
These organizations self-consciously seek to maximize performance while the system forces 
them to respond to the actions of the other self-consciously adapting organizations in the system.  
Overall effectiveness and resilience emerge as products of the actions of individual 
organizations, only a few of whose missions involve overseeing the whole of the system.  This 
constitutes a complex adaptive system, and so the study of stabilization and reconstruction 
missions requires the use of methods designed for complex adaptive systems. 
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These methods include the frameworks and network analysis methods already discussed 
but reach their maximum extension in computational simulation modeling.  The measures from 
the factor analysis and the structures and processes of the conceptual model combine to form a 
computational model that estimates system outcomes from organizational behavioral rules and 
patterns.  The patterns drive a loop that measures the completion of aid tasks and the flow of 
resources into, through, and out of, the system.  The model shows that donor exhaustion sets a 
time limit on the mission, after which the mission cannot continue at full operational levels, even 
as a trickle of resources allows missions to go on indefinitely.  At the same time, the simulation 
shows that steadily increasing organizational coordination does lead to steadily increasing 
effectiveness, at least in terms of completing aid tasks.  This provides empirical support for 
conceiving these missions as complex adaptive systems, since a model that was designed to 
mirror empirical data in endogenously producing the same outcomes that the empirical systems 
produce endogenously does produce results that match the predictions of complex adaptive 
systems theory.  This is a new approach to understanding stabilization and reconstruction 
missions that explains the variations across missions and across time within missions that has led 
so many post-conflict reconstruction scholars to abdicate in their efforts to find externally valid 
policy conclusions in case study analysis after case study analysis.  This study re-conceptualizes 
these missions to find new policy approaches with externally valid conclusions that can aid 
future missions. 
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9.3 FINAL INTERPRETATIONS 
This study addresses a very complicated study area in studying a complex adaptive system.  The 
frameworks for studying these situations ask a range of questions, all of which must be answered 
to fully understand and model the complex system.  The effort to answer all of these questions 
has played out over three different phases of analysis, including the conceptual frameworks, 
networks, factor analyses, and simulation analysis.  Each step has yielded additional results, 
building to a result that is both internally and externally valid.  Nevertheless, all empirical 
research takes place using data that is less than ideal, since all empirical data is messy and 
epistemologists and methodologists design and test their theories using idealized data.  This 
means that an empirical researcher must make compromises between the data available and the 
methods to have any ability to perform the research.  The result is that all research has limits, 
shortcomings, or blind spots that circumscribe its conclusions.  Even after accounting for these, 
this study maintains important implications, particularly for policy makers contemplating or 
actually engaging in post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction missions and setting the 
groundwork for future research. 
9.3.1 Research Questions 
Chapter 1 presented a range of research questions.  It broke the primary research question on the 
relationship between resilience, capacity, and effectiveness in post-conflict stabilization and 
reconstruction missions into six intermediary questions.  Answering the primary question 
required first answering these intermediary questions.  The analysis was designed to answer 
these questions first and Table 3-5 broke down how this study seeks the answers for each 
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question.  Together, these answers add up to the models and describe the relationship between 
this study’s conceptual variables. 
9.3.1.1 The Actors 
The IAD Framework focuses on two aspects of a system, the actors and the rules.  In an 
international response to any kind of extreme event, whether a conflict or a natural disaster, 
organizations take the leading role.  Analyzing this kind of response then requires identifying the 
organizations and what roles they play.  The framework-guided analysis and the network 
analysis took the lead role in this study in answering the questions.  The network analysis 
identified hundreds of actors in both empirical cases, defining large systems of interacting 
organizations.  In each mission, one or more organizations took leading roles in coordinating 
these missions.  In both cases, this was a humanitarian organization from the UN system; this 
was the UNHCR in Bosnia and the WFP in Haiti.  Neither was the officially planned 
coordinating agency; in Bosnia, under the Dayton Accords, this was to be the OHR, while in 
Haiti, under the UN Cluster System, this was to be OCHA.  The rest of the organizations 
involved took one of three roles, either 1) joining the central coordinating agency as system 
organizers or 2) taking on field missions while 3) local governmental agencies attempt to resume 
administrative activities.  The result is a system with three classes of organizations directly 
involved, organizers, administrative agencies, and field operators, all supported by a rear echelon 
of donor agencies that finance the mission. 
9.3.1.2 The System Rules 
The system operates under a set of both formal and informal rules, which Chapters 5 and 
6 examined directly.  Many parts of the analysis uncovered these rules.  This includes the 
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preliminary analysis to describe and define stabilization and reconstruction missions, analysis of 
the history and literature of the missions that comprised much of the framework-guided analysis 
and the field visits.  These missions take the form of internationally legitimized interventions 
into local conflicts.  This defines roles under international law.  The local government maintains 
local administrative powers while the international organizations pursue aid tasks and the 
administrative roles that peace documents or the initial request from the local government allow.  
The details of these rules are case-specific, as each government structures itself differently and is 
willing to accept greater or lesser roles for international actors.  The consistent pattern is that the 
international organizations will have established a legitimate role under law that has certain 
bounds.  In this way, the formal rules have a restrictive application, as they allow for a large 
range of actions. 
9.3.1.3 Patterns of Interaction 
The informal rules describe a far greater range of action, as they define actual practice 
rather than just the laws that govern action.  The research into the rules identified the social 
cleavages in both cases, identifying the three nations in Bosnia and the three groups of actors in 
Haiti.  It did so by identifying the cleavages in qualitative research, following the guidance of 
previous scholars and studies which this study verifies using the network analysis.  The networks 
further showed interactions followed the patterns described by scale free and small world 
network structures and that network density increases over time during a mission.  At the same 
time, the expert interviews stressed how some of the organizing agencies work by developing 
local partners that they then fund and coordinate.  These patterns appear consistently in the 
networks and interview data; cleavages persist and limit the effectiveness of the mission by 
sequestering information and resources within certain segments of the network. 
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9.3.1.4 Selection of Action 
Organizational knowledge guides the selection of actions.  Organizations each have a 
certain set of skills, whether health, search and rescue, economic development, food, or 
sanitation, and each specializes in pursuing that goal either in the field, administration, or 
coordination.  The vast majority of organizations, more than 80% in both cases, do work that 
matches closely, if not always exactly, with the kind of work they are setup to do. 
9.3.1.5 Selection of Interaction 
Generally, organizations will seek out a niche in the response system that best suits them.  
Once that position is found and entered, the organization will use whatever pattern of interaction 
suits that position.  Organizers will reach out to other organizations to facilitate coordination, 
usually in the guise of large coordinating meetings that occur with the mission’s central location, 
which was Logbase in Haiti and the UNITIC towers and UN country team building in Bosnia.  
Field organizations will move into the field and begin working.  Larger organizations, including 
the teams from large NGO’s and governments, will check in with the organizers while smaller 
and less experienced organizations will go straight the field, either unable to access the 
organizers or not knowing that they should.  This leaves these smaller organizations separated 
from the main network and presents a difficulty for researchers and operators in finding them for 
inclusion in either research like this or for coordination activities, respectively.  When faced with 
a situation that they do not know how to address, organizations will sometimes seek out other 
organizations to cope with the situation.  Other times they will continue to try to   manage the 
situation themselves, with varying degrees of effectiveness.  This tendency produced the pattern 
of error correction activities coded in the network data, analyzed in the factor analysis, and built 
into the simulation.  These actions represent a range of both planned and impromptu interactions 
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that organizations will use to support their operations when they believe they need them and can 
find coordination partners. 
9.3.1.6 Patterns of Variation 
The empirical cases show consistent structures that can be measured in consistent ways, 
even as many of the specific details of the missions are very different across the missions.  Both 
missions see the same system roles and both missions must face some kind of social cleavage.  
Both missions rely on external donors and the United Nations, even as the donors and which UN 
organizations were involved vary.  In this way, both are subject to donor exhaustion while facing 
challenges from organizations that either fail in their efforts so badly as to undermine overall 
progress or organizations that actively seek to undermine the mission.  The balance of these 
tensions versus effective field organization determines the rate at which the mission makes 
overall progress in aid tasks, after controlling for research need and availability.  The existence 
of this balance and its role in the system is consistent across cases, even as that balance changes 
across cases.  These variations do correlate with effectiveness; resilience increases with greater 
coordination and greater coordination correlates with greater effectiveness, all provided that the 
system and the organizations in it have access to sufficient resources to carry out their tasks. 
9.3.2 Study Validity 
All research studies require internal validity for the results to be believable.  Those studies that 
seek to extend their conclusions beyond the restrictive set of case studies that they use to develop 
their results need external validity to argue that their results are generalizable.  As discussed 
above, imperfect data for theoretical methods require the researcher to make certain assumptions.  
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With each of those assumptions, the researcher can lose validity if the assumption is not handled 
well.  Throughout this study, assumptions had to be made, particularly in constructing the 
simulation.  The study finds and states a basis for each decision regarding an assumption, and 
presents them through all the previous chapters, in their appropriate context.  This section 
reviews several key decisions regarding the overall internal and external validity of the study. 
Imperfections in the data created situations that require careful approaches.  Based in 
theory from distributed cognition and by direct observation, no set of situation reports or news 
reports carries all the data necessary to construct networks that are sufficiently complete to 
support meaningful analysis alone.  This requires that multiple data sources be combined to form 
the basis of the networks.  Both cases in this study used a range of data sources, listed with their 
roles, in Tables 3-2, 3-5, 5-3, and 6-3.  Formal reports, including other research studies and 
documents like the consolidated appeals documents, present a range of data, including structures, 
processes, and funding levels.  News and situation reports support networks while expert 
interviews in the field verify and validate the rest of the data.  By triangulating sources, this 
study sought to access as much of the data as exists and to ensure its accuracy. 
Triangulation is useful for addressing the limits in more than just data sources.  No one 
method currently provides full empirical grounding for both internally and externally valid 
results of analysis for complex adaptive systems.  The frameworks provide structures and the 
networks document them, but can only apply those results to the specific cases.  Factor analysis, 
as a statistical method, applies assumptions such as the independence of observations.  In an 
analysis where those observations are network ties and their characteristics, as they are in this 
study, with the component variables designed as the network tie characteristics, this 
independence is not just a potentially invalid assumption, but is fundamentally inappropriate as it 
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is a basic principle of network and complex systems that these ties are not independent.  The 
method can provide some guidance, but its results can easily be over-interpreted and over 
extended.  By limiting the range and application of these results, this study avoids that 
shortcoming, even as the numeric definitions of the component variables provides greater detail 
and measurement to the largely qualitative frameworks and measurement to the networks that 
extends beyond standard network measures.  The factor analysis cannot provide fully internally 
valid results and the networks and frameworks cannot provide externally valid results. 
Both methods can, and in this study do, provide a basis for the simulation analysis.  The 
results are internally valid to the extent that the simulation structures, processes, and parameters 
adhere to the empirically observed structures, processes, and rates.  The results are externally 
valid to the extent that the simulation is able to endogenously produce the variations seen in the 
empirical data by limiting input parameters and maximizing endogenously calculated 
parameters.  As a first construction of such a simulation, this study pursues these two goals.  
Chapter 8 lays out the large number of assumptions and decisions required for constructing the 
simulation, even after the completion of the analyses were used to build the simulation.  A 
simulation is a model, and all models are wrong, as they as simplifications.  Some models are 
useful, but only to the extent that they are reasonably complete and accurate, that their constructs 
closely match their empirical equivalents, and the relationships between those constructs are 
accurately reproduced.  Testing those requirements is the role of the frameworks, networks, and 
factor analyses in building to the simulation.  If the assumptions underlying those analyses are 
valid, then their conclusions are valid while each method’s strengths ameliorate the shortcomings 
of the other methods to ensure that both the quantitative and qualitative bases of the simulation 
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are validated, while the simulation, itself, as a method that operates at a level of abstraction 
above the individual empirical cases provides this study with external validity. 
9.3.2.1 Alternative Hypothesis: Poor Preplanning 
It is not enough for this study to find the evidence that it finds for the relationship 
between resilience and effectiveness.  This conclusions must also be subjected to competing 
hypotheses to ensure that the data and explanation that this study offers is the best available to 
explain the observed behaviors.  Section 3.3.6, Expected Findings, offers two alternative 
hypotheses for the failures of post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction missions:  poor 
planning of mission structures and processes and inappropriate or unachievable goals. 
Both of the alternatives presented in Chapter 3 represent forms of poor preplanning.  The 
‘lessons learned’ literature, discussed in Chapters 1, considers this possibility extensively.  It 
regularly identifies a lack of preplanning as part of why missions failed.  Lack of accurate 
information leads planners to misidentify the tasks that need to be done and the best ways to do 
those tasks (Dobbins et al, 2008, 2004, 2003)  This problem in mission performance is embodied 
in the sixth of the seven bullet points which Dobbins (2004; See Section 1.1.2.2) identifies as 
consistent lessons learned.  This lack of knowledge results in poor selection of tasks and faulty 
beliefs in what ultimate can be achieved.  As an identified deficiency, policy makers have 
already made efforts to address it.  As discussed in Section 1.1.2.2, responders in East Timor 
took great care in preplanning their mission, but it still failed in the long run, establishing the 
policy problem that this study addresses.  Aggressive preplanning worked in the short- medium-
term, lasting for nearly ten years, but broke down eventually.  This indicates that preplanning is 
still not enough to produce missions that are effective in the long-term. 
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Furthermore, organizations are better prepared for their field work than this alternative 
explanation suggests.  The network data from Bosnia and Haiti show that a very high percentage 
of the organizations involved in the response will have a high level of knowledge about how to 
perform the tasks which they are performing in the field.  The networks in this study show that 
organizations self-organize in ways such that they seek out niches for which they are well suited.  
Their history in doing these tasks will give them familiarity with how they work and just what 
goals they can hope to achieve.  What they will likely lack is knowledge about how local culture 
and social cleavages will affect their work and possibly limit goals in the current mission. 
For this reason, this study first measures organizations’ extent of task knowledge and 
then assumes little to no local knowledge.  It then asks how organizations can fix the gaps and 
errors in their knowledge in how it defines resilience; highly resilient organizations will identify 
gaps and errors by applying communication and coordination and then adapt to fix those gaps 
and errors.  In this way, preplanning is not actually an alternative hypothesis, but is, instead, a 
basic assumption of the study’s conceptual model of stabilization and reconstruction; so many 
missions have suffered from this deficiency that this study assumed any new mission will also 
suffer from it, and so sought ways to overcome it so that the benefits of better planning that East 
Timor saw in the short- and medium-term can be retained over the whole of the mission. 
9.3.2.2 Structural Differences between Conflicts and Natural Disasters 
A greater threat to the validity of this study’s conclusions comes from the differences 
between natural disasters and politically-driven conflicts.  This study asserts that these are 
comparable, but they are different phenomena that develop for different reasons, providing 
different histories while complexity theory asserts that those histories are relevant.  The most 
fundamental difference is that some organizations will act as “spoilers,” trying to undermine 
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reconstruction for their own political ends.  This study attempts to address this throughout by 
considering non-cooperative organizations and aid anti-completion processes during the 
simulation.  Being drawn primarily from news reports and situation reports collected after a 
natural disaster, the Haiti network data did not include such “spoiler” organizations.  The Bosnia 
did include, them, but only in small numbers.  Several organizations did regularly take non-
cooperative actions, and are discussed in Chapter 5, but they do not act in outright opposition to 
the international mission.  Only one organization in the data acts as an outright spoiler, seeking 
to undermine the international mission as well as any domestic cooperation with it, and it only 
appears once in the data, and has little to no impact.  This indicates that non-cooperative 
organizations are an important aspect of post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction, but that its 
extent does not make it fundamentally different from natural disasters, which can still have non-
cooperative organizations even as they lack spoilers. 
Further, this study does not rely on the comparability of post-disaster and post-conflict 
response efforts.  Both of this study’s cases, Haiti and Bosnia, examine post-conflict situations.  
Bosnia begins with a war; Haiti begins with an armed insurgency.  The difference comes from 
the situation in Haiti where network data does not become available in sufficient detail to support 
network analysis until after the 12 January 2010 earthquake.  The result is that the Haiti network 
data empirically examine a post-disaster response, embedded in a long-term post-conflict 
stabilization and reconstruction mission.  With this difference present, this study does not draw 
conclusions from direct comparisons of the two networks.  Rather, it uses the two cases 
independently as data sources for the models presented here and giving those models greater 
external validity.  This generates a model of post-extreme event stabilization and reconstruction 
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that is valid over a greater range of stabilization and reconstruction missions, making the study’s 
conclusions applicable to a wider range of empirical events. 
9.3.3 Research Results Implications 
This study provides evidence that there is a relationship between resilience and effectiveness in 
post-conflict reconstruction missions, after controlling for the capacity level.  It applies carefully 
constructed definitions of these three conceptual variables, each measured with a range of 
components variables.  These definitions are detailed and complex for all three concepts as well 
as of their components.  This is necessary since these variables have complex definitions in the 
literatures that support them as well as measuring their complex concepts in complex situations.  
The results indicate that a more resilient system is one that includes greater portions of its 
organizations engaged in field operations, with greater coordination within and between 
organizations both in the field and in coordinating roles, and is a system where organizations 
which lack the knowledge to complete their tasks reach out to other organizations that do have 
the knowledge to complete the tasks. 
These conclusions indicate certain policy decisions.  To increase effectiveness, increase 
resilience.  To increase resilience, facilitate more rapid and more complete communication and 
coordination between organizations.  This will expand information flow and organizations will 
be able to improve their operating picture and therefore be better able to identify changes and 
respond to them by changing or expanding coordinating partners, changing strategies to 
complete a given project or abandoning an outdated or outmoded project in exchange for a newer 
and now more appropriate project.  This is an endeavor that closely resembles military 
intelligence operations.  With their distaste for any effort that resembles military operations, 
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humanitarian organizations have been hesitant to think in these terms or apply their lessons.  On- 
site observations in Haiti revealed that such an effort had been established following the 
earthquake, in the first time that any humanitarian mission included an intelligence gathering 
effort (Haiti Informants 8 and 9, 2010).  Providing organizations with greater means to rapidly 
adjust allows a system to take greater advantage of the self-organizing properties of networks 
and complex systems, particularly when it is done with the knowledge, but without the direction, 
of any central organizing agency.  This emergent property of self-organization is one of the 
greatest strengths of network organization.  Any mission that does not seek to maximize and 
harness this property is undermining its own operations. 
The presence of the intelligence operation in the Haitian response indicates that 
organizations in humanitarian missions have begun to recognize the importance of this effort and 
operate in more flexible ways as befits operations in a complex adaptive system.  That the 
response to the Haitian earthquake still produced only limited results over a long period time 
(Comfort, McAdoo et al, 2011; Comfort, Siciliano, and Okada, 2011; Scheinert and 
Konstantinova, 2011) indicates that more needs to be done in that and future response efforts.  
This study illustrates why this is the case:  post-extreme event responses, including post-disaster 
and post-conflict responses, form complex adaptive systems that require organizations to operate 
in adaptive ways that utilize information flows as a guide for adaptation. 
9.3.4 Future Research 
This study set out to test a theory on the relationships between resilience, capacity, and 
effectiveness in post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction missions.  It is still largely an 
exploratory study.  The nation-building literature currently lacks research based on the premises 
 241 
of complex systems.  This study proposes a new conception of these missions and tests its 
accuracy in describing these missions.  This opens a new research agenda that applies the 
precepts of complex systems to post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction. 
9.3.4.1 Expansion of Cases and Models 
This agenda should start with expanding the methods used here to additional stabilization 
and reconstruction missions, listed in Table 3-1; while there still are not many cases to examine, 
this study examines only two cases, leaving several more available for expansion of data and 
additional hypothesis testing.  Additional methods can also provide additional insights.  
Developments in network analysis have generated further analyses that have not been used here.  
Particularly relevant among these is Exponential Random Graph Modeling (ERGM), with uses 
non-stochastic statistical methods to determine how combinations of node attribute values 
describe the position of network links.  This study attempted a less rigorous method of this 
analysis with the visual inspection of the network graphs in Chapters 5 and 6.  The results of 
visual inspection are less reliable and limited in the number of attributes that can be analyzed at 
one time, since network maps have only node shape, color, and size available for visually 
depicting attributes.  This limits inspection to three attributes, and one must be coded as a 
continuous numeric variable for node size to be meaningful.  ERGM offers a way testing 
relationships that is more rigorous and less limited in the number of attributes that it can 
consider.  This additional data and tool will also allow for additional refinement of the simulation 
that forms the capstone of this study is this study’s best source of externally valid conclusions. 
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9.3.4.2 Timing of Donor Exhaustion 
In the models in Chapters 7 and 8, donor exhaustion ultimately determines the length of 
the mission.  By determining the length of the mission, donor exhaustion also determines the 
ultimately level of effectiveness of the mission.  Resilience can move that level, but the ultimate 
arbiter is when the mission runs out of resources and can no longer complete any further tasks.  
This study did not gather data on how and when donors chose to stop providing funds.  Aid 
professionals working on delivering aid generally believe that aid will continue to flow so long 
as they show progress, an understanding which underlies OCHA’s consolidated appeals process 
(Haiti Informant 7, 2010).  However, those documents show that organizations do not receive all 
the aid for which they ask; this study found caps in those documents that it used to define its 
funding limits in the simulation model.  This very effort, though, implements funding levels as 
an exogenous variable in the model.  Future research will examine how donors make their 
decisions and identify if it is exogenous or endogenous to actual, or perceived, performance of 
the post-extreme event stabilization and reconstruction mission. 
9.3.4.3 Small World Network Subgroups 
The macrostructures analysis in Chapters 5 and 6 give very clear evidence that the 
networks in both Bosnia and Haiti meet the mathematical definition of a small world network.  
This definition is designed to mathematically demonstrate the accuracy of a network concept that 
has both network spanners and cohesive subgroups for describing the structures of an observed 
network.  Network analysis also offers tools to identify the existence and memberships in the 
cohesive subgroups.  If a network is a small world network, then the analysis, known as block 
modeling (Wasserman and Faust, 1994), should be able to identify the cohesive subgroups and 
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their delineation in the network maps.  An inability to do that brings into question the accuracy 
and appropriateness of the formula. 
 
 
Figure 9-1. Newman Groups in Bosnia Static Network Great Component 
 
 
Figure 9-2. Newman Groups in the Haiti Static Network Great Component 
 
 244 
Actually running the block analysis on this study’s empirical networks shows that the 
subgroups are not as readily located as the small world analysis results suggest they should be.  
Figures 9-1 and 9-2 depict this analysis.  They use Newman groups, which find groups by 
applying an algorithm that identifies boundaries between highly cohesive subgroups, and then 
colors the nodes and links in the network according to group membership.  The algorithm also 
determines the number of groups endogenously (Carley, 2011).  The figures show that the 
networks contain a reasonable number of groups for analysis, but that they overlap extensively 
and lack the kinds of clear borders that the definition of a small world network envisions.  This 
refocuses the analysis on the other part of the definition, the nodes that can quickly reach across 
this network.  The groups do show that the network contains these nodes in how interconnected 
the groups are.  Future research will examine the discrepancy between these two results, the very 
high proximity ratios found and reported in Chapters 5 and 6 and the lack of clear group 
delineations found here and will examine the applicability for small world networks in 
describing post-extreme event response systems. 
9.3.4.4 Organizational Knowledge 
Organizational knowledge in these systems includes different classes of knowledge.  This 
study operationalizes knowledge in a way that rests entirely on task-oriented knowledge, where 
higher scores code indicate an organization that is skilled in performing the tasks it is attempting.  
This is important, but it is incomplete.  Organizations must have knowledge about local society 
and administration and about on-going events.  The latter component, knowledge about on-going 
events, overlaps with resilience, and this study examines that component of knowledge as part of 
resilience.  This study, though, does not include any coding for knowledge of local society and 
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administration.  Future research should revisit the operationalization of knowledge to include this 
component. 
9.3.4.5 Aid Delivery Process 
Several aspects of this model include simplifying assumptions that are a result of limited 
data and the logistics that governed how this study was done.  The first expansion available in 
this set is a very important expansion.  Though it aimed to examine non-cooperative 
organizations in the network, this study did not succeed in gathering sufficient data on the 
behavior of these organizations.  Non-cooperative organizations tend to operate as or within dark 
networks, that are hidden from view of the major actors.  Since the data gathered for this study 
primarily comes from official sources, it largely misses these dynamics.  Future research can and 
should dig deeper into this aspect of post-conflict missions. 
Related data can provide another extension.  Resilience is operationalized in this study 
through message sending in the simulation, with adaptation only operationalized by a specific set 
of messages sent by low-knowledge organizations.  This is an accurate but incomplete 
operationalization of adaptation.  Much of adaption, as it is defined and operationalized in 
Chapter 3, includes how organizations change strategies and structures; error correction is only 
one part of adaptation.  Future research will examine more closely the specific processes that 
organizations use to complete aid tasks to examine adaptation in those processes.  Doing so will 
provide additional examination of the relationship between resilience and effectiveness, which is 
the primary focus of this study and represents an option for the best indicator of whether or not a 
mission can and will achieve the goals it sets out to achieve. 
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APPENDIX A:  Interview Protocol 
Dissertation Study, Case Studies 
Graduate School for Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh 
 
 
Protocol for Semi-Structured Expert Interviews 
Case Study:  UN Operations, Bosnia – Herzegovina, starting 1992 
Unit of Analysis:  Organization (System) 
Unit of Observation:  Manager for Response/Reconstruction Operations 
 
I am a doctoral student from the Graduate School for Public and International Affairs at the 
University of Pittsburgh, conducting dissertation research in the response to and recovery from 
armed conflicts.  I am particularly interested in how international response and recovery missions 
organize themselves to respond to ever changing environments and how they adapt their mission 
goals to that environment.  This survey is intended to focus on the systems that developed in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina following the start of the 1992 UNPROFOR expansion and the 1995 
UNMIBH mission. 
 
This questionnaire will not ask for any personal information.  If you are willing to participate, 
you will be asked about the extent to which your organization has interacted with other 
organizations while pursuing its goals in Bosnia and about what factors have influenced those 
interactions. 
 
I request your permission to record the interview for the purpose of making a transcript that will 
serve as the record for analysis.  If you are willing to be recorded, a copy of the transcript will be 
provided to you for your records and approval.  The recording will be destroyed at that time.  If 
you are not willing to be recorded, then only notes will be taken during the interview.  No 
personal information will be connected to these formal records.  These records will not be 
provided to any third party at any time. 
 
Your responses to this survey will greatly help our understanding of how response and recovery 
missions operate and how they achieve what they can and determine what they cannot achieve.  
They will be used for scientific purposes only and kept in strict confidence in accordance with 
professional standards. Any participation is completely voluntary, and you may stop the 
interview at any time. If you have questions, you may contact me at [email omitted]. 
Thank you for your time and for contributing to this project. 
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Steven Scheinert, [email omitted] 
[phone number omitted] 
 
1. What is/was the mission of your organization in Bosnia? 
a. Did it change over time?  If so, how? 
b. What factors contributed to any change in mission? 
2. What are your primary responsibilities in your organization? 
a. When did your organization establish operations in Bosnia? 
b. Has your organization ever ceased or interrupted operations in Bosnia at any 
point?  If so, why and for how long? 
c. When does your organization expect to leave Bosnia? 
d. What are the criteria for leaving (Were they/Did they include “success”)? 
e. To what extent would you rate your organization’s performance as successful?  If 
so, why?  If not, why not? 
3. What are the primary organizations with which you interact and why and how 
frequently? 
a. For the chart in 3b, please use this list for indicating often: 
 
b. Please the chart for the most important organizations that your organization 
interacts with: 
 Organization Why/What tasks How Often 
1.    
2.    
1:  Several times 
per day 
2:  Once daily 3:  Multiple 
times per week 
(less than daily) 
4:  Once per 
week 
5:  2 – 4 times per 
month (less than 
weekly) 
6:  Once monthly 7:  Once every 2 
– 4 months 
8:  Twice per 
year 
9:  Yearly 10:  Less often 
than yearly 
11:  Other (please describe) 
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3.    
4.    
5.    
 
4. With what organizations does your mission not interact? 
a. Does this pattern of interaction vary by time period?  If so, please describe how 
and when those changes happened. 
5. What are the major means of communication used among units within the mission? 
6. What are the major means of communication used between the mission and the wider 
environment in which you are conducting operations? 
7. What are the major factors that have contributed to your capacity to carry out the 
mission? 
8. What have been the major difficulties that your organization has encountered in its 
operations in this/these responses? 
a. What methods did your organization use to identify emerging difficulties? 
b. How effective were your detection methods? 
c. How has your organization met those difficulties? 
d. What have been the most effective strategies? 
e. What have been the least effective strategies? 
9. How many personnel were assigned to: 
a.  Bosnia? 
b. outside of Bosnia? 
10. How many resources were provided? 
a. Money? 
b. Materiel? 
c. Equipment? 
11. What recommendations would you make to improve the process? 
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12. Are there any key aspects to understanding you and your organization’s operations in 
Bosnia?  For examples, consider: 
a. Key factors in understanding why/how things developed the way they did 
b. Military situation/Troop levels 
c. Levels of destruction in the country 
d. Level of functional administrative capacity 
13. Please provide some information on your level of experience: 
a. Years of service: ____ 
b. Age: ____ 
c. Number of UN/aid missions participated in: ____ 
d. Level of education: _____ 
e. Years and type of training: 
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APPENDIX B: Simulation Design Notes 
Simulation V.1/Date: 25Feb2012 
 Basic Structure 
o Agents 
 Unit of Analysis is Org; Orgs set as agents 
 Primary source of system operations 
 State Chart used to place orgs in system 
 Org behavior, and resulting system behavior based on org state 
 Network Structure 
 Small world network structure, since small world proven in 
empirical data 
 Network Connections defined in parameter 
o Based on average degree centrality in empirical data 
o Contact Rate set at 1 per week 
o System Dynamics 
 Location for measuring effectiveness 
 Org behavior drives system behavior 
 System state generates measures of effectiveness 
o Aid tasks still need to be done 
o Resource availability 
 Two key tasks 
 Aid Tasks 
 Government Resources 
 Government Legitimacy 
o Left off for simplification 
o Built from complex web of politics and rule of law 
 too complicated to fit in current simulation 
 will review in future (post-dissertation) work 
o Model allows for up to weekly time counts 
 A count of 1 in model time equals 1 week 
 All rate numbers built from monthly empirical data which was divided by 
4 to calculated a weekly rate 
o Main Variables 
 Resilience 
 Relevant Parameters 
o Contact Rate 
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o Network Connections 
 Higher values represent greater resilience 
 Capacity 
 Resource numbers 
 Org Counts 
 Effectiveness (see System Dynamics bullet above) 
 Agent-Based Modeling 
o System defines number of agents in the system with parameter OrgCount 
o Organizations enter state chart and divided between two groups 
 OrganizeAid 
 Entrance rate based on percent of organizations with 
“Organization” mission categories in the empirical data 
o Haiti:  32.73% 
o Bosnia:  27.54% 
o Model uses Haiti number 
 Haiti study included aid operation start time 
 Bosnia was a mature system 
 rates lower since some have left 
 lower numbers derived in model with 
organization exit over time 
 Exit Rules 
o To Field Aid (see field aid section for explanation) 
o Time out 
 3 weeks 
 Based on field observations in Haiti 
o Resources exhaustion 
 leave operation when resources in System 
Dynamics exhausted 
 prevents further aid action when there are no more 
available resources 
 FieldAid 
 Entrance Rules 
o Entrance based on percent of organizations with “Field” 
missions categories in empirical data 
 Haiti:  34.54% 
 Bosnia:  17.87% 
 Haiti number used again for same reason as it was 
used for OrganizeAid entry rate 
o Entrance from OrganizeAid 
 Message sent from orgs in FieldAid to all network 
connections at ContactRate 
 When message received by org in OrganizeAid, org 
enters FieldAid 
 Exit Rules 
o Time out:  Same rules and basis as time out for 
OrganizeAid 
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o Resource exhaustion:  same rules and explanation as under 
OrganizeAid 
 System Dynamics Modeling 
o Aid Task loop 
 Parameter CrisisSize defines number of aid tasks 
 Completion process takes tasks from stock of undone tasks to stock of 
completed tasks 
 TaskSize parameter records number of resources needed to complete each 
task 
 Flow rules 
 Completion 
o Tasks completed by orgs in FieldAid only 
o Rate is number of orgs in FieldAid divided by TaskSize 
parameter 
o Concept is that each org applies 1 resource unit during each 
time frame while each task takes TaskSize resources to 
complete 
 Anticompletion 
o Models decay in completed work 
o Models organizations actively undermining aid efforts 
o Based on percentage of 1’s in Aid Task Completion 
component in empirical data 
o Currently set at a fixed rate 
o Resource use diagram 
 Model starts with no resources dedicated to aid activities 
 Resources stock 
 Adding resources 
o added to resource stock whenever an org enters either 
OrganizeAid or FieldAid state 
o when enters, org gives an amount determined randomly 
following a normal distribution of mean 3.75 and standard 
deviation of 1.1 
o numbers derived from distribution of component scores in 
empirical data, calculated in Stata 
 Bosnia 
 iknowledge 
o mean: 3.87 
o st. dev:  1.01 
 rknowledge 
o mean: 3.79 
o st. dev: 0.99 
 Haiti 
 iknowledge 
o mean: 3.69 
o st. dev: 1.28 
 rknowledge 
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o mean: 3.81 
o st. dev: 1.12 
 Subtracting resources 
o Whenever an org leaves either OrganizeAid or FieldAid for 
PotentialAidGivers, resources are subtracted 
o Amount is calculated as ¼ of a recalculated normal 
distribution with the same mean and standard deviation as 
used for adding resources 
o Rationale is that resources are consumed, but also include 
personnel, and personnel leave 
 Resource use for aid 
o As aid tasks are done, resources are consumed 
o Resources removed from system as consumed 
o Simplifying assumption:  Flow rate set equal to task 
completion rate; 1 resource unit needed to complete 1 aid 
task 
 Resources to Gov’t 
 FieldAid orgs complete aid tasks; OrganizeAid orgs pass resources 
to the local government 
 From AidResources stock, aid passed to GovtResources stock 
 Rate is product of number of organizations in OrganizeAid, 
ContactRate, and percent of public organizations with a 
jurisdiction of National/State or lower 
 This is since orgs can only pass resources to the government 
agencies they are connected to; formula calculates average number 
of such organizations each org is connected to 
 Percent of local government organizations derived from empirical 
data 
o Bosnia:  21.7% 
o Haiti:  10.5% 
o Set to 15% 
 Can be varied with experiment 
 On-going development/Ideas for model refinement/expansion 
o Incorporation of knowledge 
 High knowledge would lead to an organization being more effective in 
completing tasks 
 Method envisioned involves splitting FieldAid into two sub-states 
 High Knowledge FieldAid 
 Low Knowledge FieldAid 
 Resources will not be added for sub-states, only at main state, which will 
be a through-put state for knowledge-based states 
 Error correction will be done through messaging similar to FieldAid orgs 
requesting aid from OrganizeAid orgs.  ContactRate and 
NetworkConnections will still govern this process, allowing for additional 
vehicle for resilience while maintaining its basis in two key parameters 
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 Current arrangement of transitions in state chart makes adding this 
addition complicated; still assessing how best to do it 
o Opposition organizations 
 Will control AidAntiCompletion flow rate 
 Plans had been to include these in the organization state chart, but 
inclusion of knowledge states may make this too cluttered a chart to be 
pursued at this time.  I’m considering omitting for a fixed rate of 
anticompletion 
 Final plans undecided yet 
o Shock events 
 Model can include events that would provide a sudden shock to resource 
and aid task stocks 
 Examples 
 Earthquake aftershock:  new aid tasks added 
 Donor conference:  new resources added 
 War resumption:  a whole of potential ramifications 
 Interesting, but probably not necessary at this phase 
o Experimental run 
 Run model with varying parameters 
 Which parameters and how varied will allow for conclusions about 
changes in independent conceptual variables (resilience, capacity) 
 I want to finish the model before I examine this step 
 
Simulation V.1.1/Date:  27Feb2012 
 Knowledge States added to Org statechart 
o FieldAid transfers immediately to either LowKFieldAid or HighKFieldAid 
 High Knowledge defined as having a 3 or 4 on capacity knowledge 
component 
 Low Knowledge defined as having a 1 or 2 on capacity knowledge 
component 
 Rate from empirical data 
 Haiti 
o High: 86.2% 
o Low:  13.9% 
 Bosnia 
o High:  82.1% 
o Low:  17.8% 
 Model uses 
o High:  84% 
o Low:  16% 
 Rate can be varied in experimental setting 
o Timeout from FieldAid moved to Knowledge states 
o Resource exhaustion stop condition set into all 4 Aid states 
o TaskCompletion rate set to function of HighKFieldAid and TaskSize 
 Assumed that sufficient knowledge must be necessary to complete task 
 Only those with high knowledge rating have the necessary knowledge 
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o Error Correction 
 Organizations in LowKFieldAid can send a message to OrganizeAid 
requesting support 
 If message received, organization from OrganizeAid enters 
HighKFieldAid 
 Message sent to network connections at a rate of ContactRate * 
HelpResponseRate 
 Govt Resource Loss Rate added 
o No loss in Bosnia data 
o Haiti data had a rate of 3% 
o Set to 3% of stock of GovtResources lost per month (0.0075/wk) 
 Aid task anti-completion rate updated 
o Fixed rate adjusted for size crisis 
o Rate set at 1% of tasks undone per month 
o Rate/wk = 0.0025 * CrisisSize 
 Resource use rate updated 
o Previously was equal to aid task completion, assuming a task used 1 resource 
o Contradicted assumption on TaskSize parameter 
o Restored to original value:  ResourceUse = TaskCompletionFlowRate * TaskSize 
 
Simulation V.2/Date 29Feb2012 
 Exogenous Shock method added 
o Modeling for exogenous shock of a war beginning 
 Effects 
 Sharp rise in aid tasks 
 All field agencies must leave the field 
 90% of orgs in the system leave for duration 
 AidAntiCompletion rate spikes 
 Tasks become more difficult; TaskSize increases by 50% 
 Duration 
 Currently set at timeout = 30 
 Ends at timeout = 35 
 Parameter and auxiliary present for random end time, but having 
trouble w/ this:  randomizer either never produces and end or 
produces an immediate end 
o Other shocks under consideration 
 Political change 
 Natural disaster 
 Increasing prevalence of graft/corruption 
 Field entry adjusted to messaging 
o Message sent from OrganizeAid to PotentialAidGivers proceeds all FieldAid 
entry 
o Entry to FieldAid upon reception of message 
o Message passed over network at ContactRate 
 Message is conditional on SafeToEnter == 1 
 Specific math:  message sent at rate = ContactRate * SafeToEnter 
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Simulation V.2.1/Date 5Apr2012 
 Attempt to adjust field entry:  NetConnections varies with time 
o Reviewed pattern of NrmDegree Centralities for all networks 
o average of averages, ie, periods weighted equally 
 Bosnia:  0.796 
 Bosnia Dynamic Only:  0.980 
 Haiti:  0.415 
 Haiti Dynamic Only:  0.535 
 All:  0.606 
 Dynamic Only:  0.756 
o Internal variable version of NetConnections does not work 
 Cannot make it work as integer 
 SmallWorld and ScaleFree models require integer arguments 
 Instead varying ContactRate over time while varying NetConnections 
between model runs 
 Level of communication/coordination is function of both 
 Adjust field entry:  ContactRate varies with time 
o ContactRate set to base rate plus time factor 
o                   
    (    ( ))
 
 
o time() function returns model time while rint() rounds time to nearest integer 
value 
o division by two slows advance 
o plans 
 review specific formula relative to dynamic network changes 
 verify/validate shape of dynamic ContactRate 
o increase rate over the model support coordination if AidCompletion rate increases 
over time 
 Begin rethinking process of gov’t resource loss 
o Current pattern has spike followed by long, slow fade away 
o Process may be artifact of constant rate of resource allocation attenuated by loss 
rate that is a function of resource stock 
o Consider making loss function of inflow; would model corruption; certain amount 
of inflow lost to corruption 
o Consider making loss function of both resource stocks to also model corruption 
 
Simulation V.3/Date 28Apr2012 
 Programming fixes 
o Timeout for HighKFieldAid corrected; set to 3 
o Resource use rate corrected:  all field orgs use resources, only HighKFieldAid 
orgs complete tasks 
 Adding in AdminOrg state on state chart 
o Entry Condition is that the number of Admin Orgs is less than PublicOrgRate  
o Define parameter PublicOrgRate 
 Rate or organizations in the dataset that are public 
 Empirical: 
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 Bosnia:  21.7% 
 Haiti:  10.5% 
 Model splits difference:  15% 
o Entry consumes 4 resources in GovtResources 
 Rethinking Government Resource Flow 
 Rethinking gov’t resource loss 
o Corruption 
 Organizations control 4 resources, based on Org Capacity components 
 Reset to 3% of organizational resources/month or 0.75% per week 
 Rate is changed to a parameter called CorruptionFactor 
 Set at NAdminOrgs * 4 * CorruptionFactor 
o War Spending 
 All government resources are expended during war 
 Set as WarActive *  GovtResources 
o Total loss is combination of corruption and war spending 
 Overall formula LossRate = Corruption + War Spending 
 Specific formula:  LossRate = (NAdminOrgs * 4 * CorruptionFactor) + 
(WarActive * GovtResources) 
 
Simulation V.4/Date 1May2012 
 Model still is overly deterministic in completing tasks 
 Developing resource maximum 
o Exhaustion of donor resources 
o Events added that monitor development of resource base 
o Funding level 
 Haiti 
 Timeslice 1:  46% 
 Timeslice 2:  64% 
 Bosnia 
 Timeslice 1: ~13.6% 
 Timeslice 2: ~32% 
 Timeslice 3: 51.85% (all of SE Europe) 
o Funding requirement is product of AidTasks stock and TaskSize 
o Max funding is funding requirement times funding level 
o Using above numbers as a guide, funding level is set 30% 
 When funding max exceeded, organizations cease to bring in funds 
 When under funding max, organizations bring resources 
 
Simulation V.4.1/Date 7May2012 
 Reformat RMax calculation method 
o Previous version had max as numerical constant in formula 
o Design changed so that RMax is a parameter:  FundingLevel 
o ResourceMax = FundingLevel * TaskSize * AidTasks 
 New formation integrated into dissertation document 
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APPENDIX C:  Mission Categories in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
Category Frequency 
Percent of 
Dataset 
Administration 26 12.56% 
Administration: Communication 2 0.97% 
Administration: Education 2 0.97% 
Administration: Finance 5 2.42% 
Administration: Foreign Policy 7 3.38% 
Administration: Housing 1 0.48% 
Administration: Intelligence 2 0.97% 
Administration: Law 14 6.76% 
Administration: Local 12 5.80% 
Administration: Military 3 1.45% 
Administration: Planning 1 0.48% 
Administration: Railways 3 1.45% 
Administration: Refugees 4 1.93% 
Administration: Social Security 2 0.97% 
Administration: Trade 2 0.97% 
Advocacy: Human Rights 5 2.42% 
Advocacy: Security 2 0.97% 
Business: Finance 4 1.93% 
Business: Food 2 0.97% 
Business: Fuel/Energy 1 0.48% 
Business: Information Technology 2 0.97% 
Business: Lodging 1 0.48% 
Business: Logistics 3 1.45% 
Business: Telecom 3 1.45% 
Communication: Broadcast 2 0.97% 
Communication: Reporting 2 0.97% 
Field: Business 1 0.48% 
Field: Communication 1 0.48% 
Field: Health 6 2.90% 
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Field: Humanitarian 1 0.48% 
Field: Labor 4 1.93% 
Field: Law 3 1.45% 
Field: Military 12 5.80% 
Field: Military, Law 1 0.48% 
Field: Political 3 1.45% 
Field: Refugees 3 1.45% 
Field: Religion 2 0.97% 
Organization: Cultural 7 3.38% 
Organization: Finance 3 1.45% 
Organization: Health 2 0.97% 
Organization: Humanitarian 8 3.86% 
Organization: Law 3 1.45% 
Organization: Military 2 0.97% 
Organization: Politics 9 4.35% 
Organization: Religion 1 0.48% 
Organization: Security 6 2.90% 
Political Party 16 7.73% 
Total 207 100% 
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APPENDIX D:  Frequency of Organizational Nationalities in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Mission 
Nationality Frequency 
Percent of 
Dataset 
Bosnia 58 28.02% 
Bosniak 9 4.35% 
Bosnian Croat 21 10.14% 
Bosnian Serb 29 14.01% 
Canada 3 1.45% 
Croatia 7 3.38% 
Czech 
Republic 
1 0.48% 
Denmark 2 0.97% 
Germany 4 1.93% 
Greece 1 0.48% 
IGO 28 13.53% 
INGO 10 4.83% 
IPO 1 0.48% 
Italy 1 0.48% 
Japan 1 0.48% 
Macedonia 1 0.48% 
Montenegro 2 0.97% 
NGO 2 0.97% 
Russia 1 0.48% 
Serbia 4 1.93% 
Slovenia 1 0.48% 
Spain 2 0.97% 
Switzerland 2 0.97% 
USA 15 7.25% 
United 
Kingdom 
1 0.48% 
Total 207 100% 
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APPENDIX E:  Mission Categories in Haiti 
Mission Category Frequency 
Percent of 
Dataset 
Administration 58 10.49% 
Administration: Agriculture/Rural Development 1 0.18% 
Administration: Aviation 3 0.54% 
Administration: Children 1 0.18% 
Administration: Culture/Communication 1 0.18% 
Administration: Development 1 0.18% 
Administration: Economy 1 0.18% 
Administration: Education 2 0.36% 
Administration: Finance 1 0.18% 
Administration: Food 1 0.18% 
Administration: Foreign Policy 7 1.27% 
Administration: Geology 1 0.18% 
Administration: Health 15 2.71% 
Administration: Labor 2 0.36% 
Administration: Law 2 0.36% 
Administration: Local 13 2.35% 
Administration: Military 1 0.18% 
Administration: Preparedness 1 0.18% 
Administration: Preparedness/Response 1 0.18% 
Administration: Refugees 1 0.18% 
Administration: Response 5 0.90% 
Administration: Sanitation 3 0.54% 
Administration: Security 6 1.08% 
Administration: Transportation/Communication 1 0.18% 
Administration: Women 1 0.18% 
Advocacy: Children 2 0.36% 
Advocacy: Development 1 0.18% 
Advocacy: Elderly 1 0.18% 
Advocacy: Haiti 3 0.54% 
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Advocacy: Human Rights 1 0.18% 
Advocacy: Meteorology 1 0.18% 
Advocacy: Sanitation 1 0.18% 
Business:  Shipping 1 0.18% 
Business: Agriculture 1 0.18% 
Business: Aviation 2 0.36% 
Business: Banking 3 0.54% 
Business: Chemical 1 0.18% 
Business: Communication 1 0.18% 
Business: Construction 1 0.18% 
Business: Development 1 0.18% 
Business: Education 4 0.72% 
Business: Education/Research 1 0.18% 
Business: Engineering 1 0.18% 
Business: Finance 1 0.18% 
Business: Fuel/Energy 1 0.18% 
Business: Insurance 1 0.18% 
Business: Logistics 4 0.72% 
Business: Shipping 1 0.18% 
Business: Telecommunications 2 0.36% 
Business: Water 4 0.72% 
Business: Water/Sanitation 1 0.18% 
Communication: Broadcast 5 0.90% 
Communication: Health 1 0.18% 
Communication: Technical 3 0.54% 
Field Health 1 0.18% 
Field: Agriculture 2 0.36% 
Field: Aviation 5 0.90% 
Field: Children 7 1.27% 
Field: Communication 1 0.18% 
Field: Cultural 1 0.18% 
Field: Debris Removal 1 0.18% 
Field: Development 20 3.62% 
Field: Disability 1 0.18% 
Field: Education 2 0.36% 
Field: Finance 1 0.18% 
Field: Finance/Women's Rights 1 0.18% 
Field: Fire and Rescue 7 1.27% 
Field: Food 4 0.72% 
Field: Health 72 13.02% 
Field: Health/Damage Assessment 1 0.18% 
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Field: Housing 1 0.18% 
Field: Humanitarian 6 1.08% 
Field: Law 2 0.36% 
Field: Logistics 11 1.99% 
Field: Military 14 2.53% 
Field: Nuclear Power and Weapons 1 0.18% 
Field: Preparedness/Response 1 0.18% 
Field: Refugees 3 0.54% 
Field: Refugees (OPT) 1 0.18% 
Field: Response 6 1.08% 
Field: Sanitation 3 0.54% 
Field: Search and Rescue 5 0.90% 
Field: Security 3 0.54% 
Field: Supply 5 0.90% 
Field: Surveillance 1 0.18% 
Field: Water 1 0.18% 
Organization: Agriculture 1 0.18% 
Organization: Aviation 1 0.18% 
Organization: Charity 1 0.18% 
Organization: Child Security 1 0.18% 
Organization: Children 3 0.54% 
Organization: Communication 4 0.72% 
Organization: Communication/Assessment 1 0.18% 
Organization: Coordination 2 0.36% 
Organization: Damage Assessment 2 0.36% 
Organization: Data 1 0.18% 
Organization: Development 30 5.42% 
Organization: Development (Consulting) 2 0.36% 
Organization: Development (Political) 1 0.18% 
Organization: Development (Technology) 1 0.18% 
Organization: Education 2 0.36% 
Organization: Electricty 1 0.18% 
Organization: Engineering 1 0.18% 
Organization: Environment 2 0.36% 
Organization: Finance 5 0.90% 
Organization: Food 10 1.81% 
Organization: Food/Agriculture 2 0.36% 
Organization: Funding 3 0.54% 
Organization: Health 35 6.33% 
Organization: Health (AIDS) 1 0.18% 
Organization: Human Rights 2 0.36% 
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Organization: Humanitarian 7 1.27% 
Organization: Labor 3 0.54% 
Organization: Law 2 0.36% 
Organization: Local 2 0.36% 
Organization: Logistics 3 0.54% 
Organization: Military 2 0.36% 
Organization: Politics 5 0.90% 
Organization: Preparedness 2 0.36% 
Organization: Preparedness/Response 6 1.08% 
Organization: Reconstruction 1 0.18% 
Organization: Refugees 3 0.54% 
Organization: Religion 1 0.18% 
Organization: Response 10 1.81% 
Organization: Sanitation 4 0.72% 
Organization: Search and Rescue 1 0.18% 
Organization: Security 7 1.27% 
Organization: Shelter 1 0.18% 
Organization: Shelter/Supply 1 0.18% 
Organization: Supply 3 0.54% 
Organization: Women 2 0.36% 
Total 553 100% 
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APPENDIX F:  Organizational Nationalities in Haiti 
Nationality Frequency 
Percent of 
Dataset 
Anguilla 3 0.54% 
Antigua and Barbuda 3 0.54% 
Argentine 1 0.18% 
Australia 2 0.36% 
Austria 2 0.36% 
Bahamas 1 0.18% 
Barbados 6 1.08% 
Belgium 4 0.72% 
Belize 1 0.18% 
Bermuda 1 0.18% 
Bolivia 2 0.36% 
Brazil 4 0.72% 
Canada 12 2.17% 
Chile 1 0.18% 
China 2 0.36% 
Colombia 5 0.90% 
Cuba 3 0.54% 
Czech Republic 1 0.18% 
Denmark 2 0.36% 
Dominica 1 0.18% 
Dominican Republic 20 3.62% 
Estonia 1 0.18% 
Finland 3 0.54% 
France 23 4.16% 
Germany 9 1.63% 
Greece 1 0.18% 
Grenada 2 0.36% 
Guyana 2 0.36% 
Haiti 71 12.84% 
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IGO 119 21.52% 
INGO 25 4.52% 
IPO 7 1.27% 
Iceland 2 0.36% 
Indonesia 2 0.36% 
Ireland 4 0.72% 
Israel 2 0.36% 
Italy 6 1.08% 
Jamaica 7 1.27% 
Japan 2 0.36% 
Kuwait 1 0.18% 
Luxembourg 1 0.18% 
Mexico 3 0.54% 
Netherland 3 0.54% 
Norway 4 0.72% 
Philippines 1 0.18% 
Poland 1 0.18% 
Portugal 1 0.18% 
Russia 2 0.36% 
Slovakia 1 0.18% 
South Africa 1 0.18% 
South Korea 1 0.18% 
Spain 6 1.08% 
St. Kitts and Nevis 2 0.36% 
St. Lucia 2 0.36% 
St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
1 0.18% 
Suriname 3 0.54% 
Sweden 3 0.54% 
Switzerland 7 1.27% 
Taiwan 1 0.18% 
Trinidad and Tobago 1 0.18% 
Turkey 2 0.36% 
Turks and Caicos Island 3 0.54% 
UK 16 2.89% 
USA 118 21.34% 
Vatican 1 0.18% 
Venezuela 1 0.18% 
Virgin Islands 1 0.18% 
Totals 553 100.00% 
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APPENDIX G:  Daily Dynamic Networks for Haiti Timeslice 1 (12 Jan – 1 Feb 2010) 
Key for all following maps: 
Organizational Source of Funding  Organizational Jurisdiction 
Source Color  Jurisdiction Shape 
Public   Local Square 
Private   Subdepartmental Down Triangle 
Non-Profit   National Up Triangle 
   Regional Box 
   International Circle 
 
 
January 12
th
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January 13
th
 
 
January 14
th
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January 15
th
 
 
January 16
th
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January 17
th
 
 
January 18
th
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January 19
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January 20
th
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January 21
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January 22
nd
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January 23
rd
 
 
January 24
th
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January 25
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January 27
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APPENDIX H:  Task Categories in Bosnia Static Network 
Task Category (Network Ties) Frequency. Percent of 
Dataset 
Administration 15 3.50% 
Administration: Business 1 0.23% 
Administration: Communication 6 1.40% 
Administration: Education 1 0.23% 
Administration: Elections 2 0.47% 
Administration: Finance 31 7.23% 
Administration: Foreign Aid 3 0.70% 
Administration: Foreign Policy 29 6.76% 
Administration: Foreign 
Policy/Politics 
1 0.23% 
Administration: Human Rights 2 0.47% 
Administration: Intelligence 2 0.47% 
Administration: Labor 2 0.47% 
Administration: Law 17 3.96% 
Administration: Local 14 3.26% 
Administration: Logistics 5 1.17% 
Administration: Military 7 1.63% 
Administration: Privatization 3 0.70% 
Administration: Railways 5 1.17% 
Administration: Refugees 2 0.47% 
Administration: Security 2 0.47% 
Administration: Trade 2 0.47% 
Business 1 0.23% 
Business: Finance 14 3.26% 
Business: Fuel/Energy 2 0.47% 
Business: Labor 1 0.23% 
Business: Lodging 1 0.23% 
Communication 1 0.23% 
Communication: Reporting 1 0.23% 
Communication: Technical Systems 2 0.47% 
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Field: Communication 2 0.47% 
Field: Environment 1 0.23% 
Field: Health 2 0.47% 
Field: Heavy Logistics 7 1.63% 
Field: Humanitarian 1 0.23% 
Field: Labor 2 0.47% 
Field: Law 22 5.13% 
Field: Law/Security 1 0.23% 
Field: Logistics 1 0.23% 
Field: Military 1 0.23% 
Field: Reconstruction 3 0.70% 
Field: Refugees 16 3.73% 
Field: Religion 1 0.23% 
Field: Security 18 4.20% 
Organization: Administration 2 0.47% 
Organization: Coordination 1 0.23% 
Organization: Cultural 4 0.93% 
Organization: Finance 3 0.70% 
Organization: Foreign Policy 1 0.23% 
Organization: Health 10 2.33% 
Organization: Law 51 11.89% 
Organization: Law/Security 1 0.23% 
Organization: Military 1 0.23% 
Organization: Politics 9 2.10% 
Organization: Reconstruction 1 0.23% 
Organization: Refugees 9 2.10% 
Organization: Security 13 3.03% 
Politics 46 10.72% 
Politics: Ethnicity 10 2.33% 
Politics: Religion 4 0.93% 
Reconstruction: Cultural 8 1.86% 
Reconstruction: Logistics 2 0.47% 
Total 429 100% 
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APPENDIX I:  Task Categories in Haiti Static Network 
Task Category (Network Ties) Frequency Percent of 
Dataset 
Administration 7 0.21% 
Administration: Education 1 0.03% 
Administration: Finance 1 0.03% 
Administration: Foreign Policy 3 0.09% 
Business: Insurance 1 0.03% 
Business: Telecommunication 1 0.03% 
Communication: Broadcast 5 0.15% 
Communication: Reporting 16 0.48% 
Communication: Technical 3 0.09% 
Field: Assessment 341 10.20% 
Field: Aviation 50 1.50% 
Field: Children 19 0.57% 
Field: Communication 4 0.12% 
Field: Coordination 75 2.24% 
Field: Debris Removal 3 0.09% 
Field: Education 3 0.09% 
Field: Food 159 4.75% 
Field: Food/Security 2 0.06% 
Field: Health 190 5.68% 
Field: Health/Assessment 1 0.03% 
Field: Health/Security 2 0.06% 
Field: Law 2 0.06% 
Field: Logistics 43 1.29% 
Field: Preparedness 4 0.12% 
Field: Reconstruction 10 0.30% 
Field: Refugees 25 0.75% 
Field: Relief 18 0.54% 
Field: Response 7 0.21% 
Field: Sanitation 47 1.41% 
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Field: Search and Rescue 49 1.47% 
Field: Security 43 1.29% 
Field: Security/Health 1 0.03% 
Field: Shelter 12 0.36% 
Field: Supply 133 3.98% 
Field: Travel 44 1.32% 
Field: Water 46 1.38% 
Field: Women 1 0.03% 
Organization: Agriculture 7 0.21% 
Organization: Assessment 66 1.97% 
Organization: Aviation 11 0.33% 
Organization: CIMIC 1 0.03% 
Organization: Children 53 1.58% 
Organization: Communication 38 1.14% 
Organization: Coordination 164 4.90% 
Organization: Debris Removal 3 0.09% 
Organization: Development 7 0.21% 
Organization: Education 9 0.27% 
Organization: Food 85 2.54% 
Organization: Funding 113 3.38% 
Organization: Funding/Supply 1 0.03% 
Organization: Gender 3 0.09% 
Organization: Health 343 10.26% 
Organization: Health/Security 1 0.03% 
Organization: Health/Supply 1 0.03% 
Organization: Humanitarian 1 0.03% 
Organization: Logistics 169 5.05% 
Organization: Preparedness 39 1.17% 
Organization: Reconstruction 6 0.18% 
Organization: Refugees 50 1.50% 
Organization: Relief 6 0.18% 
Organization: Response 256 7.66% 
Organization: Response/Health 1 0.03% 
Organization: Risk Assessment 1 0.03% 
Organization: Sanitation 207 6.19% 
Organization: Search and 
Rescue 
15 0.45% 
Organization: Security 35 1.05% 
Organization: Shelter 44 1.32% 
Organization: Supply 195 5.83% 
Organization: Travel 1 0.03% 
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Organization: Water 30 0.90% 
Organization: Women 9 0.27% 
Politics 1 0.03% 
Total 3344 100% 
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